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PREFACE
The Florence School of Banking and Finance at the European University 
Institute’s Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies and the Brevan 
Howard Centre at Imperial College London, in cooperation with 
BAFFI CAREFIN at Bocconi University and with the kind support  of 
the European Investment Bank Institute, organised on 26 April 2018 a 
conference entitled ‘Institutions and the Crisis’.
This event follows the tradition, established in 2011, to gather yearly 
in Florence the leading economists, lawyers, political scientists and 
policy makers to discuss Europe’s economic and financial governance, 
in the light of the most pressing policy priorities, challenges and future 
prospects. In particular, this year’s conference was convened to critically 
analyse, review and debate the most salient elements and gaps of Europe’s 
post-crisis institutional architecture. 
The event was opened by the first panel, which looked back at the 
way the EU Institutions managed the financial crisis and drew analytical 
and practical insights from both a research and public policy perspective. 
Discussions in the panel evaluated the European crisis management, 
going beyond the established view that Europe did ‘too little too late’. The 
panellists reflected on the capacity of EU institutions and instruments to 
manage interdependencies stemming from a common currency.
The second panel discussed the role of the various European courts 
in tackling the recent financial crisis, particularly assessing how they 
discussed, challenged and legitimized the EU’s key crisis response 
mechanisms and decisions. Speakers discussed whether courts are likely 
to be effective enforcement mechanisms for the new fiscal rules and 
assessed how judicial control interfered with crisis decisions by other 
public authorities.
The discussion in the final panel was focused on the Eurozone’s future 
institutional prospects, looking at the crucial reform steps necessary to 
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make the EMU and the euro sustainable and ‘future-proof ’, discussing 
the existence of possible alternatives for ensuring the stability of the 
Euro, as well as addressing the difficult balance between risk-reduction 
and risk-sharing measures that Europe must find in the current populist 
context, to stay on course in EMU reform.
The event follows a 2017 conference entitled ‘The Changing Geography 
of Finance and Regulation in Europe’, a 2016 conference entitled ‘Filling 
the Gaps in Governance: The Case of Europe,’ a 2015 conference entitled 
‘The New Financial Architecture in the Eurozone,’ a 2014 conference 
entitled ‘Bearing the Losses from Bank and Sovereign Default in the 
Eurozone’, a 2013 conference ‘Political, Fiscal and Banking Union in the 
Eurozone,’ a 2012 conference, ‘Governance for the Eurozone: Integration 
or Disintegration, and that of 2011, ‘Life in the Eurozone With or Without 
Sovereign Default.’ 
As with all the previous conferences, the debate after each panel and 
was lively and thoughtful. We prefer not to take a stance here on any of 
the issues but simply provide in this book the contributions by individual 
speakers and let the reader draw his or her own conclusions.
Preface
1KEYNOTE SPEECH  
Euro area reform: reflections  
on an initiative1 
Jean Pisani-Ferry2
The euro is nearly 20 years old: 10 quiet years followed by 10 tumultuous 
ones. The end of the first decade was marked by glowing, oddly uncritical 
reviews.3 Ten years later, however, complacency has largely vanished 
from assessments of the state of the euro area, and disagreements over its 
future remain unsolved. Six years ago already, the heads of the European 
institutions issued a blueprint for the future, the “Four presidents’ 
report” of June 2012 (Van Rompuy et al., 2012), and the heads of state 
and government of the euro area agreed on “breaking the vicious circle 
between banks and sovereigns” by establishing a banking union (Euro-
area leaders, 2012). Much has been done for sure, but the agenda set 
by the leaders has not been completed and the roadmap for the future 
remains a matter for fierce controversy. At their June 2018 summit, 
1 Updated version of remarks prepared for the conference Institutions and the crisis 
held in Florence in April 2018. This paper is also published in Franklin Allen, Elena 
Carletti and Mitu Gulati (eds), Institutions and the Crisis (RSCAS, Florence School 
of Banking and Finance, European University Institute, Florence; Brevan Howard 
Centre at Imperial College, London; Baffi Carefin, Bocconi University, Milan, forth-
coming 2018. 
 I am grateful to Agnès Bénassy-Quéré and Isabel Schnabel for comments on an earli-
er draft and I am especially indebted to Jeromin Zettelmeyer, with whom I extensive-
ly discussed the relevance and implications of the contributions to the Voxeu debate 
platform that we moderated jointly between April and July 2018.     
2 Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa chair at the European University Institute, Florence and 
Mercator Senior Fellow at Bruegel, Brussels. Professor at Sciences Po, Paris and the 
Hertie School of Governance, Berlin. 
3 I must admit that I (modestly) contributed to this literature. 
2despite the prior Franco-German rapprochement and the joint Meseberg 
declaration by President Macron and Chancellor Merkel (French and 
German governments, 2018), the heads of state and government of the 
euro area could only agree to call for further work on a series of still-
divisive issues. 
The nature of disagreements
Why is it so difficult to agree? Why is it so difficult, for countries that 
jointly decided almost thirty years ago to embark on what they knew 
was an extremely ambitious endeavour, to find agreement on directions 
for reform? The architects of the euro were fully aware of the incomplete 
character of the contract written down in the Maastricht treaty. They 
knew, or at least they suspected, that the launch of the European currency 
would mark the start of a journey and that further decisions on economic 
integration, financial policy, the creation of a fiscal capacity and the 
coordination of national policies would be needed down the road. But 
they assumed that participation in the euro would create a momentum 
and help to tackle future issues. It is therefore striking that discussions 
have proved so difficult and that since the crisis erupted in the open in 
2010, so many decisions were only taken on the edge of the precipice. 
There are essentially two possible theories for this enduring state of 
controversy: the “Battle of interests” and the “Battle of ideas”. The first 
posits that problems are fundamentally distributional: decisions are 
controversial because they pit creditors vs. debtors, high-debt vs. low-
debt states, stable vs. crisis-prone countries or global banks vs. local 
banks. The second emphasises cognitive issues. According to this reading, 
a major factor behind disagreements is that actors do not share the same 
representation of reality but rather work with different implicit or explicit 
models of it. 
As with any zero-sum game, divergent interests may be hard to 
reconcile, but they are analytically simple to deal with, because the settling 
of a dispute is regarded by both sides as a purely transactional matter. 
Divergent representations may be less divisive, because the protagonists 
may ultimately all gain from cooperating, but agreement may be harder 
to reach. Worse, because they reason with different models, participants 
may agree on a solution that leaves them actually all worse off.4 As 
4 This is a classic result from the theory of international coordination. See for example 
Frankel and Rockett (1986). 
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3emphasised by Baldwin and Giavazzi (2015) it is essential, to settle on 
lasting and effective responses, to start from an intellectual consensus on 
the causes of the crisis.     
Richard Cooper’s study of XIXth century international cooperation 
in public health provides a telling example of a battle of ideas (Cooper, 
1989). Public health is an interesting case to study because there cannot 
be any doubt that all countries share a common interest in containing 
the propagation of diseases. Distributional dimensions can therefore be 
assumed minimal. It took however no less than five decades and seven 
international conferences to reach an effective international agreement 
on the prevention of cholera, because participants in the negotiation 
adhered to opposite models of disease transmission. The contagionist 
school assumed that it essentially took place through contact and 
advocated long quarantines, whereas the miasmatic school emphasised 
poor sanitary conditions and advocated local sanitation. On several 
occasions, fierce negotiations resulted in compromising on a short 
quarantine. This was an ineffective solution in both models, and for this 
reason it was not implemented. It is only when the intellectual dispute 
was resolved (essentially by acknowledging that the miasmatic school 
was right) that a lasting solution could be found.            
In the euro context, the “Battle of interests” view offers an appropriate 
lens for analysing controversies over legacy issues: debts, NPLs, real 
exchange rate misalignments and imbalances – and in general all 
what the jargon categorises as risk reduction issues. But as analysed by 
Brunnermeier, James and Landau (2016) or Mahfouz and Pisani-Ferry 
(2016), there are other, long-standing controversies over the rules of the 
policy game and the role of policy institutions that cannot be understood 
until their genuinely cognitive dimension is taken into account. 
This type of reading is particularly suited to the analysis of Franco-
German debates. True, official views on banking union are on both sides 
coloured by interests: France is the home base of several of the largest 
European banks, whereas the German banking system is characterised 
by a much lower degree of concentration and the mostly regional reach 
of the vast majority of banking institutions. Discussions on supervision 
and deposit insurance, for example, are therefore best read within the 
framework of the “Battle of interests”, even more so because of the 
closeness between national banking lobbies and national ministries of 
Finance. But other disputes, especially on the resolution of the euro crisis 
and the reforms needed to avoid further crises, cannot be understood 
Euro area reform: Reflections on an initiative - Jean Pisani-Ferry
4within this perspective. Although the two economies have grown 
dissimilar, particularly over the recent decades, it is hard to pin down 
French and German stances over stabilisation, moral hazard or the role 
of discretionary policies as the naked expression of interests.5 France 
and Germany have genuinely different perceptions of risks and their 
propagation.
The 7 + 7 initiative
This difference is one of the reasons why a group of 14 French and 
German economists (hereafter the 7 + 7 Group) joined forces in 
September 2017 to endeavour to forge ambitious proposals for euro-area 
reforms. Their fear, as expressed in an initial op-ed (French and German 
economists, 2017), was that the two countries would settle on a “small 
bargain” that “would not make the euro area more stable”, that “would 
not address the fundamental causes of why fiscal rules have not worked 
well” and that might “induce a false sense of security, hindering needed 
reforms both at the national and European levels”: In other words, a sort 
of short quarantine. Four months later they issued a joint report (French 
and German economists, 2018) that started from the recognition that 
“both the French and the German position have a point” and stated 
that making progress without ending up with a collection of half-
baked compromises required “a shift to reconcile fiscal prudence with 
demand policies and rules with policy discretion”. Claiming that “market 
discipline and risk sharing should be viewed as complementary pillars of 
the euro area financial architecture, rather than as substitutes”, the 7 + 7 
Group put forward a series of proposals for the financial, the fiscal and 
the institutional architecture of the euro area.  
 
5 Michael Burda (2015) claims that German economists do not differ from their 
European colleagues because they rely on a different analytical framework but 
because they stand for a different national interest. His demonstration however fails 
to convince.  
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5Box1: Key proposals of the 7 + 7 report
1. Reform of fiscal rules, including of the enforcement device
• Introduce debt-corrected expenditure rule (acyclical    
 discretionary spending)
• Ditch EU sanctions, assign more individual responsibility to   
 countries
2. More and better risk sharing
• Reduce home bias in bank sovereign portfolios through   
 concentration charges
• Introduce common deposit insurance with national    
 compartments
• Promote “safe asset” based on diversified sovereign debt   
 portfolio (e.g. ESBies)
• Create low-conditionality access to ESM liquidity for pre-  
 qualified countries
• Create unemployment/employment reinsurance fund
3. A targeted role for market discipline
• Enforce the fiscal rule via mandating the issuance of    
subordinated  (junior) bonds for the financing of excess spending
• Make sovereign debt restructuring a credible last resort when   
 debt is clearly unsustainable
4. Clarify role of institutions
• Separate “prosecutor” (watchdog) and “judge” (political)
• Upgrade ESM to IMF-like institution, introduce political   
 accountability
• Strengthen national fiscal councils 
Throughout their joint work, 7 + 7 never actually bargained over different 
interests. Their common aim was to overcome intellectual disagree-
ments stemming from different appreciations of risk or different implicit 
models. As standard among economists, they started from the desirable 
properties of the target regime, rather than from the current situation. 
Legacy issues such as the high public debt ratio of some euro countries 
or the strong home bias exhibited by bank balance sheets were taken on 
board at a later stage, when addressing transition from one equilibrium 
to another.
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6Th e 7 + 7 furthermore shared the conviction that negotiation on the 
basis of national “objectives” and “red lines”, as traditionally practiced, 
was bound to constrain the outcome to inferior solutions. As illustrated 
in Figure 16, they saw for example the discussion over trade-off s between 
German-inspired responsibility and French-inspired solidarity as 
essentially pointless as long as the solution set under discussion remained 
situated inside the effi  ciency frontier. Th ere was in their view room for 
simultaneous improvement on both accounts.  
Figure 1: Trade-oﬀ s vs. eﬃ  ciency: A stylised representation
In the 7 + 7’s view, a reason why such improvement on both 
axes was regarded as possible was a strong, but generally neglected 
complementarity between risk-sharing and fi scal discipline. Far from 
being antagonistic, they thought that both aims could go hand in hand 
for the following reasons: 
• A common deposit insurance protects banks from runs and helps 
to break the ‘doom loop’. Hence, debt restructuring becomes a 
more feasible option;
• A common safe asset helps banks to diversify away from domestic 
sovereign bonds. Hence, it contributes to delinking sovereigns 
6 Th is representation was fi rst proposed by Jakob von Weizsäcker in a comment on the 
7 + 7 report. 
Keynote speech
7from ‘their’ banks and to strengthening market discipline;   
• Precautionary liquidity lines for pre-qualified countries help to 
cushion shocks but also incentivize fiscal responsibility;  
• Temporary stabilizing transfers to cushion severe economic 
disturbances alleviate the burden on national fiscal policies, 
therefore contributing to fiscal sustainability;
• Overall, risk-sharing arrangements make the no bail-out rule 
easier to enforce and therefore more credible. 
The debate about the report
Although it was discussed at various stages with senior officials from 
both sides, and although some of the ideas therein made their way to 
the French-German roadmap issued by the ministers of Finance issued a 
few days before the Meseberg meeting (French and German ministers of 
Finance, 2018), it is fair to say that the gist of the report was not endorsed 
by the French and German authorities. France was circumspect on the 
concentration charges and uncomfortable with the acknowledgement 
that debt restructuring had to feature as a last-resort option, because it 
feared being dragged into accepting some form of automaticity. It was 
sympathetic to deposit insurance but unwilling to spend much political 
capital for it. Germany was politically unhappy with the emphasis on 
a European deposit insurance scheme and had reservations about the 
proposal for a stabilisation fund, whose functioning would involve fiscal 
transfers. Both governments were doubtful of the junior bonds and the 
common safe asset (and they actually closed the door to Sovereign Bond-
Backed Securities – SBBSs – in their joint June 2018 roadmap). And none 
of them was keen on questioning the effectiveness of the Stability and 
Growth Pact in the way the report did. 
The report was however influential in that it helped to structure 
discussions on euro area reform. Presentations have been made at the 
European Parliament, the European Commission, the Economic and 
Financial Committee (EFC), the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), 
the ECB, the IMF as well as to Treasuries and central banks in Belgium, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy and Spain. It was discussed in a series 
of seminars, elicited significant interest in the community of economists 
and triggered a series of discussions within the profession. In April 
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82018, a debate page7 was opened on www.voxeu.org.8 By end-July it had 
attracted 25 contributions.        
The contributions to this debate provide an interesting collection of 
views and are indicative of the discussions triggered by the proposals of 
the 7 + 7 report. The sample is admittedly biased: very few contributions 
emanated from the Northern European conservative school whose 
strong reservations towards the very principle of a new stabilisation 
instrument were forcefully expressed in the paper by eight Finance 
Ministers prepared at the initiative of the Netherlands (Eight-ministers 
position paper, 2018). Although well-represented at national level in 
several countries – and despite invitations to contribute – this school of 
thought largely abstained from entering the European debate on EMU 
reform.  
On the contrary, several of the contributors criticised the report 
for not going far enough, especially on fiscal stabilisation and liquidity 
provision. One, by Peter Bofinger (2018 expressed the view that the 
balance between stabilisation and discipline was so tilted towards the 
latter that implementing the report’s proposals would make the euro area 
worse off. The opinion that in a steady state, it would be “a game-changer 
in the wrong direction” was however not shared by the other contributors. 
In what follows I take up some of the important criticisms or 
comments made and aim at clarifying the corresponding debate. 
Legacy vs. system design 
As already indicated, the 7 + 7 did not emphasise proposals to address 
problems inherited from the past (what economists call legacy problems) 
but rather ideas for a better permanent regime. This does not mean that 
they started from a clean slate and overlooked the legacy issues. Rather, 
the features of the proposed permanent regime and the transition leading 
to it were conceived in a way that was meant to allow countries with high 
public debts or weak banking sectors to take part in it. 
Because of its public finances and recent banking sector troubles, 
Italy is an especially testing case. Bini-Smaghi (2018) and Micossi (2018) 
implicitly or explicitly wonder if the proposed regime would increase its 
vulnerability. Tabellini (2018) goes one step further and argues that it 
would be dangerously destabilising for high-debt countries and the euro 
area as a whole. But the proposed solution has also attacked from the 
7  https://voxeu.org/debates/euro-area-reform 
8  I moderated it jointly with Jeromin Zettelmeyer. 
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9opposite angle: as explained in his contribution (Feld, 2018), Lars Feld, 
who was initially part of the 7 + 7 group, did not endorse the final report 
because he thought it involved the risk of a distributional bias in favour of 
high-debt countries. His reasoning is that lack of fiscal space at national 
level would inevitably lead them to draw disproportionately on common 
fiscal facilities. As his contribution makes clear, he is not convinced that 
the devices introduced to limit this risk – prequalification, co-payment, 
thresholds, etc..) would be sufficient to control it.    
An alternative strategy could have been to start by addressing the 
legacy issues head on through some sort of stock operation (a debt 
work-out and the cleaning up the bank balance sheets) even at the cost 
of accepting some degree of mutualisation. This was the logic behind 
the debt redemption pact of the German Council of Economic Experts 
(2012), co-authored by Lars Feld, Beatrice Weder di Mauro (one of the 7 
+ 7, at that time a member of the GCEE) and others: get rid of the shadow 
of the past, so that the steady state system could remain based on sound 
principles. In this particular case, Feld means restoring the fiscal space 
at national level and upholding the Maastricht assignment that made 
individual member states responsible for stabilisation. Better, in a way, 
pay now than commit to open-ended solidarity.         
An objection to Feld’s approach is that the 7 + 7 proposals did not 
simply, not even primarily intended to find a way around the lack of fiscal 
space. They aimed at addressing systemic weaknesses in the design of the 
Maastricht system that were revealed by the crisis and would persist even 
if all public debt were magically reduced to 60% of GDP and if all bank 
NPLs were suddenly eliminated. 
Another objection is that its political feasibility is questionable. The 
proposal for a debt redemption pact was first formulated seven years ago 
and in policy circles, it was at best considered with polite interest. Even 
in the case of Greece, for which debt unsustainability is manifest, no 
agreement has been found to proceed to a genuine stock operation. To 
put it simply, the states’ revealed preference is to avoid to pay now.
Monetary dimensions
Redenomination risk
The 7 + 7 report has been criticised for not addressing the redenomination 
risk (Bini Smaghi 2018, Cohen-Setton and Vallée 2018, De Grauwe 
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and Ji 2018, Domenech et al. 2018, Watt 2018). It is true that in the 
report, the risk that markets would price an exit from the euro area – as 
opposed to merely the solvency risk – is mentioned only once and that 
the corresponding response, the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions 
(OMT) instrument, is not mentioned at all. But as explained by Farhi and 
Martin (2018), one of the authors’ important aims was in fact to address 
and diminish the redenomination risk. 
Although this aim should have been spelled out more explicitly, there 
is in fact little substantial ambiguity on this point. The report adamantly 
advocated resolving sovereign debt crises through restructuring inside 
the euro area rather than through exit from it. Indeed, the reduction of 
the cost of restructuring it called for would logically diminish the threat of 
exit. Furthermore, proposals to break the “doom loop” for good (through 
concentration charges on bank balance sheets, a common deposit 
insurance and the introduction of a safe asset) would help contain the 
risk of self-fulfilling exit expectations.     
The role of the ECB
A related criticism is that the 7 + 7 report did not discuss the role of the 
ECB and did not mention the Outright Monetary Transactions scheme 
(Cohen-Setton and Vallée 2018, Wolff 2018). Again, this is factually true 
as the report’s focus was on the agenda for intergovernmental Franco-
German discussions, which were (fortunately) not expected to cover 
issues related to the way an independent ECB fulfils its mandate. But 
whereas the 7 + 7 deliberately abstained from discussing central bank 
policy, they worked under the assumption that the ECB would continue 
tackling the risk of self-fulfilling crises, including through activating the 
OMT if necessary (Farhi and Martin 2018). So there is in fact no neglect 
of central bank policy matters.
A number of issues however do deserve further discussion. Cohen-
Setton and Vallée (2018) especially argue that the ECB should be made 
able to backstop the sovereign bond market of a solvent country even in 
the absence of a conditional assistance programme. It is true that the 7 + 
7 acknowledge the possibility for a solvent country to be granted access 
to a liquidity window without being required to change its policy, while 
the official ECB doctrine remains that the OMT can only be activated 
in complement to national reform efforts (Cœuré, 2013). If access to 
ESM liquidity if granted to a prequalified country without ex-post 
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conditionality, this should logically apply to the OMT as well. The point 
relates more broadly to the need for an alternative liquidity support 
scheme advocated in the report.      
Liquidity support
The 7 + 7 report proposed creating at the ESM a liquidity support line for 
pre-qualified countries. The new facility would provide low-cost lending 
to countries with continued market access satisfying pre-set criteria. The 
safety provided by this additional buffer would help to avoid precipitous 
fiscal retrenchment in times of rising risk aversion and it would thereby 
contribute to overall stabilisation.9 However the report did not specify 
the amounts involved and it did not specify how this facility would be 
financed. 
Vihriälä (2018) strongly endorses the need for reforming the current 
regime for liquidity support. He argues that the €500bn ESM capacity 
ceiling could quickly be exhausted, that it is not appropriate to endow the 
ECB with the responsibility of deciding whether or not to provide support 
to sovereigns, and that to condition liquidity support on an adjustment 
programme is likely to delay its activation excessively. However, he finds 
that the 7 + 7 report fails to define how precautionary lending would be 
financed. 
Vihriälä’s solution would be to give to the ESM access to ECB 
funding for the financing of precautionary lending (and not for standard 
conditional assistance, which would continue being financed on the basis 
of the resources provided by the member states), so that it could provide 
liquidity in adequate amount. Technically, the ESM would borrow from 
the ECB, using its capital as collateral. There would be no pre-set size 
limit to overall liquidity support, but eligibility conditions would be 
strict. There should also be a clear separation between the ECB decision 
that market conditions warrant the activation of liquidity support and the 
ESM decision to grant it to a particular sovereign.   
9  A similar proposal features in the Franco-German roadmap of June 2018. 
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Fiscal architecture
Quasi-automatic restructuring 
The 7 + 7 report has been criticised by officials and observers for 
having advocated quasi-automatic sovereign debt restructuring and 
for having taken the risk of corresponding financial trouble lightly. In 
fact, it emphatically rejected both numerical thresholds and procedural 
automaticity (such as the automatic roll-over of standard bonds coming 
to redemption during an ESM programme). As far as debt sustainability 
is concerned, the 7 + 7 report made two proposals: 
• That debt restructuring be considered as a last-resort option for 
insolvent sovereigns. The no bail-out rule – that is, the principle 
that the ESM does not lend to an insolvent state would be upheld 
– but exactly in the way the same principle is implemented by the 
IMF: lending would be decided on the basis of a debt sustainability 
analysis and would be conditional on a high enough probability 
of sustainability;  
• That debt restructuring be made less disruptive financially and 
economically through the introduction of single-limb collective 
action clauses (that would make it possible to let creditors pass 
a single vote on a restructuring proposal, instead of voting 
separately on the treatment of each issuance, which makes it 
possible for hold-outs to retain a blocking minority). 
These two proposals were endorsed in the Franco-German Meseberg 
declaration and can now be regarded as being part of the two countries’ 
policy consensus. Several contributors (De Grauwe and Ji, 2018, 
Tabellini, 2018, and Wolff, 2018) however argue that the very existence of 
a sovereign restructuring procedure may trigger panic. De Grauwe and Ji 
furthermore dispute the possibility of deciding if a government is actually 
insolvent and recall that in the early 2010s, Ireland, Spain and Portugal 
were regarded by some as insolvent, whereas they were in fact suffering 
from liquidity shortage – a point already alluded to by Micossi (2018). 
This is a fundamental debate. The no bail-out rule, one of the core 
principles of the EMU, requires avoiding official lending or indirect central 
bank support to an insolvent state. To renege on this principle because 
insolvency is hard to diagnose in real time would amount to endorsing 
fiscal dominance. In the eyes of the German constitutional court, such 
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an acknowledgment would in turn amount to an infringement to the 
core EMU contract. So there is in fact no choice but to operationalise 
the principle that as a last resort, an insolvent sovereign must undergo 
debt restructuring. When and how it should be enforced is a matter 
of judgement. For this reason, this decision should be bestowed to a 
technically apt and politically legitimate institution. What institution 
it should be, what would guarantee that it decides even-handedly and 
consistently, and what methodology should guide its assessment are 
admittedly matters for further work. But the principle should not be 
regarded as a matter for discussion. Indeed, in his counterfactual account 
of the Greek crisis, Papaconstantinou (2018) points out that the lack of 
an agreed framework for debt restructuring contributed to unhelpful 
gambles for redemption. 
Fiscal rule
Had the 7 + 7 criticism of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) been 
formulated a few years ago, it would certainly have elicited strong 
rebuttal, especially from official circles. The fact that few commentators 
disputed it is indicative of the evolution of the debate. Only Bini-Smaghi 
(2018) regards its negative assessment as unjustified, whereas Beetsma 
and Larch (2018) speak of an “excessively complex system of rules that 
few understand”, and Wieser (2018) bluntly claims that the present rules-
based SGP has become “nearly unmanageable”. Wieser is even harsher 
than the 7 + 7: he argues that the present system has produced short-
termism, fine tuning of the rule book and political loss of legitimacy. 
Beetsma and Larch point out a “surprising convergence of views” 
on how to overhaul the SGP. They regard the essential tenet of the 7 + 
7 proposal – an expenditure rule based on potential GDP growth but 
adjusted to address situations of excessive public debt – as a potentially 
consensual solution that would provide a basis to streamline the current 
system and help to limit the recourse to escape clauses. 
The proposed rule was criticised by some for remaining dependent 
on unobservable variables. It is true that potential output growth is 
not directly observed, so that controversy on the proper assessment of 
it would remain. But an expenditure ceiling based on potential output 
would create much less noise than the current approach based on the 
current and projected output gaps.   
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Two further controversial points in the 7 + 7 proposal are, first, the 
possibility left to governments to depart from the agreed rule provided 
they finance additional expenditures through the issuance of junior 
bonds and, second, the reform of the institutional set-up. 
Junior bonds
In coherence with the view taken on the SGP and the need to make 
governments more responsible for their own mistakes, the 7 + 7 
report advocated the introduction of fixed-duration junior bonds for 
the financing of expenditures over and above the ceiling given by the 
national spending rule. These bonds – and only them – would undergo 
an automatic maturity extension in case of an ESM programme. But as 
they would presumably be issued in small quantity to finance departures 
from the agreed expenditure rule, the bulk of the public debt stock would 
remain unaffected.    
The idea stems from political considerations: at a time when the 
policy consensus of the 1990s has eroded, the EU should avoid being held 
responsible for imposing a fiscal straightjacket that would offer an easy 
target to populist grievances. Rather, governments should be free to make 
their own choices and try to convince markets that their policies might 
actually work. But they would be legally compelled to finance additional 
expenditures or tax cuts through standardised 5-year bonds that would 
be subject to automatic maturity extension in case of ESM programme 
and would be first to suffer a haircut in case of restructuring.
Echoing concerns often heard in official circles, Buti et al. (2018) 
fear that junior bonds, though clearly distinct from standard bonds, 
would provide a conduit for transmitting destabilising market reactions. 
Increased probability of an ESM programme, the reasoning goes, would 
lead to a freeze of the secondary junior bond market that could spill over 
onto the market for standard bonds. Although not subject to maturity 
extension, the latter would suffer from the deteriorating reputation of the 
issuer. Ultimately, the entire bond market could freeze prematurely. 
There is indeed no experience of issuance of such bonds by sovereigns 
and even private-sector experience is limited in this regard. The proposal 
in the 7 + 7 report is that junior bonds would be (i) optional, so that a 
country could commit not to resort to such instruments, (ii) standardised, 
so that they would be clearly distinguishable from regular bonds, and (iii) 
subject to a specific regulatory treatment. These provisions should limit 
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the risk of spill-over onto the regular bond market.  
Other objections are that the market for junior bonds would be thin, 
that financial markets are subject to wide gyrations in their assessments, 
and that it would be hard to establish and enforce a legal obligation to 
finance excessive deficits by junior bonds. These are real concerns, but 
the proposal by Beetsma and Larch to suspend the disbursement of EU 
funds to a country in infringement of the rules would not be easy to 
implement either. Ultimately what must be found is a balance between 
two imperfect institutional arrangements: one that relies on peer pressure 
underpinned by legal obligations and one that relies on market pressure. 
Neither is failure-proof.   
Purple bonds 
A dual sovereign bond market structure is also advocated by Bini-
Smaghi and Marcussen (2018), but in a different way. Drawing on the 
Blue Bonds-Red Bonds proposal of Delpla and Weizsäcker (2010), they 
propose to introduce “purple bonds” that would benefit from a non-
restructuring guarantee under an ESM programme. In a permanent 
regime, to be reached at a 20-years horizon, each sovereign would be 
allowed to issue such bonds up to 60% of its GDP. Additional bonds 
(dubbed red) could be issued, but as they would not benefit from the 
same guarantee, the risk of restructuring would be priced in and as in the 
case of junior bonds, they would serve as a channel for market discipline. 
To avoid destabilisation, Bini-Smaghi and Marcussen envisage 
granting the purple bond status to the entire stock of public debt 
outstanding. Gradually however, new issuances would be guaranteed only 
for an amount corresponding to compliance with the Fiscal Compact. 
The rest, if any, would have to be issued in the form of red bonds. To 
be concrete, a country that starts from a 100% debt-to-GDP ratio would 
need to reduce it by two percentage points per year to bring it to 60% 
within 20 years. The stock of purple debt would therefore be gradually 
reduced over this 20-year transition period. 
The purple bonds proposal would in a way achieve the stock operation 
mentioned earlier. Apart from the fact that objections to the junior bonds 
proposal would also apply to the red bonds, the question is raises is 
whether the ESM can extend a no-restructuring guarantee to all existing 
public debt. This would commit it ex ante to the type of concessionary 
lending currently granted to Greece, to the benefit of any country whose 
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present level of public debt would prove unsustainable. As discussed 
already, political appetite for an ex ante transfer, even a contingent one, 
seems limited.      
Institutional set-up
The 7 + 7 report claimed that the institutional architecture of fiscal 
surveillance should be reformed, first by assigning more fiscal 
responsibility to national fiscal councils and, second, by better separating 
the role of ‘prosecutor’ and ‘judge’. The latter would be done either 
by assigning different tasks to the Commission and the chair of the 
Eurogroup or, if the role of chairing the Eurogroup were assigned to the 
ECFIN Commissioner, by separating functions within the Commission. 
The discussion about these issues is bound to gain in importance as 
there seems to be wide agreement that the role of the ESM should be 
strengthened. It is also easy to be sceptical, as Weiser (2018), about the 
actual degree of independence of national fiscal watchdogs. Further 
debate is likely on how to avoid duplication and rivalry between European 
institutions, and how to ensure that fiscal responsibility is better rooted in 
credible domestic institutions.           
Fiscal stabilisation and fiscal capacity 
The Maastricht policy assignment was remarkably clear and simple: 
reflecting the consensus of the time, monetary policy was regarded a 
strong enough instrument for addressing area-wide shocks whereas, 
provided governments played by the rules, national fiscal policies were 
supposed to enjoy sufficient margins of manoeuvre within the constraints 
of the SGP to tackle country-specific shocks. 
These hypotheses have been seriously questioned by the economic 
developments of the last decade. Contrary to the view of the early 2000s 
(Taylor, 2000), fiscal policy is increasingly regarded as a necessary 
complement to monetary policy, especially in situations when the latter 
is constrained by the zero lower bound (Furman, 2016); and market 
reactions, or the fear of them, can prevent national fiscal policy from 
playing its stabilisation role when a country is hit by a large shock. Hence 
the need to reconsider the role of fiscal policy in EMU.
The 7 + 7 report aimed to provide a response to the second problem 
– how to help individual countries deal with large shocks – by proposing 
a fiscal stabilisation scheme based on the evolution of employment or 
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unemployment indicators. The idea was also endorsed by the IMF 
(Arnold et al., 2018). The proposed system would take the form of a fund, 
financed by national contributions, that would provide one-off transfers 
to countries experiencing a sudden and large change in the employment 
or unemployment rate. Contributions would be set in such a way that it 
would not give rise to one-way recurring transfers. A similar idea was 
outlined in the French-German roadmap, however without transfers. 
In the ministers’ proposal of June 2018, large shocks would merely 
elicit loans. Loans, however, may not provide effective stabilisation in a 
situation where countries fear being cut off from access to liquidity;10 and 
they could furthermore result in lasting disputes between creditors and 
debtors. 
As to the first problem, the report fell short of proposing a euro 
area budget or a central fiscal capacity able to cover aggregate shocks. It 
recognised that aggregate fiscal support might be desirable but argued 
that a euro budget could only be the result of decisions regarding common 
public goods and the institutional underpinnings of their financing. 
Apart from Peter Bofinger, commentators generally regard the 
stabilisation proposals of the 7 + 7 report as positive, though insufficient 
(Dullien 2018, Domenech et al. 2018, Watt 2018, Wolff 2018). Dullien 
for example points out that had the proposed scheme been in operation 
prior to the crisis, Spain would have received in total a transfer 
amounting to 1.3% of its GDP and Ireland less than 1%). Though some 
in Northern Europe would regard this number as high, it is certainly not 
commensurate to the stabilisation provided by the US federal budget. 
Several would have wished the report propose either a proper budget, or 
a central fiscal authority capable of monitoring and steering the aggregate 
fiscal stance. The challenge here, however, is not to demonstrate that 
the euro area would be macroeconomically better off with a significant 
common budget. It is to overcome either one of two major obstacles: 
the fact that coordination is toothless whenever it comes to telling a 
surplus country that it should relax its stance; and the fact that a proper 
budget requires agreeing on the common public goods, revenue, and 
accountability procedures.           
10 Research has evidenced significant multiplier non-linearities in conditions of mar-
ket concerns over a country’s fiscal sustainability.  
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Financial architecture
As far as banking union is concerned, the 7 + 7 report advocated precise 
steps aiming to break the “doom loop” for good. It proposed introducing 
(i) concentration charges so that banks exhibiting (home) bias in the 
composition of their sovereign bonds portfolio would be required to post 
more capital (but no risk-weighting of individual assets, which implies 
that all sovereign bonds would continue to be treated in the same way); 
and (ii) a common deposit insurance scheme that would guarantee 
all bank deposits equally but for which banks would continue paying 
different fees depending not only on bank-specific risk, but also on the 
safety of the national banking systems. 
Concentration charges would make it costly for national banks to 
continue to disproportionately hold bonds issued by their sovereign. For 
this reason, their introduction would primarily affect countries, such 
as Italy, where banks have behaved as the residual buyer of domestic 
government securities. In order to avoid destabilising sovereign bond 
markets, the 7 + 7 report advocated for concentration charges to be 
phased in gradually, possibly after having granted grandfathering to all 
existing holdings. Here especially, the aim was to define the target of the 
long-term regime and to work out the transition very carefully. 
Deposit insurance
As detailed in Schnabel and Véron (2018a, 2018b), the scheme for 
deposit insurance was also designed in order to combine the guarantee 
that all deposits are equally safe – a strong deterrent to bank runs – and 
a financing system avoiding full mutualisation for as long as national 
authorities can influence bank solvency through a variety of policy 
provisions such as company and household bankruptcy procedures. 
The 7 + 7 scheme therefore combined a fully integrated setting with 
differentiated contributions (based on structural indicators of creditor 
rights) and a two-tier waterfall financing structure with national 
compartments and a common compartment that would start to pay 
out once the national compartment has been depleted, and that would 
be reimbursed over time so that the operation of the system would not 
involve any permanent transfer. 
The scheme was essentially criticised for being unnecessarily complex 
and potentially inadequate. Building on simulations, economists at the 
Keynote speech
19
ECB have claimed that a single fee structure could be designed that 
would ensure a high degree of safety and avoid any cross-subsidisation 
(Carmassi et al., 2018). They even claim that reinsurance-type structure 
could have undesirable distributional consequences – but their assumed 
structure differs from that proposed in the 7 + 7 report (because it assumes 
fixed target levels for the national compartments). Schoenmaker (2018) 
also criticises the proposed system on the ground that the replenishment 
of national compartments could be procyclical. So even if an agreement 
could be reached on the principle of a common deposit insurance, its 
design would remain a matter for economic debate.   
Safe asset
The 7 + 7 report proposed common synthetic safe securities be intro-
duced in parallel to the concentration charges so that banks would be 
incentivised to treat them as diversification assets. The safe asset issue 
has been part of the euro discussion at least since Delpla and Weizsäcker 
(2010) formulated their Blue bonds–Red bonds proposal. Over time sev-
eral variants were put forward, discussed, and (generally) discarded but 
as observed by Buti et al. (2018), versions of the idea that involve pooling 
and tranching but no mutualisation have not been fully explored yet. 
The version endorsed in the 7 + 7 report did not involve any 
mutualisation. Instead, it advocated introducing privately issued 
but regulated Sovereign Bond-Backed Securities (SBBSs) based on a 
diversified portfolio of euro-area sovereign bonds. The senior tranche 
of the synthetic asset – what Brunnermeier et al. (2017) called ESBies – 
would constitute a euro-area safe asset. It would be introduced in parallel 
to the phasing-in of bank concentration charges, from which it would be 
exempt, and would therefore constitute an investment vehicle for banks 
aiming at reducing their home bias. The creation of euro-area safe assets 
would therefore neither be left to private-sector initiative (because of the 
creation of a specific regulatory framework) nor be taken charge of by an 
official institution (as in some proposals that envisaged them to be issued 
by the ESM). 
Claeys (2018) rightly observes that despite having been endorsed 
by the European Commission and the European Systemic Risk Board, 
SBBSs remain controversial and that they are especially unpopular with 
debt management agencies. As pointed out by Zettelmeyer and Leandro 
(2018), there are three main reasons for this distrust: first, the fear that 
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the senior tranche would lose safety in a crisis; second, the fear that in 
adverse market conditions, the issuance of synthetic securities could be 
blocked by the lack of buyers for the junior and mezzanine tranches; 
third, the potential spill-overs from the synthetic asset on the demand for 
national bonds and the liquidity of the corresponding markets. 
Simulations by Zettelmeyer and Leandro (2018) suggest that these 
fears are not without rationale – indeed, the SBBS’s junior tranche could 
lose market access and the senior tranche could be hit by extreme tail 
risks – but that they are largely exaggerated. Distrust remains however. 
A demonstration of it was given by the Franco-German roadmap of June 
2018, which discarded SBBSs out of hand.
Other dimensions
Northern bias
As Frieden (2018) points out, any reform programme for the euro 
area must address the concerns of both core and periphery countries. 
Though they intended to help unlock the French-German discussion, 
the 7 + 7 aimed at proposing solutions that would suit all euro area 
members. Several contributors however implicitly regarded their report 
as unbalanced and biased towards the perspective of Northern member 
states. The critique was most explicitly formulated by Tabellini (2018), 
who claims that the 7 + 7 report “reflects the nationality of its authors, 
namely two countries that belong to the core of the Eurozone and are not 
exposed to a considerable risk of a sudden stop on their sovereign debt”. 
He argues that the compromise found by the 7 + 7 is not suitable to a 
country exposed to the risk of a debt run and that its proposals would in 
fact increase the vulnerabilities of countries with high legacy debt.    
Tabellini’s critiques of the knock-on effect of the acceptance of 
sovereign restructuring as a last-resort option and of the junior debt 
instrument echo those formulated by other commentators and officials. 
He furthermore adds that the ESM would not be the right institution to 
carry out a debt sustainability analysis, because it represents the interests 
of the stronger member states, who are also creditors. But he falls short of 
saying how situations of insolvency should be dealt with.  
His more important and original point is however that breaking the 
doom loop is a bad idea in the first place. He claims that through acting 
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as residual buyers of domestic sovereign bonds in situations of stress, 
national banks play a stabilising role that should not be hampered by 
concentration charges or other provisions aiming at the same goal. This 
is in fact a fundamental critique of the direction taken by EMU reforms 
since 2012, when the heads and state and government decided to opt for 
banking union. If domestic banks are to remain the safety valve of the 
sovereign bond market, it is fully rational for the markets’ assessment 
of their solvency to be correlated to that of the sovereign. This in turn 
creates a major conduit for overreaction in times of economic stress 
and elevated risk aversion. If Italy and countries in similar high-debt 
situations reject the very idea of a bank balance sheet diversification, the 
logical implication will be for regulators in financially stronger countries 
to perpetuate or even intensify ring-fencing in order to protect their 
financial systems from the fallout of financial disorder across borders. 
That is exactly what policy architects in the EU have been trying to avoid 
since the crisis erupted in 2010.    
Structural convergence and structural reforms
Finally, some commentators (especially Domenech et al., 2018, Dullien, 
2018, and Wolff, 2018) have criticised the 7 + 7 report for what it does 
not address: boom-bust cycles, macroeconomic imbalances prior to the 
crisis, and the divergence in economic performance that resulted from it. 
The authors of the report are certainly the last to deny that these are 
major issues for the sustainability of the euro area. But concerns about 
them should not prevent serious discussions about the policy system. 
Convergence is important, but by itself it cannot address flaws in the 
rules of the game or inherent vulnerabilities of the policy system. Both 
must be tackled.   
Conclusion 
The authors of the 7 + 7 report were aiming at breaking the deadlock 
in Franco-German discussions and at changing the broader policy 
conversation on euro area reform. It is fair to say that they had limited 
success on the first point. Some of their proposals certainly found their 
way to the Meseberg declaration. Their plea for an ambitious agreement 
that exploits the hidden complementarities between the ‘French’ and 
the ‘German’ agendas was at least heard. But the overall architecture 
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of the official French-German compromise is quite different from the 
one proposed in their report. The logic put forward by the 7 + 7 was 
intellectually coherent but probably not palatable enough politically 
for officials from France and Germany to endorse it and build on it. As 
illustrated by some of the contributions prompted by the report, it also 
elicited several guarded or even negative reactions from other countries, 
especially Italy.    
The 7 + 7 had more success with their second aim. As this survey 
illustrates – and despite uneven willingness to engage in the debate on 
the part of the various schools of thought – the tone of the discussion 
has changed in comparison to what it was a year ago when Emmanuel 
Macron’s ideas started being discussed. Within the group of economists 
who participated in the endeavour, there is not a German position and a 
French position anymore. All the 7 + 7 stand by what they have proposed. 
Nobody can claim anymore that French and German economists behave 
as the prisoners of their respective national crisis narratives. This is not a 
minor achievement. 
Furthermore, the report has served as a reference point for a much-
broadened discussion among policymakers and academics. Through its 
questioning of the relevance of well-established quarrels – such as the 
dispute between the advocates or risk-reduction and the proponents of 
risk-sharing – and because it has put forward new options, it has helped 
to break the status quo bias that is so pervasive in European policy 
discussions and to clarify which ideas command wide consensus and 
which remain a matter for controversy. Some feel that the 7 + 7 proposals 
are insufficient, some that they have gone too far, some that they have 
taken the wrong direction. But such controversies are definitely useful.  
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DINNER SPEECH 
Europe and financial crises in the 
future
Natacha Valla1
At a time when the global environment is surrounded by renewed 
uncertainties, and as initiatives to construct a more robust architecture 
and governance for the European Monetary Union have stalled, it is 
useful to pause and take stock of the progress made to better understand 
“what is really missing” for Europe to become a safer place when the next 
financial crisis bursts.
My remarks will be divided into three parts, starting with a short 
historical benchmarking of the European crisis. Having done so, the 
paper will turn to the prospects of European Monetary Union moving 
forward, arguing that the achievements so far have been substantial for 
a still juvenile currency. Finally, the paper will close with thoughts about 
what it would take to make Europe a safe and resilient environment.
1. Financial crises: five lessons from history and four 
questions for Europe
Taking some distance from the mere facts that describe the economic and 
financial history of Europe over the past decade, let me zoom out and 
select five facts from history, which can be seen as relevant for the Euro-
pean context today. Narrowing down the lessons from history to a mere 
set of “five” is by definition a very subjective exercise. But that selection 
will point to the specific questions we, in Europe, need to ask ourselves at 
1 This text was written when the author was at the European Investment Bank. Current 
contact details: Natacha.valla@ecb.int, Natacha.valla@eui.eu. All views are the author’s 
own and do not engage any institution.
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the current juncture. 
A first fact that economic history has taught us is that sovereign default 
has been a fairly banal phenomenon for a long time. In previous centuries, 
it was not rare for a large number of countries to be in simultaneous 
default. In several occasions, 40% of sovereigns happened to be in default 
– 1840, 1889 and 1940 are examples at hand, which Carmen Reinhart and 
Rogoff describe in their works. Many of the countries that now qualify as 
“advanced economies” – France, Austria and the likes – and benefit from 
a favourable assessment of the state of their public finances by markets 
used to be serial defaulters and have “graduated” from default after a long 
learning process. This pervasiveness of sovereign defaults should help us 
put in perspective the notions of “safe assets”, or “benchmark” for risk free 
debt instruments, about which parties tend to become very passionate 
when it comes to assessing Europe’s financial situation.
A second lesson from history is that we have become better – or faster 
- at handling default. Again relying on the work of Carmen Reinhart, 
looking at the average length of sovereign crises, experience shows that 
over the period 1800 to 1945, there have been over about 120 countries 
in default and it took on average six years to sort the situation out. Over 
1945 – 2006, the number of countries in default rose to close to 170, but 
the average length of a default episode falls to three years. Collectively, 
somehow, we have therefore become faster at handling (more) sovereign 
default.
All good. But there are mitigating factors that should be taken into 
account. A third lesson from history is that while the global economy 
learnt its way through managing default, the structure of financial 
interactions has changed in the meantime. Relative to the already quite 
dense network of financial interactions that developed over centuries, 
capital mobility has intensified substantially over many decades. And 
despite the – now well documented2 – abrupt sudden stop in international 
capital flows that materialised in 2008, the gross international investment 
positions are today very large, as will be commented below. 
Fourth historical observation: the understanding of financial crises 
by the economics profession has improved. Our understanding of the 
mechanisms by which sovereign currency or banking crises unfold 
are now clearer than in the past. But our ability to predict, ex ante, the 
timing of a crisis or its amplitude, remains limited. In their seminal 
work, Schularik and Taylor show that one can go a long way in detecting 
2 See Bussière et al. (2018)
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imbalances by looking at a parsimonious set of simple macroeconomic 
variables such as loan growth, loan to GDP ratios, and house prices. The 
dynamics of those variables turn out to be fairly solid predictors of crises. 
But turning points or bursting times remain to a large extent cryptic to 
forecasters.
Final lesson from history: short term costs of crises have often turned 
out to be very sizable. This explains why successful policy reactions to 
financial crises have been massive, and rightly so. It has not been rare to 
see a hit of 10 to 100% of GDP after a financial event. Likewise, the fiscal 
burden related to bank recapitalization by the public sector can amount 
to 40- 45% of GDP. Public debt levels also tend to surge as a result of 
crisis management measures – by so much as 15 to 80% of GDP. Finally, 
ratios of non-performing loans have at times climbed to up to 60% of 
GDP. Taken altogether, those short-term costs are still in collective minds 
today. 
Those stylised facts raise very specific questions for Europe and its 
position within the international monetary system today:
• On sovereign debt: what do we collectively want to achieve? Do 
we want to reduce the probability of sovereign default episodes 
to occur in the future? Or to improve our ability to handle them 
once they occur? Or a little bit of both?
• On capital mobility: are we ready and willing to be more “hands 
on” when it comes to handle investment flows across borders? Is 
there a consensus view, today, about what would be an efficient 
cross-border allocation of savings within Europe? This question 
is important because it has implications on the way public poli-
cies react to the arithmetic of the balance of payments. For a very 
long time, trades dynamics was seen as the main driver of global 
imbalances, while developments “below the line” of the balance 
of payments, those that have to do with capital flows, were merely 
seen as a mirror image of their “above the line” current account 
counterparts. Today, however, our understanding of the network 
effects of financial flows is continuously improving as more data 
becomes available,3 and policymakers have understood that the 
dynamics of economic integration across countries is as much a 
financial matter as a mere “trade” one. 
• On loan and asset price dynamics: this is a candid question, but if 
the link between the behaviour of bank lending and asset prices, 
3  See for example the work by Battiston or by Heipertz et al.
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and the occurrence of crises is as strong as the literature suggests, 
why does there seem to be a tendency nowadays to look through 
their (too?) strong growth rates in some jurisdictions? Recent 
studies by the OECD or the IMF vindicate this view. 
To sum-up, the short-term cost of crises is very high and might have 
become politically unacceptable; countries may learn their way away 
from sovereign default over time, but this process is secular and cur-
rent outstanding debt levels need to be kept in mind ; and the dynamics 
of those asset prices that happen to be informative about forthcoming 
financial disruptions are, in some places, preoccupying. So should it be 
concluded that everything should be made so as to avoid the next crisis, 
for example via a further, and more granular, tightening of financial reg-
ulation? 
2. Stressing crisis prevention over crisis mitigation
The question as to whether priority should be given to crisis prevention 
over crisis curation is everything but rhetorical for Europe. Yet, the lit-
erature – for example the works of Rancière and Tornell - has shown 
that there might be a trade-off between risky and safe output growth so 
that the answer is not univocal. Comparing the growth of real per capita 
GDP in countries that have consistently displayed different approaches 
with regards to financial liberalisation, they find that countries that let 
their financial systems grow and develop in an unconstrained way fared 
on average better – looking at real GDP - than those that have imposed 
limits to financial and credit developments. India and Thailand are cases 
in point. 
Another argument usually put forward in favour of financial 
liberalisation is that it tends to be accompanied by structural 
improvements in the legal system of a country, a deepening of its 
contractual environment, and in particular an improved enforceability 
of contracts. Seen that way, one may ask whether Europe should consider 
adopting a softer approach when it comes to sovereign debt, asset price 
and loan growth dynamics, and pressures on its banking sector.
Unfortunately there is something special about current historical 
circumstances in Europe that reduce the validity of this argument. First, 
it would very likely rule-out a repeat of the massive policy measures taken 
between 2008 and 2015. Today’s initial conditions are not favourable: 
first, a generalised bail-out would not be politically supported. Second, 
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the “reform return” usually stemming from the policy support proposed 
to crisis-hit countries in exchange for structural reform agendas to their 
economies had probably become quite low. A reform fatigue has spread 
across many countries in Europe. And third, the macroeconomic volatility 
associated with financial disruptions is detrimental to many, in particular 
as our democracies had failed to reassure their citizens that they would 
share the benefits of stronger but riskier growth and be protected by 
appropriate safety nets if needs be. So overall, the structural “returns to” 
financial crises are likely to be currently very thin. In fact their potential 
political implications are currently unambiguously dissuasive. 
3. A stocktaking of progress, and a wishlist for, EMU 
Let me turn to what could be a wishlist for the European Monetary Union 
moving forward. It has become a sad leitmotiv to restate the need for 
more economic policy coordination as long as economic convergence 
among EMU member states remains insufficient and given the absence 
of fiscal transfers that would prevail if EMU was also a political union. 
But achievements should not be understated. Europe has just about 
recovered from the most severe financial and economic crisis over the 
past hundred years. Democracies still prevail, even if they are subject to 
preoccupying populistic movements. The euro is turning twenty: this is 
certainly a milestone worth celebrating. But in the scale of time needed 
to establish a new currency, twenty years are in fact very short: this calls 
for patience and clemency.  
Banking Union and Capital Markets Union
Within a few years, European countries came up with very ambitious 
plans: they established a fairly advanced Banking Union, laid the ground 
for the Capital Markets Union, and the European Central Bank adapted 
its monetary policy framework and stance to very extreme economic and 
financial circumstances. 
As always when progress is made, it can be done better, or faster. The 
Banking Union still lacks a solid backstop for its Single Resolution Fund. 
On this front, advances in the spring of 2018 have been encouraging. It 
also lacks an insurance scheme for retail deposits that would bar bank 
runs for good. On that front, political hurdles are higher. But does this 
mean that the current context is worse than before? A last, topical example 
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relates to debt sustainability issues and the role of debt sustainability 
analysis in the European debate about risk sharing and risk reduction. It 
would be helpful to focus more on criteria rather than processes in that 
debate.
Regarding the Capital Markets Union, policymakers might have 
understood that its purpose lies way beyond technical and institutional 
set-ups: its stakes are in fact very deep and far reaching. By focusing 
on the fundamental aims of financial deepening, on the development 
of deep and liquid markets and on the prevalence of smooth and 
continuous supply and demand for asset classes that are indispensable 
for long term investors to allocate savings efficiently across geographies 
and intertemporally (this is the case for safe assets, green assets, and 
the financial instruments needed to securitise nonmarketable assets in 
general), CMU caters for the promotion of the euro as an international 
currency. 
Achieving a capital markets union in Europe would lay down the 
necessary conditions for the euro to become and remain a leading 
international currency. The trajectory of the US dollar at the time it 
became a dominant currency globally offers interesting parallels. In their 
work, Eichengreen and Flandreau have looked at the development of 
the US dollar in the 1920s. Back then, the US currency followed a path 
very similar to the CMU agenda today, including initiatives to deepen 
markets, strengthen institutions and integrate infrastructure.
The European financial structure
Another dimension of integration very specific to Europe is the evolution 
of its financial structure. Very often, the differences between the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of financial ecosystems based predominantly 
on bank or on markets have been underlined. The mutation and expan-
sion, even if mild and uneven, of market finance in Europe is a fact. The 
jury is still out, but there is evidence that the diversification of financing 
channels can become a factor of resilience in an environment where 
banks would become smaller but healthier. 
Another manifestation of this structural shift in financial structures 
in Europe, and between Europe and the rest of the world, is the new 
anatomy of international capital flows. With the “sudden stop” in 2008, 
banks from Western Europe virtually disappeared from the map of cross-
border investment flows, as suggested in the recent work of Bussière et al. 
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Non-bank financial institutions do matter more than before in the way 
Europe is financially intergrated with the rest of the world. Insurance 
companies, pension funds have gained space. They account for increasing 
shares of gross international investment positions, thereby being 
also more exposed to valuation effects. At the global level, investment 
volumes affected by those institutions are still relatively small, but make 
up for about 10% of total global financial investment. Another category 
of financial intermediaries, so called “other financial intermediaries”, 
grow the fastest and currently represent investments of around USD100 
trillion.
Where does this evolution leave Europe on the international financial 
scene? It certainly creates new potential risks that need to be monitored. 
Such entities do engage in maturity and liquidity transformation. Their 
leverage is sometimes significant. At the same time, a lot will depend 
on whether non-banks behave in a way that can compensate, and not 
amplify, the cyclical behaviour of bank funding and bank risk taking. 
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OFFICIAL LENDING IN THE EURO 
AREA: A LOOK BACK1
Aitor Erce
Introduction
Until it was dragged into the resolution of the euro area sovereign debt 
crisis, the International Monetary Fund targeted solvent but illiquid 
sovereigns facing temporary international liquidity shortages. The Fund 
did this through three- to ten-year loans provided against a pre-agreed 
path of policy adjustment focused on fiscal, monetary and exchange rate 
measures.2
This lending approach, in place when Greece requested support in 
2010, was the result of a process of adaptation driven by various waves of 
crises after trade and financial liberalization. As described in Schandler 
(2013), during the 1990s the IMF started to face crises characterized 
by sudden swings in capital flows. As a result, larger and more front-
loaded loans were needed to stave off the crises than during earlier trade-
related crises. This led the IMF to develop the exceptional access policy 
(EAP) and various front-loaded and precautionary instruments. As the 
EAP increased the Fund’s risk exposure, more stringent conditions on 
1 This chapter heavily draws on joint work with Giancarlo Corsetti and Timothy Uy. 
I thank Jose Bustamante, Gong Cheng, Antonio Fernandes, Mitu Gulati, Efstathios 
Sofos, Rolf Strauch, Vilem Valenta, Mark Walker and seminar participants at 2018 
Banca d’Italia Fiscal Workshop and “Institutions and the Crisis” Conference (Euro-
pean University Institute) for useful comments. These are the author’s views and not 
those of The European Stability Mechanism.
2 The work-horse IMF instruments for crisis resolution are the Stand-By Arrangement 
(SBA), and the Extended Fund Facility (EFF). The SBA aims to help countries ad-
dressing short-term balance of payments problems, while the EFF aims to help over-
come longer-term problems. EFF implies up to four years of programme engagement 
(instead of three under the SBA) and long maturities (up to ten years compared to 
five years under the SBA).
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the country’s ability to repay were put in place (IMF, 2016a). Only if the 
IMF’s debt sustainability analysis (DSA) showed that debt was sustainable 
with high probability could a country access the EAP. Otherwise, a debt 
restructuring was required. The Fund’s involvement in the euro area -a 
monetary union of heavily financialized and interlinked economies, 
some of which had accumulated large imbalances- put this approach to 
the test. In the face of contagion fears if official support was not provided 
to Greece the Fund annexed a new clause (systemic exemption) to its 
exceptional access policy. While previously only countries passing the 
IMF’s DSA could access it, with the new exemption the IMF could lend 
to sovereigns whose solvency was uncertain if their default could have 
systemic effects (IMF, 2016a).
In parallel, the euro area authorities took an incremental approach 
to fighting the crisis leading to the development of a permanent crisis 
resolution mechanism (Corsetti et al., 2017). The fact that different 
assistance vehicles were used in Cyprus, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and 
Greece shows the extent to which the approach evolved. While initial 
euro area official loans followed the IMF blueprint as the crises deepened 
lending vehicles and their terms were adjusted. As summarised in Table 
1, this adjustment to the terms of support led to a significant departure 
from IMF standards.
This chapter describes the development of the euro area crisis 
resolution framework and uses its divergence from the IMF approach 
to gain insight into the effect of official loans on market access and debt 
sustainability. Armed with those insights the chapter discusses issues 
relevant for the design and implementation of sovereign bailouts. 
The Development of the Euro Area Sovereign Safety Net
While there was prior experience of International Monetary Fund-
European Union cooperation in funding sovereign bailouts through the 
medium-term financial assistance (Hungary, Latvia and Romania) such 
a route was not available for euro area countries.3 Thus, when the Greek 
government first approached its euro area partners arguing about its 
difficult position the reaction was to impose on Greece a significant fiscal 
adjustment.
As this failed and the situation spun out of control, in March 2010, 
3 Article 143 excluded euro area members from this facility and Article 125 prevented 
cross-country fiscal support (no- bail-out clause).
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euro area governments agreed to provide, together with the IMF, a 
financial assistance program composed of IMF credit and bilateral loans 
by euro area countries (Greek Loan Facility, GLF) for a total of 110 billion 
euros.4 The GLF, which contributed with 80 billion euros, included the 
following conditions. The maturity of the loan was 5 years with a 3-year 
grace period. The pricing of the loan followed IMF practice. For the first 3 
years, the interest rate was set at 6-month euribor with a 300 basis points 
(bps) surcharge (100 bps above IMF surcharges). Thereafter, the cost 
increased by 100 bps. According to Pisani-Ferry et al. (2013), the higher 
interest rates (even if below market rates) were aimed at limiting moral 
hazard. From its side, the IMF contributed with a 30 billion euro Stand-
by-Agreement, with a five-year maturity and the standard (at the time) 
200 bps for credit 300% above the quota plus additional 100 bps for credit 
outstanding after 3 years.
Given the availability of resources at the European level, why was 
the participation of the IMF necessary? Pisani-Ferry et al. (2013) argues 
that recourse to the Fund was needed given the lack of expertise at the 
EU level. According to Jost and Seitz (2012) another motivation was the 
lack of confidence of some governments on the capacity of the European 
Commission (EC) to deal with the crisis without bending to political 
pressures. Taking part in the Greek program did not come free of charge 
for the IMF. In order for the Fund to provide the amount of resources 
requested by Greece it needed to resort to the exceptional access policy. 
But that required that Greek public debt was sustainable with a high 
probability. As discussed in IMF (2014), this was not the case. According 
to Schadler (2013), in the face of political pressures and the need to act 
swiftly to avoid an even bigger meltdown the IMF created an exemption 
(systemic exemption) allowing access to the EAP, even if debt was not 
sustainable with high likelihood, if the default could have systemic 
implications.
Unfortunately, despite the signing of the Greek program, Ireland and 
Portugal started to suffer market pressures. Faced with the need to provide 
additional official support the authorities reacted by creating jointly 
managed institutions. In May 2010, the European Financial Stability 
Mechanism (EFSM) and the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
were created. The EFSM was designed as an emergency funding program 
4 The disbursement of the bilateral loans was decided by unanimity and subject to 
strict conditionality assessed by the European Commission and the European Cen-
tral Bank, together with the IMF and the corresponding country authorities.
40
reliant upon funds raised on the financial markets by the European 
Commission using the budget of the European Union as collateral.5 In 
turn, the EFSF was created as a temporary rescue mechanism for euro 
area countries.6 The creation of these institutions changed the program’s 
funding structure from direct bilateral loans to public guarantees on 
market financing. Beyond this difference, the Greek template was the one 
to be applied in EFSM/EFSF programs. 
In December 2010, overburdened by the housing bubble burst and 
subsequent bailout of its banking system, Ireland became the first client 
of the new institutions. The Irish program provided a financing package 
of 85 billion euros. It included contributions by the EFSM (22.5 billion 
euros) and EFSF (17.7 billion euros, and bilateral loans from the UK, 
Sweden and Denmark (3.8 billion, 0.6 billion and 0.4 billion euros, 
respectively).7 The maturity of the loan was set at 7.5 years and the spread 
at 294 bps. Additionally, Ireland signed an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) 
agreement with the IMF for 22.5 billion euros. A few months later, in 
April 2011, it was the turn of Portugal to request support. In this case the 
financing of the 78 billion euro program fell on equal parts on the EFSM, 
EFSF and IMF. The maturity was set to 7.5 years and the spread slightly 
above 200 bps (see Table 1). In turn, Portugal signed an EFF program 
with the IMF. 
Confronted with a still worsening situation, in June 2011, the 
authorities agreed to set up a permanent institution to deal with crises 
within the euro area, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which 
would become operative by 2014.8 It was also agreed to enable both 
the EFSF and ESM to provide loans for bank recapitalization, and to 
intervene directly in primary and secondary sovereign bond markets. 
The bank recapitalization facility, created to assist in the management 
of bank crises, focuses its conditionality on the financial sector. This 
5 The EFSM can borrow up to €60 billion and on-lend the proceeds to the beneficiary 
country.
6 In order to build a sufficiently large firewall, euro area governments provided the EFSF 
with guarantees able to support a 440 billion euro lending capacity. Overcollateral-
ization (165%) gave the EFSF a high rating, enabling cheap funding (a few bps over 
German bund). 
7 The program also included an Irish contribution of 17.5 billion euros.
8 Within the ESM framework, country assessment and conditionality design is done by 
the EC, who acts, in liaison with the ECB, as an agent of the ESM. Also program nego-
tiation remains an EC task that, whenever possible, should involve the IMF. To achieve 
this new policy regime, the Lisbon treaty was reformed to strengthen fiscal coordi-
nation and surveillance. One of these changes was the inclusion of collective action 
clauses in all new euro area sovereign bonds.
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remarkable change in program design opened the door to official lending 
without IMF participation.
By then, despite the fact that the first program reviews spoke of “an 
impressive start”, the situation in Greece took a turn for the worse.9 The 
reaction was to provide additional support by lowering the interest on 
the loan and increasing maturities (June 2011). Despite these additional 
measures, it soon became clear that Greece would not manage without a 
contribution from its private-sector creditor base. In March 2012, Greece 
signed a second program with the EFSF and the IMF, which envisioned 
additional funding for 130 billion euros to be added to 34.5 billion euros 
of undisbursed funds from the GLF.10 From the 130 billion euros, 19.8 
billion came from a new EFF program with the IMF. The rest was provided 
by the EFSF with a 20-year maturity and 150 bps spread. Simultaneously, 
the GLF borrowing costs and maturities were changed to match those of 
the EFSF. The terms were softened again in December 2012.
Something similar happened with the Portuguese and Irish programs. 
While both programs remained on track, the actual performance fell 
short of expectations. According to Pisani-Ferry et al. (2013), the Irish 
under-performance was due to the effect on public debt of the bail-out 
of the banks’ junior creditors. In Portugal, the program relied on the 
implementation of structural reforms which did not materialize.11 In 
July 2011, both loans underwent significant reductions in interest and 
increases in maturities. The aim of these changes was to provide fiscal 
space and enhance the ownership of both programs. The euro area loans 
to Ireland and Portugal experienced a last 7-year maturity extension in 
late 2013.
As the fire spread to Spain and Italy, the authorities accelerated the 
inauguration of the ESM to October 2012, with 500 billion euro lending 
capacity supported by 700 billion euros in capital. Since its inauguration, 
it has delivered loans to Spain (July 2012), Cyprus (June 2013) and Greece 
(2015).12  While the euro area framework could deviate substantially 
9 According to Pisani-Ferry et al. (2013) the reasons for the set-back were: excessively 
optimistic economic projections, initial official indecision, weak program imple-
mentation and excessive stringency of initial funding conditions.
10 The new MoU asked for a debt restructuring and recognised the failure of the previous 
program to lift competitiveness.
11 The initial design failed to see the problems with implementing structural reforms, in 
a monetary union, during a crisis. In fact, the IMF’s DSA showed that only structural 
reforms could stabilize Portugal’s debt dynamics (Pisani-Ferry et al., 2013).
12 On June 2012, euro area governments agreed to provide financial assistance for Spain´s 
banking system through the EFSF until the ESM became available. Eventually, by the 
time an agreement was reached the ESM was operational.
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from the IMF´s blueprint, the Cypriot template replicated previous 
programs, with ESM and IMF contributing with 9 billion and 1 billion 
euros, respectively. Still, as summarized in Table 1, the average maturity 
of the euro area loan to Cyprus was 15 years, with the fi nal payments in 
2030. Instead, the Spanish program was markedly diff erent. By granting 
up to 100 billion euros for bank recapitalization in exchange for fi nancial 
sector reform, the euro area proceeded with a bail-out without the IMF’s 
fi nancial involvement.13
Shift in Paradigm: Key Differences in IMF-style and ESM-
style Lending
As just described, a major diff erence between IMF and euro area offi  cial 
lending is the longer maturities applied by the latter. Th is approach 
signifi cantly reduces roll-over needs of countries under support. Figure 1 
exemplifi es this eff ect using Irish and Portuguese debt repayment profi les 
both prior to the programs and once they had been implemented. Th e 
importance of euro area loans in smoothing debt redemptions, as debt 
stocks increased, is evident.
Figure 1. Managing Debt Repayment Flows: Redemption Profi les 
pre- and post-programs. Maturing debt is measured in million euros
13 Both loans featured small margins over borrowing costs (10 bps to Cyprus and 30 
bps to Spain).
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Sources: Corsetti, Erce & Uy (2017).
In addition to this divergence in lending terms, there were (at least) three 
other relevant departures from the IMF blueprint. First, motivated by the 
fear of spillovers the offi  cial sector moved beyond catalytic fi nance to lend 
into uncertain solvency in what Tirole (2015) defi nes as “self-interested 
solidarity”. Second, traditional IMF conditionality includes adjustments 
to the exchange rate, managed through interest rates and foreign reserves. 
Th is framework was not applicable in the euro area where interest and 
exchange rates are out of the control of national central banks. As a result, 
conditionality focused on fi scal and structural measures. Finally, euro 
area bailouts can address bank crises, subject to conditionality focused 
on fi nancial sector reform. Th e Spanish program exemplifi ed how this 
change could put the euro area offi  cial lenders on a path of action out 
of reach for the IMF. As the program was designed to tackle structural 
problems in the banking system and conditionality focused on fi nancial 
sector issues, the IMF could not co-fi nance the program.
Offi cial Lending in the Euro Area: A Look Back - Aitor Erce
from the IMF´s blueprint, the Cypriot template replicated previous 
programs, with ESM and IMF contributing with 9 billion and 1 billion 
euros, respectively. Still, as summarized in Table 1, the average maturity 
of the euro area loan to Cyprus was 15 years, with the fi nal payments in 
2030. Instead, the Spanish program was markedly diff erent. By granting 
up to 100 billion euros for bank recapitalization in exchange for fi nancial 
sector reform, the euro area proceeded with a bail-out without the IMF’s 
fi nancial involvement.13
Shift in Paradigm: Key Differences in IMF-style and ESM-
style Lending
As just described, a major diff erence between IMF and euro area offi  cial 
lending is the longer maturities applied by the latter. Th is approach 
signifi cantly reduces roll-over needs of countries under support. Figure 1 
exemplifi es this eff ect using Irish and Portuguese debt repayment profi les 
both prior to the programs and once they had been implemented. Th e 
importance of euro area loans in smoothing debt redemptions, as debt 
stocks increased, is evident.
Figure 1. Managing Debt Repayment Flows: Redemption Profi les 
pre- and post-programs. Maturing debt is measured in million euros
13 Both loans featured small margins over borrowing costs (10 bps to Cyprus and 30 
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The Effect of Repayment-Flow Management on Market 
Access
As the aim of the euro area approach is to manage repayment flows in 
order to minimize roll-over risks and reduce the likelihood of a disorderly 
default, in Corsetti et al. (2017) we call it “repayment-flow management to 
smooth market access”.
This approach has been criticised in the Greek case on the grounds 
that it failed to provide a final solution to the debt overhang (Eichengreen 
et al. 2018) and, by discouraging investment, further depressed growth 
(Marsh et al., 2016). Against this background, this section uses the July 
2011 Eurogroup decision to extend the maturities of the EFSF/EFSM 
loans to Ireland by 7 years as a large-scale “experiment” and presents 
evidence that the terms of official loans can be effectively used to affect 
market access conditions.14
As the extension aimed to reduce refinancing risks in a window 
of seven years, one would expect default risk to recede more within 
that window. To assess whether repayment-flow management had a 
heterogeneous effect across maturities, I use data on sovereign yields 
(coming from Bloomberg) for three maturities: three, five and ten years.15 
To facilitate the description of the dynamics following the maturity 
extension, Figure 2 contains three snap-shots of the yield curve: one 
week before the extension, one month after, and three months after. In 
turn, Figure 3 show changes to market liquidity, as measured by bid-ask 
spreads (also from Bloomberg) three months after the event.
Before the July 2011 extension Ireland was facing substantial stress, 
the yield curve inverted and 3-year yields averaging 16.5%. Figure 2 
shows that the announcement had a strong and long-lasting positive 
effect.  Already after one month all yields had fallen. After three months 
all yields were further down and the yield curve had flattened out 
significantly.
14 The event analysis presented in this section is one of four that Corsetti et al (2017) 
contains. In Corsetti et al (2018) we do a related exercise using a quantitative model 
and the Portuguese experience.
15 An important caveat to our approach is that we do not control for other explanatory 
factors, especially monetary policy, which could also explain the dynamics. Com-
fortingly, no major ECB operation coincided with this window.
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Figure 2. Yield Curve aft er Maturity Extension
 
 Source: Bloomberg and European Stability Mechanism.
Market liquidity also improved. Figure 3 shows that bid-ask spreads 
narrowed for all maturities. Similar to the yields, the largest drops in 
bid-ask spreads occurred in the 3-year maturity, followed by the fi ve and 
the ten-year ones.
Figure 3. Market Liquidity aft er Maturity Extension 
Source: Bloomberg and European Stability Mechanism.
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The maturities benefiting most from the extension were those below 
seven years, indicating that the measure provided the desired benefits. 
Remarkably, the effect extended beyond the seven-year window. As 
argued in Corsetti et al. (2017, 2018), this reduction in risk across-
the-curve (and beyond the extension window) implies that default 
expectations and market access conditions are endogenous to the lending 
terms imposed by the official sector.
This important linkage between official lending and market access 
supports the argument that in giving its bailout funds flexibility to set 
the terms of official support the euro area equipped itself with additional 
room for manoeuvre, which adequately used can enhance program 
effectiveness.
Implications
This section discusses potential implications of the feedback from the 
terms of official lending into market access and default expectations just 
described on a number of aspects relevant to the design of official bail-
outs.
Moral Hazard
Moral hazard is probably the major drawback invoked against the use 
of official support. As an insurance scheme it creates incentives not to 
undertake costly policies that can reduce default.16 That concern explains 
why official lending is delivered against conditionality (IMF, 2014).
What about more concessional loan terms provided by the euro area? 
Do they worsen moral hazard? While repayment-flow management 
can be designed to affect investors’ risk perception and smooth the 
transition back to market financing, Abraham et al. (2018) argues that 
more concessional lending reduces reform efforts. According to Marsh et 
al. (2016) this deters further investment. Relatedly, Corsetti et al. (2018) 
shows it can increase the risk of fundamental default, a form of moral 
hazard independent of adverse effects on effort. Instead, Mueller et al. 
(2016) argues that official sector flexibility increases ownership of the 
reforms.
This last argument may be most relevant to the euro area, where a 
16 See Conesa and Kehoe (2016) or Abraham et al. (2018).
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long boom fuelled by capital inflows and low rates led to the build-up 
of significant imbalances (Gourinchas and Rey, 2017). Whether the 
deep structural reforms carried out by program countries, such as 
Greece or Ireland, were discouraged or made easier by repayment-flow 
management is unclear. Most likely the answer is case-specific. This calls 
for further work on understanding the link between incentives to reform 
and the terms of official support.
Measurement of Debt Sustainability
For the IMF to provide large loans, public debt needs to be sustainable 
with high probability. This policy design puts the concept of sustainability 
at the core of the crisis resolution approach.
Following the failure of the first and second Greek programs, voices 
of discomfort emerged that debt sustainability was too focused on debt 
stocks and should also consider flow-related debt metrics.17 The resulting 
debate triggered a change to the official debt sustainability analysis (IMF, 
2013b). To limit rollover risk official debt sustainability analysis (DSA) 
now incorporates a threshold based on the so-called gross financing needs 
(GFN). If this threshold value is exceeded debt is not sustainable (Hagan 
et al 2017). GFN adds interest payments, maturing debt and primary 
deficits and is designed to capture the forthcoming financing needs of a 
country (Gabriele et al., 2017). Given the critical role of official lending 
in shaping refinancing needs, it is straightforward that debt sustainability 
needs to be assessed simultaneously with the availability and modalities 
of potential official loans.
One major drawback of repayment-flow management is that longer-
horizon loans require forecasting macroeconomic dynamics even further 
in the future, increasing uncertainty and making it even harder to assess 
whether a debt stock is sustainable. Instead, the maturity of IMF lending 
operations requires focusing on sustainability up to one decade after the 
start of a programme, the time it usually takes countries to repay the IMF 
loan. 
17 For example, according to the 2012 Eurogroup framework, reaching a debt-to-GDP 
ratio of 124% in 2020 and remaining below 110 percent of GDP in 2022 would ensure 
Greece’s debt sustainability. See also Bassaneti et al. (2016).
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Debt Restructuring
There is broad agreement that the international financial architecture 
places too much burden-sharing on the taxpayer (IMF, 2013c). A number 
of recent proposals try to correct this through changes to the framework 
that limit the extent of private-sector bail out via official loans and 
facilitate a smooth restructuring of privately-held sovereign debt.18
The feedback between market access conditions and the terms of official 
lending presented in this chapter informs the design of these proposals. 
One clear implication of this feedback is that proposals envisioning 
automatic restructuring, without considering whether official lending 
could make debt sustainable, may be sub-optimal and move the 
framework from “too little, too late” into “too much, too early”.19 An 
adequate framework embedding official lending and debt restructuring 
in market economies needs to recognize (and benefit from) the feedback 
from the terms of official support into market access conditions. 
Solvency and Spillovers: A New Rationale for Official Lending?
As described in Hagan et al. (2017), IMF lending should be catalytic and 
only made available to solvent economies. The prospects of systemic 
fallout following a Greek default challenged this rationale. In the euro 
area, IMF lending was also used to prevent cross-border spillovers.
This was done through a “systemic exemption” clause added to 
the exceptional access policy.  The ensuing debate crystallised in an 
internal evaluation in the use of this policy in the first Greek program 
(IMF 2013c). The negative evaluation of the experience led the IMF to 
eliminate the exemption in 2016. The exemption was replaced by a clause 
stipulating that IMF involvement in the financing of countries with an 
unsustainable debt burden (according to the Fund’s DSA) could still be 
justified provided other official creditors commit to cover any funding 
gaps  (IMF, 2016a).
Should the euro area follow suit and only lend against solvency? 
Or should systemic considerations remain a factor determining official 
lending? According to the rationale in Tirole (2015), for as long as 
18 See Corsetti et al. (2015), Andritzky et al. (2016) or Benassy et al. (2018)
19 According to IMF (2014), calling a debt restructuring unnecessarily may have larger 
costs that solving the crisis through the usual combination of domestic adjustment 
and official support. Instead, according to Andritzky and Schumacher (forthcom-
ing), the damage from mild restructuring operations can be very small.
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strong financial linkages across euro area economies remain there will be 
incentives to use official lending to avoid the potentials spillovers from 
sovereign defaults (“self-interested solidarity”).
Seniority
A contentious issue during the crisis was related to the payment ranking 
of creditors. Under the current set-up the IMF is senior to anyone else 
(Schlegl et al., 2015). The IMF’s rationale for claiming seniority relates 
to debtor-in-possession (Diaz-Cassou and Erce, 2011). According to this 
logic, the financing provided by the IMF will increase debtors’ ability to 
repay, benefiting all pre-existing creditors. In exchange for this, the Fund 
claims seniority. Still, as discussed in Schadler (2014), it is not infrequent 
that if an IMF program fails new funding is made available to refinance 
the official loans.20 Similar reasoning applies to the ESM, next in the 
creditors’ pecking order.21 Remarkably, the ESM waived its seniority 
on the Spanish program. One driver of this decision was the fear of an 
adverse market reaction. According to Gros (2010) and Ghezzi (2012), 
the euro area experience proved that private sector subordination can 
have perverse effects when markets are not certain about the success of 
the program. As the proportion of liabilities held by the official sector 
increases, a lack of program success effectively dilutes private creditors 
and may undermine market access.
One implication of the feedback between the terms of official 
lending and market expectations discussed in this chapter is that official 
creditors willingness to backload the repayment of their loans -effectively 
counteracting the debt dilution effect of official seniority- may result in 
an increase in the perceived likelihood of repayment (see also Hatchondo 
et al., 2016).
20 Such “inherited-program” problem can impair the IMF’s catalytic role and limit its 
impartial role (Simpson, 2006).
21 The EFSF, EFSM, private creditors and bondholders all share seniority status. In the 
context of the OMT, the ECB said it would be pari-passu. Still, during the Greek debt 
restructuring ECB holdings were spared from the restructuring exercise (Gulati et 
al. 2013).
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Coordination within the Global Safety Net
The international monetary system is composed of a plethora of regional 
and multilateral organisations tasked with guaranteeing financial 
stability.22 Globalisation has increased the need for coordination across 
the various layers of the official safety net and global and regional lenders 
need to adjust to it.23 According to IMF (2016b), regional lenders may 
bring in-depth regional knowledge, better tailored instruments, enhance 
legitimacy and have stronger incentives to avoid spillovers. In turn, the 
IMF and other multilaterals may be better equipped for systemic crises 
and, through their broader representation, suffer less political pressure.
The insights regarding the effect of the terms of official lending on 
market access conditions presented before imply that multilateral and 
regional official lenders could reconsider their co-operation models. 
When the loan structure is rigidly front-loaded, repayments may kick 
in exactly when a country is trying to re-enter the market -see the 
experience of Greece during the summer of 2016 when bond repayments 
became due in tandem with IMF loan repayments. In order to avoid such 
episodes, official lenders need to work out efficient ways to coordinate 
repayment-flow structures while considering the goals and degrees of 
seniority of each lender.
Conclusions
The virulence of the euro area crisis forced the authorities to design new 
policies and institutions without much time for reflection. The need to 
re-adjust policy frameworks is well illustrated by the development of 
tools and mechanisms for the provision of official lending. In this corner 
of the policy toolkit, the euro area started the crisis in an institutional 
void, with no tool or procedures beyond pre-existing IMF loans. As 
the crisis grew worse, the authorities moved from bilateral loans to the 
creation of a permanent crisis management institution.
This chapter has read the evolution of the lending vehicles used to 
provide official support as an experiment and extracted lessons regarding 
the relation between the terms of official lending and market access. The 
extent to which official programmes are successful in restoring growth 
and market access depend critically on the terms of the support. The 
22 See Cheng (2017) for an overview.
23 See G-20 (2016) or ESM (2017).
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evidence points to potential efficiency gains for the official sector from 
better understanding how the management of repayment-flows impacts 
market access, incentives for structural reforms and stabilisation policies 
and, therefore, affects debt sustainability.  
In addition, the euro area experience has redefined the goals of official 
lending. While the traditional approach builds on the idea of catalytic 
finance, the recent experience -where large amounts of lending have been 
provided to countries which did not pass the debt sustainability analysis 
but were considered systemic- suggests additional grounds to motivate 
official lending. Preventing cross-border spillovers from default in one 
country motivates forms of self-interested solidarity, which work more 
effectively through policy coordination.
Closely connected, the “co-operation despite divergence” by the 
euro area lenders and the International Monetary Fund holds lessons 
for official operations in a world where the interaction between regional 
and global safety nets is set to increase. The insights from the euro area 
crisis imply that multilateral and regional official lenders could design 
efficient ways to coordinate the loans’ repayment flow structures, while 
considering their mandates and degrees of seniority.
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REGULATORY INTEGRATION AND 
POLITICAL SUBORDINATION1
Tuomas Saarenheimo
The euro crisis changed European economic policy landscape. Within a 
span of only a couple of years, there was a flurry of new legislation, with the 
aim of “strengthening” the European economic governance framework. 
The reforms touched nearly all areas of economic policy. The European 
Semester was born, and the six-pack and two-pack legislative packages 
together with the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in 
the Economic and Monetary Union (the Fiscal Compact) provided it 
with substantive content. In parallel, the Banking Union centralised the 
responsibility for supervising and regulating significant banks. 
With a few years of experience of operating the new framework, one 
can now make two observations. First, it is fair to say that, as is often 
the case when matters are fixed in a great hurry, the implementation 
of the reforms has not been without difficulties. While some parts of 
the new framework have worked more or less as planned, in others 
enforcement seems to be falling chronically short of expectations. But 
second, and more fundamentally, as I will argue below, these changes 
have taken the direction and content of EU integration into a new and 
qualitatively different territory, with novel challenges that the Union has 
found difficult to navigate. I will argue that there is a link between these 
two observations. What worked and what did not was largely predictable 
and depended on the type of responsibilities that the EU institutions 
were tasked with. To make EMU integration sustainable, it is important 
to learn from these experiences.
1 This presentation draws on the following two articles: Leino P. and Saarenheimo 
T. (2017), “Sovereignty and Subordination: On the Limits of EU Economic Policy 
Co-ordination”, European Law Review, issue 2, 2017; Leino P. and Saarenheimo T. 
(2018), “Fiscal Union for EMU – Managing Incompleteness”, European Law Review, 
forthcoming.
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The EU regulatory state
Let us start from the reforms that worked. Most observers would 
probably agree that, by and large, the Banking Union has got to a good 
start. It is true that the Europe-wide Comprehensive Assessment of bank 
balance sheets in 2014 may not have become the hoped-for watershed 
moment in the transition from the old, fragile national banking systems 
to a new, well-capitalised European one. Likewise, some recent cases of 
dealing with failing banks may have taught us more about the remaining 
gaps and loopholes in the European regulatory architecture than about 
the architecture itself. But dealing with the mountain of legacy problems 
in European banking was always going to be difficult and involve 
unpleasant trade-offs. In the end, legislation has been followed and, even 
when executive choices have provoked debate, they have fallen within 
a reasonable scope of administrative discretion. While work remains 
to be done, what we have now is a European banking sector that, by 
any standard, is much stronger and more consistently supervised than 
the old one. Likewise, the European System of Financial Supervision, 
and particularly its three microprudential supervisory agencies (EBA, 
ESMA, EIOPA), have contributed to a much more coherent and uniform 
supervisory rulebook across Europe.
What needs to be pointed out here is this: these developments are 
essentially a continuation of Europe’s traditional integrationist project, 
building on a “regulatory state”, as Giandomenico Majone called it in the 
1990s.2 By this term, Majone referred to the process of replacing public 
ownership, planning and dirigiste policies by privatization of economic 
activity and delegation of its regulation to non-elected expert bodies. In 
the glory days of EU integration, from around the Single European Act to 
early 2000s, this is where the focus of action was. It is in those years that 
the Commission’s DG Competition became the competition authority, 
and the European agency apparatus, including Environment, Medicine, 
Food Safety and, a little later, Chemical agencies, were established. Even 
the single monetary policy can be considered belonging in this category.
These were all tasks for which there are good reasons to treat them 
as regulatory and suitable for delegation to executive agencies (in the 
case of monetary policy, an independent central bank). By and large, 
before assigned to EU agencies, these tasks were already delegated to 
2 Majone G. (2007) The rise of the regulatory state in Europe, West European Politics, 
17:3, 77-101, DOI: 10.1080/01402389408425031
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technocrats at the Member-State level. In countries outside of the EU, they 
still are. Within the Single Market, it made a great deal of sense to bring 
those tasks to the European level. There was no qualitative difference: 
technocrats continued in charge, only now acting in EU level bodies. The 
obvious benefit was that, instead of performing their tasks in a nationally 
fragmented manner, they operated consistently throughout the Union, 
ensuring level playing field, better competition and substantial benefits 
to the European economy. So far so good.
Crossing the boundary to the political
Many other measures the EU took in response to the crisis were of a 
different nature. Pressed on by the impeding risk of a euro breakdown, 
the need to impress markets by a decisive response, and by the widespread 
perception that the crisis was rooted in failures of national economic 
policies, the EU essentially took upon itself the task of preventing national 
economic policy mistakes.3 The regulatory, technocratic approach as such 
did not change, but its subject matter did. While continuing to centralise 
regulatory functions, the EU regulatory state also entered the space of 
the Member States’ national decision-making in areas that fall under the 
competence of their democratic institutions.
In this way, the EU extended the regulatory mode of integration into 
areas that were far beyond the traditional boundaries of administrative 
tasks delegated to technocratic experts. The EU’s regulatory presence 
started to expand deeper into political issues, with the Commission as 
the technocratic agency, with the aim of guiding Member States towards 
better economic policies. It is not clear how many of those involved 
realised at that time that a fundamental boundary was being crossed, 
with substantial implications. Some did, including Majone,4 but many 
probably did not. There is little evidence that this viewpoint was widely 
debated or even recognised in the discussions leading to the adoption of 
the relevant legislation.
Many tasks allocated to the Commission under the new Economic 
governance framework adopted from 2011 onwards fall into this category. 
On the fiscal policy side, the Stability and Growth Pact had already existed 
since the 1990s, but the six-pack made it much wider and denser. On 
3 This issue has been examined in more depth in Leino and Saarenheimo, 2017.
4 Majone, G. (2014), From regulatory state to a democratic default. J Common Mark 
Stud, 52: 1216-1223. doi:10.1111/jcms.12190
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the side of macroeconomic policies, the loose obligation to co-ordinate 
macroeconomic policies was sharpened into the Macroeconomic 
Imbalances Procedure and Country-Specific Recommendations, with 
few limits to their scope of application. The European semester was born 
and new types of sanctions were introduced, either through direct fines 
or through links to EU funds. This process seems destined to continue. 
The Five Presidents’ Report foresees a process of “binding structural 
convergence”, which would expand EU intervention to a wide range 
of matters falling under national competence such as labour market 
regulation and social policies.5 
The first thing to note is that, unlike in enforcing fiscal discipline, 
where the Treaties give the EU clearly circumscribed powers to address 
excessive deficits, the EU has little legal competence in matters of 
economic policies. The Treaties leave fiscal stabilisation as well as 
macroeconomic and structural policies squarely to the Member States. 
The EU has the power to coordinate and to issue recommendations, 
which, under Article 288 TFEU, are non-binding. While legally 
speaking these are weak powers, the fact is that today these powers are 
exercised with the threat of substantial financial sanctions attached. This 
demonstrates how the Union has already managed to stretch its powers 
remarkably far. But even more importantly, the type of regulatory control 
exercised through the SGP, the MIP and the CSRs is very different from 
the traditional regulatory integration model. It is not about transferring 
executive powers from national agencies to European ones. It is about 
bringing deeply political national decisions under centralised control by 
the EU institutions.
Before proceeding, it needs to be recognised that the distinction 
between the ‘technical’ and the ‘political’ is not always clear. The line 
between those public powers that are fundamentally political and belong 
to elected officials and those that can be de-politicised and delegated 
to technocratic agencies is subject to debate and can change over time. 
The broad trend seems to be towards de-politicisation; many policy 
fields where political decision-making used to be the norm are today 
commonly delegated. Monetary policy provides the perfect example of 
this. In the early part of the 20th century, monetary policy used to be, 
to varying degrees and with some notable exceptions, under political 
control. During the latter half of century, central banks gradually gained 
5 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/5-presidents-report_
en.pdf
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greater independence, a process accelerated by the 1970s stagflation and, 
during the 1980s, a growing body of academic literature demonstrating 
the benefits of independent monetary policy guided by a mandate 
centred on price stability. By the end of the 1980s, the de-politicisation 
of monetary policy was largely complete throughout the Western world. 
This was an important precondition for the creation of the common 
monetary policy in the EU. It is difficult to imagine that an agreement 
on EMU would have been possible as long as monetary policy was still 
under party political control at the national level. 
To be suitable for technocratic delegation, a public function needs to 
be such that it can be confined within a reasonably well-defined legislated 
mandate.6 Executive agencies can and regularly do deal with trade-offs, but 
those should be technical in nature – such as the one between economic 
or therapeutic value and safety considerations in health, medical or 
chemical regulation – and not involve significant value judgments. 
Another relevant viewpoint to drawing the line between the regulatory 
and the political is electoral salience. Issues that tend to mobilise people 
politically and feature prominently in political parties’ electoral programs 
are, almost by definition, political, and poorly suited for delegation. In 
contrast, issues that are suitable for being treated as regulatory, are less 
likely to reach public consciousness and become politically divisive.
Against these metrics,  fiscal, labour market and social policies  are 
clearly located at the highly political end of the spectrum. They contain 
trade-offs that necessitate fundamental value judgments, and they feature 
high on political agendas. They are essentially what electoral platforms 
are made of, the very heart of political contestation and democratic 
choice. In any society that we would call democratic, they are for elected 
officials with a political mandate to decide. 
Technocratic steering for political decisions
The above arguments have hopefully established that, with its economic 
governance framework, the Union has entered into an endeavour that is 
qualitatively different from its traditional model of regulatory integration. 
But to appreciate the full implications of this endeavour, it is important 
6 See, for example, Leino, P. (2017): “Accountability dilemmas of regulating financial 
markets through the European supervisory agencies.” In C. Harlow, G. Della Cana-
nea and P. Leino (eds), Research handbook on EU administrative law, Chelteham ; 
Northampton : Edward Elgar, 2017, Research handbooks in European law series, pp. 
209-240.
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to understand that there are two distinct dimensions to the process. 
The first dimension is geographic; the centralisation of certain public 
powers from the national level to the Union. The second dimension 
is technocratisation; the attempt to correct the perceived failings of 
(national) political decision-making by subjecting it to technocratic 
controls.
The european economic governance framework is, indeed, a 
deeply technocratic exercise, run by career civil servants. Application 
of the complex rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, the In-Depth 
Surveys underlying the MIP assessments, and the Country-Specific 
Recommendations are all prepared primarily by mid-level Commission 
staff, aided by technocratic committees of Member State experts. Under 
the Reverse Qualified Majority voting rules, established as part of the six 
pack, Commission proposals, once cleared by the Commission College, 
are eventually sent to the Council to be rubber stamped, for example 
the Fisheries Council as an A-item, without any substantive discussion. 
This is executive decision making and therefore European Parliament is 
not involved, apart from the highly theoretical prospect of calling the 
Commission as a whole into account.
In a sense, the most political stage of the process may actually be the one 
that takes place within the College of Commissioners, which adopts each 
Commission proposal. Whether it is right to call the Commission political 
is an interesting point of debate. On the one hand, by proclamation of its 
President, the self-identity of the present Commission is clearly political.7 
On the other hand, the traditional ethos of the Commission is one of 
a technocratic, non-political “guardian of the Treaties”. What is clear is 
that a mere proclamation by its President to be political does not create 
the checks and balances and accountability structures that constitute 
an integral part of proper political decision-making.8 The institutional 
reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty and intended to tighten the ties 
7 “The Commission is political. And I want it to be more political. Indeed, it will be 
highly political.” J.-C. Juncker, “A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, 
Fairness and Democratic Change Political Guidelines for the next European Commis-
sion”, Opening Statement in the European Parliament Plenary Session Candidate for 
President of the European Commission (Strasbourg, 15 July 2014), p.16.
8 Leino, P. and Saarenheimo, T. (2018), Discretion, Economic Governance and the (New) 
Political Commission. In J. Mendes (ed), Executive Discretion and the Limits of Law. 
Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
PART I - A Look Back: Evaluating - European Institutions’ Crisis Management
63
between the Parliament and the Commission help little in this respect.9 
A further question is the extent to which the European Parliament is the 
appropriate accountability forum for decision-making that is directed at 
the Member States on matters that fall under their national competence.
Regardless of the nature of the Commission College, the reality is that 
the EU economic governance framework is largely run by technocrats, 
and there really is no other way to do it. The task is just too complex, 
its dimensionality far too large for democratic bodies to handle. At the 
level of a nation state, the government and the parliament only deal with 
policy questions of a single country, their own. Even at the level of a 
single country, economic policy assessments tend to be complicated, with 
multiple interconnections and feedback loops, and there are limits to the 
level of sophistication which the ministers and members of the parliament 
can be expected to develop on them. But generally, the national political 
institutions can be relied on to acquire a sufficient level of understanding 
on key economic issues in their own country. This enables them to debate 
the issues, consult with stakeholders, decide, and communicate the issues 
to the media. The media can generally be relied to report the issues to 
the public, and the voters, if they are so minded, have the means to keep 
track of the decisions and hold their elected officials accountable. They 
frequently do so, since this is the stuff that national elections are made of. 
When moving from the national policy sphere to the EU economic 
governance framework, one needs to multiply the dimensionality by 28 
(soon 27). The identified sources of macroeconomic imbalances or the 
content of the Country-Specific Recommendations are indeed country 
specific - they differ from country to country. Forming an informed 
view on the merits of each recommendation requires a comprehensive, 
systemic understanding of and interconnections between the economic 
structures in that country. For 28 countries, the dimensionality of the 
task would surely overwhelm the capabilities of any elected body. There 
simply is no conceivable way for an elected body to scrutinise and debate 
each separate set of country-specific instructions in an informed manner. 
In reality, it does not matter whether those instructions are sent for 
approval to the Ecofin Council of the Agricultural Council; the Finance 
Ministers are no more likely to rise to the challenge than the Agricultural 
Ministers. 
9 For the close linkages between the Commission and the Parliament, see Article 17(7) 
and 17(8) TEU, and their interinstitutional framework agreement (IIA, 2010) and the 
‘special partnership’ it aims to develop [2010] OJ L304/47. 
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But even if an elected body could be created with the superhuman 
abilities to match the task, the outcome would still not be proper 
democratic accountability at the European level, because many other 
prerequisites would still be missing. There still would be no true 
European political party organisations to formulate consistent political 
platforms throughout the Union for the voters. There would still be very 
little in terms of European civil society organisations. There would still 
be no real European media to communicate decisions to the voters. And, 
with the present convoluted EU decision-making mechanisms, there 
would be no feasible way for the voters to figure out who exactly was 
responsible for the decisions and factor it in their voting behaviour in 
the European elections. In sum, if these tasks are indeed increasingly 
transferred to the EU level, the country-specific, tailored approach 
incorporated in the European economic governance framework, coupled 
with the shortcomings of European political integration, means that 
the framework can only be operated by technocratic bodies, outside of 
proper democratic accountability. 
So, in contrast to the traditional regulatory integration, where power 
was transferred from national technocrats to European technocrats, 
the Economic Governance framework represents a different kind of 
transfer of public power: from national democratic, political institutions 
to European technocratic bodies. The political space in which national 
elections operate shrinks without a counterbalancing increase in political 
space at the European level. The result is a net reduction of democratic 
choice.
Enforcement blues
To be more precise, the result would be a net reduction of democratic 
choice, if the framework were to be enforced. In practice, this has not 
been the case. Instead, EU institutions have found it difficult to make 
effective use of their increased powers to regulate Member States’ fiscal 
and economic policies. Almost everyone – academic observers,10 the 
10 Bofinger P., “The Way Forward: Coping with the Insolvency Risk of Member States 
and Giving Teeth to the European Semester” in How to Fix Europe’s Monetary 
Union (2016); C. Claeys, Z. Darwas and Á. Leandro: “A proposal to revive the Euro-
pean fiscal framework”, Bruegel Policy Contribution 2016/07 (2016).
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ECB,11 the European Court of Auditors12 – agrees that the fiscal rules have 
been enforced unevenly, at best. The sanctions related to the Excessive 
Imbalances Procedure have never been used. And the macroeconomic 
conditionality in the EU budget has proved to be largely a dead letter. I 
would argue that these difficulties were foreseeable.
Trying to limit political choices of sovereign nations, for example 
to get a Member State to correct its fiscal deficit or to implement an 
important structural reform, is not a simple matter. The reason why 
Member States find fiscal consolidation or structural reforms difficult in 
the first place is that they tend to be unpopular among the electorate. Even 
if the government managed to muster the political will to push through 
the unpopular reforms, the price is often lost elections and reversal of 
the reforms by the next government. Jean-Claude Juncker phrased it 
ten years ago: “We all know what to do, but we don’t know how to get 
re-elected once we have done it.”13 
In such politically loaded matters, any interference by the EU tends 
to be highly visible in the Member State, and anything that looks heavy-
handedness usually gets bad press. Almost invariably, there are political 
forces standing ready to capitalise on the situation. Anti-EU narratives 
will be ready to present the EU as the perpetrator, captive to neoliberal 
interests or a religion of austerity, the sitting government as a gutless 
collaborator, unwilling to stand up for its sovereign rights, and the 
Member State citizens as victims. The risk is an electoral response of the 
kind that Brussels considers unhelpful.
As the EU institutions do not wish to make themselves the champions 
of eurosceptic platforms, they have adapted. Instead of blind enforcement 
of rules, the economic governance framework has evolved into what 
it is today: a discursive, context-sensitive process, which tries to coach 
countries towards sensible policies, all the while taking good care not 
to overdo it, not to damage the good guys or help the bad guys.14 This 
was the case when Italy, heading for elections, received lenient treatment 
under the SGP in late 2017. It was also the case in 2016 with Spain 
and Portugal, two seriously austerity-fatigued countries, when the EU 
11 See speech by Mario Draghi, Frankfurt am Main (16 March 2015), http://www.ecb.
europa.eu/press/key/date/2015/html/sp150316.en.html.
12 European Court of Auditors (2016), “Further improvements needed to ensure effec-
tive implementation of the excessive deficit procedure”, Special Report No.010/2016.
13 The Economist (2007), “The Quest for Prosperity”, March 15th
14 In his 2016 State of the Union speech, President Juncker assured that the Commission 
“… will continue to apply the pact not in a dogmatic manner, but with common sense 
and with the flexibility that we wisely built into the rules.” http://europa.eu/rapid/at-
tachment/SPEECH-16-3043/en/SOTEU%20brochure%20EN.pdf
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decided to cancel their fines under the SGP. And it was definitely the case 
with France in 2015, when it was allowed, once again, to miss its deadline 
for correcting its excessive deficit, “because it is France”, as explained by 
President Juncker.15 
This is not to say that the process is without value. On the contrary, 
in many cases the discourse can be a helpful input to domestic political 
debate. Further, the signals emanating from Brussels carry authority 
and can be an important focal point for bond market participants. This, 
in turn, strengthens Member States’ incentives to do what they can to 
receive a clean bill of health from the EU. From the broad perspective 
of nurturing a political environment that supports responsible fiscal 
and economic policies, the reasons for flexibility were, in each of the 
cases mentioned above, logical. Still, it is decidedly not the rules-based, 
mechanistically-enforced system that some had in mind. One could 
also argue that there is something disturbing in the thought that the 
EU administers its economic governance framework, at least in part, to 
promote certain outcomes in national elections.
What is the alternative?
I would argue that the biggest risk to EMU long-term stability is not 
economic or financial, but political. The risk is we end up creating an 
economic governance system that, even if benevolent in its intentions, 
ends up removing ownership of policies from the Member States and 
deprives their citizens a meaningful voice in them. When key building 
blocks of political platforms are removed from the national political 
space and outsourced to Brussels, there can be all kinds of undesirable 
consequences. Apart from voter apathy, there is a high risk of discontent 
and an anti-EU backlash.
A better choice, I think, would be to build the EU and the Euro Area 
on the basis of the principles of subsidiarity and conferral. The EU can 
advise and assist Member States in formulating their economic policies, 
but ultimately it needs to respect their sovereignty in policy areas that 
belong to their legal competence. It should be understood and accepted 
that the EU has neither the legal powers nor the legitimacy to prevent 
Member States from making policy mistakes. 
15 “EU gives budget leeway to France ‘because it is France’—Juncker” Reuters, 31 May 
2016, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-eu-deficit-france-idUKKCN0YM1N0 [Ac-
cessed 14 February 2017].
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Once one abandons the goal of preventing Member States’ policy 
mistakes, it follows that one needs to concentrate on reducing the 
cross-country externalities from those mistakes. Private risk sharing, 
through the Banking Union and the Capital Markets Union, will need 
to work much better. This is technically demanding, but there is nothing 
fundamentally impossible there. It is essentially continuation of the 
regulatory integration model that has been thoroughly tested and found 
to work.
If there are some policy fields that are just too risky to leave to the 
Member States, then the EU should not try to centralise them through 
the backdoor of coordination. Instead, it should centralise them openly, 
by changing the Treaties and shifting legal competences to the EU, as it 
did with the Common Agricultural Policy. Instead of the EU tailoring 
reform programs for each Member State - which bear some resemblance 
with IMF programs – the EU would be legislating unified policies for the 
EU (or the Euro area) as a whole and for all its citizens. In other words, 
it would follow the traditional federal route. The European Parliament 
would play a central role in the substantive content of policies, instead of 
just co-legislating the bureaucratic procedures for technocratic decision-
making, as is the case with the coordination-based approach. This 
would provide EU citizens at least some chance to keep decision-makers 
democratically accountable.
It is perfectly understood that recreating at the EU level the mechanisms 
of democratic accountability that we take for granted at the national level 
will be, for reasons described above, slow and difficult. It can only be 
a process of evolutionary nature, rather than a one-off reform, and any 
results will come far too late to be a solution to the immediate concerns 
of the Eurozone. Yet, the federalist model is far better suited to support 
the development of proper mechanisms of democratic accountability 
than an economic governance framework based on coordination and 
supported by financial sticks and carrots. It presents a clear division of 
responsibilities, raises the visibility and stakes of European elections, and 
thereby nurtures gradual politicisation of European decision-making. 
Even then, the realistic time frame is likely to be very long.
I am aware that calling for a Treaty change and federalist solutions 
will be seen by some as so long-term as to be obstructive. But it is not my 
intention to be obstructive. These are big issues, and they touch the very 
core of our democratic systems. I do not think we should use shortcuts in 
dealing them. Some things are simply too important to be rushed. 
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THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 
AND THE EU’S DEVELOPING 
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL 
ARCHITECTURE
Baudilio Tomé Muguruza
The ECA: responding to the financial crisis
Since the global financial crisis and the ensuing sovereign debt crisis, 
the EU has devoted considerable time and resources into reacting to 
the immediate effects and building a new framework to stave off future 
problems. The challenge for the European Court of Auditors (ECA) 
has been to keep pace with the myriad responses and developments. 
Considering the amounts that have already been committed and the 
changes to the EU’s financial architecture, it is vital that we carefully 
assess the measures taken to date, and devise new ways in which to carry 
out our duty as the guardians of the EU’s finances to help Europe be better 
prepared the next time problems occur in the financial sector. 
The financial crisis “swept across EU Member States in waves, first 
affecting the non-euro area countries in 2008-2009 and later spreading to 
the euro area itself ”.1 The first wave, affecting non-euro area countries led 
to Hungary, Latvia and Romania seeking assistance from the EU’s balance 
of payments mechanism and the IMF. The second caused sovereign bond 
ratings to decrease and interest to increase, meaning Greece applied 
for financial assistance in 2010, followed later by Ireland, Portugal and 
others. 
1 ECA (2015) “Financial assistance provided to countries in difficulties”, ECA Special 
Report no.18/2015, p7 
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European policymakers had to react to resolve the crisis with both 
urgent and extraordinary measures, and reforms for longer-term 
restructuring of Europe’s financial and economic governance frameworks. 
The EU’s response can be grouped into four clusters: the new supervisory 
and regulatory authorities; the monitoring role of the Commission; the 
financial and technical assistance provided to countries in difficulty; and 
the establishment of the Banking Union. 
The ECA, acting as the external auditor of the EU, did not ignore 
these developments. This meant new challenges for public audit. To 
begin with, the Court addressed the myriad developments in the field by 
producing a position paper on the topic in 2011. The paper highlighted 
an important link between the unfolding EU-level response to the 
financial crisis and the important implications for the use of public funds 
in the EU. Meanwhile a wider debate was taking place, and a resolution 
by the Contact Committee of Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) of the 
EU outlined concerns and informed all EU SAIs of their respective roles. 
At the same time, the Court was also reviewing its own strategic 
outlook. In order to better understand the changing audit environment 
and how to adapt to it, the ECA published a paper2 in 2014 seeking to 
reflect on the developments and highlight the issue of accountability. 
Alongside setting out six elements for a strong accountability and audit 
chain3, the ECA also identified a number of challenges to accountability at 
the EU level. These included the EU’s then rapidly changing institutional 
set-up, which contained different audit arrangements for different 
institutions and bodies. An example of this is the European Central 
Bank (ECB). Since the financial crisis, the ECB has been afforded more 
responsibilities due to its special position and expertise. However, while 
the ECA has a mandate to audit the ECB’s operational efficiency, not all 
of these functions have been subject to external audit. This led to the 
ECA’s suggestion that, “differences in accounting, audit and discharge 
arrangements may lead to disproportionate levels of scrutiny, gaps and 
2 ECA (2014) “Gaps, overlaps and challenges: a landscape review of EU accountability 
and public audit arrangements”
3 Six elements for a strong accountability and audit chain: a clear definition of roles 
and responsibilities; management assurance about the achievement of policy objec-
tives; full democratic oversight; existence of feedback loops to allow for improve-
ments; strong mandate for independent external audit; and the implementation of 
audit recommendations and follow-up (ECA (2014) “Gaps, overlaps and challenges” 
p6). 
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overlaps”.4 
It was thus decided in 2013 to establish a specialised project team to 
build the ECA’s capacity in this area, so we could adequately cover the 
new developments in the field of EU financial and economic governance. 
The team, made up of 20 auditors from across the Court, as well external 
experts, received specialised training programmes. These adaptations 
were necessary for the Court to be fully able to address the new European 
finance architecture. 
The new supervisory and regulatory authorities 
In its response to the crisis, and to help prevent future crises of this 
nature, the EU created three new supervisory and regulatory authorities. 
Together, the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), and the European Insurance 
and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) are part of the European 
System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) umbrella.5 At the time of writing, 
the ECA has completed work on the first two of these authorities, which 
are outlined in the rest of this section. A third special report, on EIOPA, 
is due for publication in 2018.  
European Banking Authority (EBA)6
EBA was set up in 2011 out of the Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors (CEBS) to strengthen the regulatory framework and the 
supervision of banks. Integration of the markets for financial services 
and their deregulation in the EU has been fast, but supervision of 
banks’ activities had until then been restricted to national borders. As a 
response, EBA now has stronger legal powers of supervision and within 
the legislative process of the EU. The authority7 is tasked with developing 
the ‘Single Rulebook’ and monitoring and assessing the market. However, 
EBA does not carry out day-to-day supervision of financial institutions; 
4 ECA (2014) “Gaps, overlaps and challenges”, p7
5 Under the umbrella are the European Banking Authority (EBA); European Secu-
rities and Markets Authority (ESMA); European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB); and 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA).
6 ECA (2014) “European Banking supervision taking shape – EBA and its changing 
context”, ECA Special Report no.5/2014
7 The organisation itself is financed 60% from national supervisory authorities and 
40% from the EU budget.
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that responsibility lies with the European Central Bank and the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). Instead, the system relies on cooperation, 
“with information exchanged via the supervisory colleges in order to 
have a consolidated overview of a bank’s risk exposure”.8 
For its audit, the Court looked to assess whether the Commission 
and EBA had “satisfactorily carried out their responsibilities in setting up 
the new arrangements for the regulation and supervision system of the 
banking sector and to examine how successfully those new arrangements 
were functioning”.9 The report found that EBA laid the foundations for a 
new regulatory and supervisory system in the European banking sector, 
which is an “important first step” in the response to the causes of the 
crisis.9 
However, there were shortcomings that need to be addressed, namely 
related to EBA’s mandate. In the future it will be important for EBA to 
have a clear and wide-ranging mandate and experienced staff to ensure 
the reliability and credibility of stress tests. Clarification of the roles and 
responsibilities of EBA (and the SSM) is also necessary for a successful 
Banking Union and effective banking supervision; these tasks are already 
enough of a challenge with a clear division of responsibility, let alone with 
contradictions and conflicts.  
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)10
The experience of the financial crisis prompted the realisation that 
reform of credit rating agencies (CRAs) was needed. Before 2007 
regulators everywhere relied on credit ratings agencies, and CRAs were 
only lightly regulated in combination with self-regulation, focusing on 
a few specific areas such as insider trading and market manipulation.11 
The harsh realities of the 2008 financial crisis changed all that. As a 
result, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) was 
established in 2011 as well to “protect public interest by ensuring the 
integrity, transparency, efficiency and orderly functioning of securities 
markets”.12 Within six months of its establishment, it was also given 
8 ECA (2014) “EBA and its changing context”, p15
9 Ibid., p8
10 ECA (2015) “EU supervision of credit rating agencies – well established but not yet 
fully effective”, ECA Special Report no.22/2015
11 According to a Communication from the Commission on Credit Rating Agencies 
(OJ C 59, 11.3.2006, p.2).
12 ECA (2015) “EU supervision of credit rating agencies”, p9
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exclusive supervisory powers over EU and non-EU CRAs13, to add to 
existing responsibilities concerning: market intelligence and research 
for risk assessments; investigations into non-compliance; and disclosure 
of CRA methodologies and key assumptions. In addition, in May 2013 
another amendment was approved with the aim of reducing reliance on 
credit ratings and improving EU Member States’ sovereign debt ratings.
For its audit, the ECA specifically analysed whether registrations had 
been done correctly, whether risk assessment had been implemented 
soundly, whether the supervisory framework really addressed the 
problems with CRAs, and whether enough information was published 
by ESMA and CRAs. 
The report found that overall ESMA represented another good 
foundation and that its methodology for ratings was rigorous. Nowadays 
for instance, it is easier and faster or credit rating agencies to register. 
However, ESMA’s supervision is too broad, meaning consistency 
is lacking, and it would thus benefit from a definition of its exact 
supervisory tasks. Additionally, despite shortening the two-part process, 
regulatory requirements for agency registration are cumbersome at 227 
days in length on average.14 In addition, ESMA’s risk-based approach was 
not always evenly applied leaving some high-risk areas under-supervised. 
The ECA also found weaknesses with regards to transparency, such as a 
lack of public scrutiny on the disclosures. Lastly, CRAs often force users 
to create accounts and surrender their data to third parties in order to 
access the disclosed information. 
Monitoring by the Commission
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP)15
The MIP operates on an annual cycle, beginning with the publication 
of an economic and financial assessment, and then an in-depth review 
where required, before the Commission offers country-specific 
recommendations to correct the imbalances. If a country’s imbalances 
are found to be ‘excessive’, the Commission should propose that the 
Council activate the ‘excessive imbalance procedure’, which includes the 
13 This amendment to the CRA regulation is also referred to as CRA II.
14 ECA (2015) “EU supervision of credit rating agencies”, p15
15 ECA (2018) “Audit of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP)”, ECA Special 
Report no.3/2018
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possibility of sanctions on euro area Member States. It exists to prevent 
the build-up of imbalances across the euro area, which was an issue 
before the 2008 financial crisis.  
The ECA audited the design and the implementation of the MIP 
between 2012 and 2017. We found that the procedure is well designed, 
but that the Commission is not implementing it in such a way to ensure 
effective prevention and correction of imbalances. When the Commission 
offers country-specific recommendations (CSRs), it is the responsibility 
of the Member State concerned to implement those recommendations. 
However, without the systematic linking of the MIP-country-specific 
recommendations to specific macroeconomic imbalances by the 
Commission, it is difficult for Member States to take appropriate remedial 
action. The ECA also noted that there is some inconsistency between 
CSRs offered for the national level and those offered at the euro area level. 
It is also notable that the Commission has not recommended 
activation of the excessive imbalance procedure since the establishment 
of the MIP in 2012, despite several Member States having been identified 
as having excessive imbalances, with some on no less than 16 occasions.16 
The Commission could not provide sufficient audit evidence to justify 
the systematic non-activation of the excessive imbalance procedure, 
leading the ECA to conclude that the politicisation of the later stages of 
the process have “reduced the credibility and effectiveness of the MIP”.17 
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP)18
The Excessive Deficit Procedure is designed to help prevent EU Member 
States amassing excessive government deficits. This is done by checking 
the data from each Member State to assess whether thresholds have been 
breached. The Commission then provides a series of recommendations 
and a deadline to any Member State placed under the EDP, and continues 
to monitor the implementation of the corrective measures. 
The ECA examined the Commission’s implementation of the 
procedure in six Member States between 2008 and 2015. We found 
positive signs in the Commission’s efforts to adapt, simplify and 
rationalise the procedure. According to the ECA’s 2016 special report, the 
16 Ibid., p33
17 Ibid., p34
18 ECA (2016) “Further improvements needed to ensure effective implementation of the 
excessive deficit procedure”, ECA Special Report no.10/2016
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Commission acknowledged that further improvements could be made 
in the usefulness of the tool by increasing transparency to “maximise the 
effectiveness of extensive rules and guidelines”.19 
The ECA also found that the effectiveness of the Commission’s 
enhanced surveillance under the new reporting requirements of the ‘Six-
pack’ and ‘Two-pack’ measures was dependent on the cooperation of 
the Member States, and that there is no legislative provision or sanction 
to ensure compliance. Therefore, it is even more important that the 
Commission makes full use of the tools it does have at its disposal in 
other areas. However, as with the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure, 
the ECA’s auditors found that the Commission does not make full use 
of its powers, in this case to ensure progress towards the resolution of 
‘action points’ concerning methodology and data completeness, even if 
their resolution within the deadline is also not mandatory. 
In addition, transparency – always regarded by the ECA as vitally 
important – was found to be lacking, despite improvements, with a lot of 
information on data assumptions and parameters unavailable.  
The ECA is also in the process of preparing two reports on the European 
Semester, which are due to be published in 2018. 
Assistance to countries in difficulty
A number of financial instruments were used to help countries 
experiencing difficulties. For instance, a balance-of-payments 
mechanism was available to both euro area and non-euro area countries 
through loans conditional on the implementation of policies designed to 
address underlying economic problems, often in cooperation with the 
International Monetary Fund.20 In addition, during the crisis, bilateral 
loans from euro area countries (the so-called Greek Loan Facility) were 
also provided in 2010 as the first financial support programme for Greece. 
The European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism was created to provide 
conditional financial assistance to euro area countries in difficulty and 
was used in Ireland and Portugal, as well as to provide short-term bridging 
loans to Greece. Though it still exists for specific tasks left over from the 
crisis, the principal provider of financial assistance to EU countries is 
19 Ibid., p75
20 European Commission (2018) “Balance of payments (BoP) assistance”, https://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-fi-
nancial-assistance/loan-programmes/balance-payments-bop-assistance_en  
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now the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which has been used in 
Greece, Spain and Cyprus. The ESM is the successor to the temporary 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). The EFSF and now the ESM 
act as a €700 billion backstop for euro area countries who can no longer 
access the markets.21 
Financial assistance to countries in difficulty22
For its audit investigation into the financial assistance provided to 
countries in difficulty – Hungary, Portugal, Ireland, Latvia and Romania 
– the ECA found that after initially being unprepared, the Commission 
oversaw programmes that were successful in prompting reforms. Until the 
crisis, the Commission had estimated those countries’ public budgets to 
be stronger than they actually turned out to be, thus exposing weaknesses 
in its methodology for estimating fiscal balances and surveillance of 
large foreign financial inflows. This meant that the Commission was 
unprepared when countries started requesting assistance. That said, even 
with warning signs missed, given the enormous time constraints, the 
Commission managed to take on new management duties and gather the 
necessary expertise.
The ECA found that in the Commission’s processes there was limited 
quality control, weak monitoring and shortcomings in documentation. 
Furthermore, there were differences in the way some countries were 
treated in comparable situations. This stemmed from the fact that the 
Commission managed the conditions for each financial assistance 
programme differently. In some cases, frequent changes to conditions 
made progress hard to track, while in others reforms became gradually 
diluted, making them less stringent and therefore easier to comply 
with. The structural reforms required were not always in proportion 
to the problems faced, or they pursued widely different paths. In some 
countries deficit targets were relaxed more than the economic situation 
would appear to justify.
21 ESM (2018) “History”, https://www.esm.europa.eu/about-us/history 
22 ECA (2015) “Financial assistance provided to countries in difficulties”, ECA Special 
Report no.18/2015
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Despite these weaknesses in process, some of which did improve over 
time, the assistance programmes were successful in prompting reforms.23 
Overall, the assistance was soundly based and countries continued with 
the reforms initiated by the programmes, with deficit targets mostly met. 
Financial and technical assistance to Greece24 25
When Greece requested external assistance in 2010, the European 
Commission responded with both technical and financial assistance. 
The technical assistance involved the creation of a Task Force, which was 
focused on helping Greece undertake reforms of its public administration, 
improve the tax system, and also helping foster growth. The financial 
assistance took the form of three economic adjustment programmes – 
the last of which is due to finish in August 2018 – which aimed to cover 
the country’s immediate financing needs, as well as prompting structural 
reforms in the Greek economy.
The two ECA special reports on both types of assistance to Greece 
sought to assess whether the EU’s interventions made a positive impact 
in helping bring about reform. It should be noted that we did not audit 
the actions of the International Monetary Fund, European Stability 
Mechanism or Greek authorities, nor did we examine the counterfactual 
scenario of no financial assistance. 
The ECA found, as was the case for the other countries in difficulty, 
that after initially being unprepared, the Commission did well to establish 
new functions quickly in a field where it had little prior experience. In all 
the assistance provided to Greece, also as with the financial assistance to 
other countries, we found a need to better formalise inter-institutional 
cooperation with other programme partners, namely to improve 
transparency.  
The EU’s financial assistance has had varying degrees of success in 
bringing about reform in four key areas: taxation, public administration, 
the labour market, and the financial sector. 
23 One of the areas that improved markedly during the period audited was the pro-
gramme documents, which provide the basis for the decisions taken by the Council or 
Commission. In time, the Commission allocated staff more effectively and was better 
prepared (ECA (2015) “Financial assistance to countries in difficulties” p9). 
24 ECA (2015) “More attention needed to improve the delivery of technical assistance to 
Greece”, ECA Special Report no.19/2015
25 ECA (2017) “The Commission’s intervention in the Greek financial crisis”, ECA Special 
Report no.17/2017
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We found that the conditions in the economic adjustment 
programmes were not embedded in a broader, Greek-led, long-term 
strategy for the country. The Commission also did not adapt their scope 
and timing appropriately. There were also weaknesses in the assessment 
of implementation of structural reforms. The assessments should be more 
systematic and accurately documented, and the Commission should 
undertake an interim evaluation for successive programmes.
Overall, reforms did bring fiscal savings, but the specific objectives 
of the adjustment programmes were only met to a limited extent, partly 
because of the political instability the country experienced in this period. 
That said, most importantly, these programmes helped avoid default by 
Greece, by promoting reform and bringing fiscal consolidation. However, 
the country’s ability to finance itself fully on the financial markets remains 
a challenge as of early 2018.
As far as the technical assistance is concerned, a Task Force mobilised 
expertise from Member States, international organisations, and other 
specialist bodies, and coordinated technical assistance requested by 
the Greek authorities as they worked to implement structural reform 
commitments under the Economic Adjustment Programmes for Greece. 
We found that the Task Force was flexible and effectively delivered 
assistance that was innovative but did not always prove effective in some 
areas, such as in the design of long-term projects.26    
A key player in the EU’s financial assistance, and increasingly in other 
areas such as the Banking Union, is the European Central Bank (ECB). 
The European Court of Auditors is mandated to audit the operational 
efficiency of the management of the ECB, thus we attempted to assess its 
involvement in the Greek programmes. However, this line of inquiry has 
emerged as an audit gap in recent years, as the Bank has questioned this 
mandate and refused to provide sufficient evidence for audit conclusions 
to be drawn. As the following section will highlight, this poses a risk to 
accountability, both at present and in future.
26  ECA (2015) “Technical assistance to Greece”, p8
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Banking Union
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)27 and its crisis management28
The financial crisis also encouraged euro area Member States towards 
establishing the Banking Union. The first pillar of this is the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). It is designed to guarantee the consistent 
application of prudential rules – to improve financial condition of credit 
institutions – across the euro area. This move towards Banking Union 
gave the ECB, through the SSM, the power to supervise the banking 
sector in close cooperation with the national authorities. If the ECB finds 
that one of the 120 most important banking groups that it supervises is 
failing, or is about to fail, it notifies the Single Resolution Board, and then 
the Board adopts a scheme placing the bank concerned into resolution. 
The ECA audited the operational efficiency of the SSM, as well as 
its crisis management mechanisms. In general, it found that the ECB 
succeeded in establishing a complex supervisory structure and system 
of supervision in a relatively short time, but this complexity means it is 
reliant on on strong coordination. In practice this means that it is too 
heavily reliant on national competent authorities rather than its own 
inspectors to ensure ‘full and effective supervision’, as required by EU 
law. For instance, when carrying out inspections, teams were 92% staffed 
by the national authorities, as opposed to ECB officials. This means that 
while resources are shared, there is considerable scope for overlap and 
possible conflicts of interest, as very few ECB staff are involved in both 
on-site and off-site supervision. 
Also there is a lack of separation between monetary policy and 
supervision functions. The ECB’s structure means that supervision is 
overseen by the SSM Supervisory Board, but this does not have control 
over the supervisory budget, which raised concerns at the Court about 
the independence of the two areas of the ECB’s work. Moreover, there is 
a sharing of services between departments, where some provide services 
to both functions, but without clear rules to minimise potential conflicts 
of objectives.29 
27 ECA (2016) “Single Supervisory Mechanism – Good start but further improvements 
needed”, ECA Special Report no.29/2016
28 ECA (2018) “The operational efficiency of the ECB’s crisis management for banks [SSM 
II]”, ECA Special Report no.02/2018
29 ECA (2016) “Single Supervisory Mechanism”, p10
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On the ECB’s crisis management for banks, the ECA found that overall 
the framework for crisis management procedures was substantial and the 
ECB’s process for assessing banks’ recovery plans is positive. However, the 
same problems occur in this area with regards to allocation of staff when 
urgent situations arise. Furthermore, there are flaws related to guidance 
in the operational framework for crisis management. In particular, there 
is a “lack of objective criteria or indicators for determining that a bank 
has entered a crisis situation” and “there is no guidance on the best use of 
the ECB’s powers or the most appropriate measures to be considered in 
specific scenarios”.30 
Single Resolution Board (SRB)31 
The second pillar of the Banking Union is the Single Resolution 
Mechanism (SRM), which has responsibility for dealing with failing 
banks in the euro area, with decisions taken by the Single Resolution 
Board (SRB). The SRB’s work, as part of a broader system of supervision, 
is guided by the Single Rulebook, which is a harmonisation of legislation 
and guidelines on the resolution and supervision of banks. The SRB, 
with the assistance of national resolution authorities, is responsible for 
contingency planning for the resolution of banks within its remit, and 
for managing bank resolution procedures as necessary and appropriate. 
Its remit extends to all significant banks and cross-border less significant 
banks in the euro area.
For its audit, the ECA assessed whether the SRB is equipped to 
undertake bank resolutions effectively. As with all the newly created 
components in the EU’s financial architecture, setting up in a short time 
frame proved a challenge. Resolution planning, it was found, requires 
continued efforts to improve the resolution plans, as well as a system of 
rules and guidance for resolution planning. Staffing issues also affect the 
SRB. In this case though, the Board’s activities are being held back by a 
basic lack of personnel.  
The SRB’s future work and impact is also dependent on an 
improvement in external cooperation and coordination with the ECB, 
and between these bodies and national level. Specifically, the division 
of responsibilities between the national authorities and the SRB is still 
30  ECA (2018) “The operational efficiency of the ECB’s crisis management for banks”, p11
31 ECA (2017) “Single Resolution Board: Work on a challenging Banking Union task 
started, but still a long way to go”, ECA Special Report no.23/2017
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unclear. These issues have the potential to delay and restrict information-
sharing – particularly the flow of information with the ECB – and detract 
from the efficiency of coordination.32 
However, as with its investigations into the financial assistance 
provided to Greece, the Court had trouble fully carrying out its audit 
investigations. For the three reports into both pillars of the Banking 
Union, access to many documents from the ECB – which were necessary 
for completing the audits – was withheld. While the ECA was still able to 
make several observations, it was prevented from drawing full conclusions 
on its findings, despite having an audit mandate. These incidences 
highlight a growing trend towards the emergence of potential audit 
gaps, and the serious knock-on effects this has for public accountability, 
particularly in light of the potential for future developments in the EU’s 
financial architecture.  
Future developments
The experiences of the last decade have been a considerable test for the EU, 
its institutions, and its Member States. Overall, the ECA has found that 
in the white heat of the financial and sovereign debt crises, the European 
Commission has generally laid positive foundations towards resolving 
the weaknesses that left it so exposed to the last crisis. Nevertheless, there 
are inevitably improvements to be made throughout all four clusters 
discussed in this chapter. 
In the moment of writing, in early 2018, we are presented with a 
great opportunity to make those improvements to the construction and 
governance of the euro area, and complete the Banking Union. It is vital 
that we capitalise while the euro area is returning to health. 
Proposals outlining how the EU’s economic and monetary union 
might develop over the coming years have been made, and it is now up to 
Europe’s policymakers, to decide what shape the future will take. 
However, it is equally important that accountability plays a central role 
in that future. The financial crisis has prompted the EU and its Member 
States to improve the EU’s financial governance architecture, but this has 
meant the EU’s institutional framework has become more complex. As 
the ECA highlighted in 2014 and has discovered since, some institutions 
and bodies have gained responsibilities quickly, but are not subject to 
comprehensive external audit. This means, for example, that the ECA is 
32 ECA (2018) “The operational efficiency of the ECB’s crisis management for banks”, p10
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limited in what and how it can audit the activities of the ECB. Meanwhile, 
the ESM is an international financial institution that currently lies outside 
the TFEU, and therefore also outside the remit of public auditors.  
Without proper and consistent public audit arrangements, there 
remains the strong possibility for gaps in accountability in the EU’s 
financial governance architecture. Reform requires policymakers to pay 
attention to not only the core aims of the initiatives being undertaken, 
but to proper accountability to the European and National Parliaments, 
as well as clearly defined audit and access rights for external auditors, 
such as the European Court of Auditors, to properly fulfil its mandate as 
the guardians of the EU’s finances in the future. 
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WHY HAS EURO CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
BEEN SO HARD?
Jeromin Zettelmeyer1
The euro crisis began in 2010 as a fiscal crisis in Greece and a banking 
crisis in Ireland, two small countries which together made up about 4 
percent of euro area GDP. IMF-EU programs backed by the ECB were 
meant to quickly address the underlying fiscal and financial problems 
and prevent contagion. Instead, the crisis spun out of control. By early 
2011, it had reached Portugal; by the third quarter of 2011, Italy and 
Spain. By 2012, the entire euro area was in recession. Even after it began 
to recover, in 2014, aftershocks of the crisis continued to haunt the euro 
area. After a government opposing EU- and IMF- sponsored adjustment 
came to power, Greece almost exited the euro in 2015. Most recently, 
a government coalition crystalizing anti-EU sentiment in Italy poses a 
serious, perhaps existential, challenge to the euro and the EU. With sim-
ilarly polarized views in other countries, it looks like the euro crisis may 
be perpetuating itself indefinitely (or until the euro collapses).
Why was it so difficult to bring the euro crisis under control, and 
why do we continue to suffer from its legacies today, after more than 
eight years? Part of the answer surely has to do with the extent of private 
and public debt problems accumulated in the boom years – in some 
countries, on top of high pre-existing levels – and the magnitude of the 
external financial shock that hit the euro area in 2008-09, triggering a 
deep recession. But the United States and other advanced countries were 
similarly affected by the 2008-09 financial crisis and recovered much more 
quickly. Among 37 countries listed as “advanced” by the IMF, 32 suffered 
negative growth in 2009, but only 11 – nine members of the euro area, 
1 Peterson Institute for International Economics, CEPR and CESifo. 
 I am grateful to Olivier Blanchard, Mitu Gulati and Jean Pisani-Ferry for insightful 
comments on an earlier draft.
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plus neighboring Sweden and the Czech Republic – suffered a double 
dip recession, with negative growth in 2012. Hence, the full answer must 
surely include the struggle of euro area institutions – defined broadly to 
include the European Commission, the ECB, political institutions such as 
the Eurogroup of finance ministers, and national authorities – to develop 
a coherent and effective crisis response.
This essay explores three reasons why European institutions found 
it so difficult to manage the crisis, all of which are specific to the euro 
area setting.2 First, managing a center-periphery crisis in a currency 
union setting poses specific challenges. It took European institutions 
time to understand and address them. The second reason was a collective 
action problem caused by creditor-debtor conflict of interests. The third 
reason, finally, reflects an intellectual and political failure, namely, the 
transposition of creditor-debtor conflicts to a setting – the debate about 
euro area reform – where these conflicts could and should have been 
avoided.
Learning to manage an international financial crisis inside 
a currency union 
Compared to systems of pegged exchange rates, which European countries 
had experimented with in the 1980s and 1990s, currency unions are much 
more resilient because the payments system linking member central 
banks (called “Target” in the euro area) can accommodate unlimited 
capital flows between members. A currency union is equivalent to a fixed 
exchange rate regime combined with permanent and unlimited central 
bank swap lines, at pre-determined rates, between the members of the 
regime. Official balance of payments support of the kind that the IMF 
has traditionally provided is hence unnecessary: unlimited access to such 
support is an automatic privilege of membership.  Perhaps reflecting this 
reasoning, the EU’s Balance of Payments Facility, created in 1988 to allow 
EU members to adjust to balance of payments disequilibria, excluded 
Euro area members from 2002 onwards.
However, the consequences of capital flow reversals go beyond the 
2 These reasons are not meant to be exhaustive. For example, a frequent criticism is 
that euro area authorities were slow to force banks to recognize losses and raise cap-
ital, delaying the recovery (see the April 2013 and April 2014 issues of the IMF’s 
Global Financial Stability report). This criticism is directed primarily at national au-
thorities managing their own economies, and it is not clear that membership in the 
currency union had much to do with this particular set of policy choices (a similar 
criticism, although to a lesser extent, was directed at the UK). 
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balance of payments. “Sudden stops” in capital flows can prick credit 
bubbles, expose underlying private debt problems, and precipitate a 
collapse of credit and investment through financial sector channels. 
In severe cases, they can trigger banking crises. They can also lead to 
sovereign debt crises: via tighter financing conditions, spillovers from 
banking crises, and through the impact of a recession on government 
finances. 
As it turned out, these implications of capital flow reversals not only 
continued to be possible in the euro area, they also became harder to 
manage. As Europe discovered after the collapse of Dexia in late 2008, 
pre-crisis financial integration, partly induced by currency union, can 
make the resolution of banking crises more difficult. The same is true for 
the management of fiscal crises: currency union sovereigns are exposed 
to self-fulfilling debt runs, since they lack national central banks that 
would normally be able to backstop their liquidity (De Grauwe 2011). 
With Italy and Spain on the brink of losing market access in 2011 and 
2012, a construct needed to be found that allowed the ECB to assume 
this role within the legal constraints posed by its prohibition of monetary 
financing of governments. 
European institutions responded to these challenges – incrementally, 
and punctuated by mistakes and setbacks, but they eventually got 
it right.3  The first step was the creation of temporary facilities – the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the ECB’s Secondary 
Market Programme (SMP) – to lend to crisis-hit sovereigns and stabilize 
government bond markets, respectively. This was followed by a blueprint 
for creating the ESM, designed specifically to deal with sovereign debt 
crises inside the euro area. Mistakes and setbacks included the design of 
the SMP, a limited-volume program subordinating private bondholders; 
the design of the first Greek program; the Deauville announcement 
linking the creation of the ESM to “private sector involvement” (PSI); 
and the initial decision to “haircut” depositor in Cyprus. Most of these 
mistakes were later reversed or at least contained, albeit at considerable 
cost; but some, like the catastrophic Greek program, caused permanent 
damage. 
The backdrop for some of these mistakes was a conflict of interests 
– in particular, the desire to minimize any redistribution benefiting the 
crisis countries, a topic taken up below. Others simply reflected a lack of 
3 For accounts of the crisis response, from different perspectives, see Pisani-Ferry 
(2014) and Bastasin (2015).
Why has euro crisis management been so hard? - Jeromin Zettelmeyer
86
experience in managing financial crises. The Deauville announcement is 
a case in point. The principle that unsustainable debt ought to trigger a 
debt restructuring “involving” private creditors is commonsensical (even 
tautological), and the idea that the euro area should have a procedure 
for doing so was sound. But the communication was terrible. Markets 
interpreted the PSI announced at Deauville not as a rarely-to-be-used 
feature of the European financial architecture that would be erected 
after the crisis (as it was presumably intended), but as a signal that the 
official sector would insist on debt restructuring in the crisis that was just 
beginning to unfold. 
The crisis was contained only after the ECBs announced the “Outright 
Monetary Transactions” (OMT) program, plugging the most threatening 
hole in the crisis resolution architecture of the euro area – the inability 
to stop a self-fulfilling run on the debts of a member state. The period 
of experimentation and ad hoc institution-building was over, but it took 
two and a half years – from April 2010 until September of 2012.
A “chicken game”: crisis resolution in the presence of 
distributional conflict
The resolution of debt crises involves a trade-off between fiscal adjustment, 
official financing, and debt restructuring. How this trade-off is resolved 
has significant distributional implications. Fiscal adjustment goes at 
the expense of the debtor country. Official financing puts the resources 
of official creditors and their shareholders – referred to as the creditor 
countries – at risk. Debt restructuring goes at the expense of private 
creditors, and so reduces the direct drain on public resources. But it also 
creates financial stability risks in both debtor and creditor countries, as 
private creditors may be systemically – and politically – important. 
As a result, while creditor and debtor countries have a shared interest 
in resolving the crisis quickly, their interests conflict on how to resolve it. 
In the euro crisis, debtor countries wanted moderate fiscal adjustment, 
ample official financing and – in the case of Ireland – a bail-in of senior 
bank bondholders. In contrast, creditor countries wanted as much fiscal 
adjustment and as little official financing as possible (preferably on 
penalty terms, one of the several mistakes of the initial Greek program). 
They were also opposed to restructuring bondholders, in Ireland and 
initially in Greece, both because the ECB feared that this would set an 
adverse precedent and lead to contagion and because some of the banks 
holding bonds had tight connections to their respective governments.
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This resulted in an incentives structure prone to gambles for 
redemption – postponing debt restructuring to see if it could be avoided 
altogether. Incentives faced by debtor and creditor countries also shared 
some of the features of the “game of chicken”, in which accommodation 
by at least one side is necessary to avoid catastrophe, but each side 
prefers the other to do the accommodation.4  In the case of the euro area 
crisis, as in the game of chicken, outright catastrophe – in the sense of 
disorderly default and euro area exit – was avoided. Instead, one of the 
two equilibria predicted by the game of chicken prevailed – namely, deep 
fiscal adjustment, and too little debt restructuring. Debtor countries 
agreed to crisis resolution strategies that accommodated the preferences 
of the creditor countries.
Apart from being inefficient, this equilibrium created problems that 
went beyond what is captured in the (static) chicken game. First, even 
where fiscal adjustment worked in the sense of eventually engineering 
a return to capital markets, it contributed to a sense of unfair treatment 
in the debtor countries. Europe helped them avoid catastrophe, but on 
harsh and seemingly self-serving terms. Second, in one case – Greece 
– excessive fiscal adjustment and the failure to undertake meaningful 
reform exacerbated the economic collapse, led to a debt restructuring 
that was too little and too late, and created a political backlash that 
generated a new crisis in 2015.
Neither debtor nor creditor countries can be blamed for trying to 
resolve the crisis on their terms. There was a genuine conflict of interest. 
This said, the creditor countries and the institutions advising them and 
setting the terms of the adjustment – the European Commission and 
the IMF – should have realized that pushing the debtor countries too 
far risked undermining the crisis resolution strategy in both economic 
and political terms. More than eight years after the agreement on the first 
program, in Greece, Europe is still suffering the consequences.
4 The game of chicken has its name from a game played by two trucks on a collision 
course, in which the first driver to “chicken out” (i.e. to accommodate by swerving 
to avoid collision) loses the game. There are no equilibria in which both sides accom-
modate, or both fail to accommodate. Failure to accommodate by both sides would 
lead to collision, which any of the two sides would prefer to avoid by swerving. Ac-
commodation by both sides is not an equilibrium either, since each side would prefer 
to win by not accommodating. Hence the two equilibria of the game involve one side 
accommodating but not the other. In the context of the euro crisis, accommodation 
by a debtor country can be interpreted to mean to accept ambitious fiscal adjust-
ment, while accommodation by the creditors would have meant a larger financing 
envelope or an early acceptance of debt restructuring.
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Euro area reform through the prism of redistribution
The third reason why the euro crisis dragged on and crisis-related political 
fault lines became increasingly cemented was that the distributional 
conflict created by the crisis infected attempts to reform the long-
term financial architecture of EMU. This created costs by shackling 
institutional design – for example, defining the ESM as an “ultima ratio” 
institution that can be activated only in the face of a threat to the euro area 
as a whole, rather than pre-emptively and proportionally. It also stopped 
more ambitious reforms, such as the completion of banking union. And 
it contributed to a continuing anti-euro backlash in both creditor and 
debtor countries. 
In the public opinion of creditor countries, plans for more risk 
sharing across EMU members – proposed by the European Commission 
and countries such as France, Italy and Spain – are now widely viewed 
as attempts to create a regime in which virtuous, better performing 
countries would pay for the sins of past and future crisis countries. In the 
debtor countries, lack of progress on euro area reform has been widely 
interpreted as a sign that the creditors were unwilling to show solidarity, 
instead forcing the “south” to engage in austerity policies and other 
forms of self-harm. Both narratives lead to the same conclusion: that the 
euro is a threat to democracy, either because it forces countries to take 
actions against the will of their electorates (a familiar argument in Italy) 
or because it creates contingent fiscal commitments, through a growing 
number of institutions that mutualize risk, forcing elected representatives 
to surrender fiscal control (a frequent line of argument in Germany). The 
creation or rise of populist parties such as Syriza, the AfD, the Lega, or 
Five Star is directly linked to these narratives.
However, the premise on which these arguments are built – that 
more risk sharing in the euro area boils down to more north-to-south 
transfers –  is incorrect. Unlike crisis resolution, successful institutional 
reform in the euro area does not entail an inherent distributional conflict. 
Depending on how risk-sharing institutions are designed, the alleged 
trade-off between risk sharing and good incentives may not exist. This 
is clear from the fact that insurance arrangements are commercially 
viable, which could not be the case if they were to lead to systematic 
transfers from the insurer to the insured. Although insurance can give 
rise to moral hazard, this can be contained through the design of the 
insurance contract, which ensures that insurance is beneficial for all 
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contracting parties. By transposing features of insurance contracts such 
as deductibles or experience-rated contributions to euro area risk sharing 
arrangements such as euro area deposit insurance or unemployment 
insurance, it would be possible to significantly lower risk in the euro area 
without creating a “transfer union” (see, among others, Gros 2013, Gros 
2018, Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2018, and Véron and Schnabel 2018).5
Two recent papers, by Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2018) and Berger et 
al (2018), take this argument a step further. They argue that, far from 
leading to “transfer union” and undermining incentives, well-designed 
risk sharing arrangements are in fact needed to rule out transfer union, 
because without them, the no-bailout-rule is not credible. When debt 
restructuring leads to significant domestic euro area disruptions, even 
creditor countries will be in favor of bailouts. Hence, debt restructuring is 
unlikely to happen even when it is efficient ex ante, and when the chances 
that bailouts will succeed are low.6 
Unfortunately, governments across the euro area – particularly 
creditor country governments – have failed to distance themselves from 
the idea that risk sharing in the euro area necessarily entails (systematic) 
redistribution. Some governments, notably in Germany, are in fact guilty 
of actively promoting the idea. The German government has traditionally 
rejected both European deposit insurance and fiscal risk sharing, claiming 
that this would lead to moral hazard. Even reinsurance was viewed as 
an unacceptable “further mutualization of risks”.7 Little wonder, then, 
that many German voters have bought into the idea that any form of 
additional euro area risk sharing runs counter to the German interest. 
By promoting the idea that more risk sharing will likely lead to north-
to-south redistribution, the German government has given intellectual 
respectability to the arguments of Eurosceptics and done a disservice to 
German and European interests.8 
5 See Gros (2013), Gros (2018), Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2018) and Véron and Schnabel 
(2018). 
6 This argument is not new: Gros and Meyer (2010) advocated the creation of a “Euro-
pean Monetary Fund” on the grounds that “Market discipline can only be established 
if default is possible because its cost can be contained.”
7 German non-paper on banking union, 8. September 2015, http://blogs.ft.com/brus-
selsblog/files/2015/09/Nonpaperfinal_20150910091345.pdf 
8 Very recently, there are signs that the German position may be shifting. Germany’s 
new finance minister, Olaf Scholz, has recently endorsed the idea of a European un-
employment reinsurance mechanism, albeit one based on loans rather than transfers. 
See http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/interview-with-finance-minis-
ter-olaf-scholz-a-1211942.html 
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More surprisingly, the proposition that meaningful euro area risk 
sharing is possible without systematic transfers has also been under attack 
from the opposite end of the political spectrum. Commentators such as 
Münchau (2018a) and academics such as de Grauwe and Ji (2018) have 
taken the view that only full risk mutualization will make the euro area safe, 
in the form of a jointly and severally guaranteed “Eurobond.”  Proposals 
to create euro area safe assets that avoid mutualization (see Brunnermeier 
et al, 2017 and Leandro and Zettelmeyer 2018 a,b for a survey) are 
derided as a euro area version of the “CDO scam of the subprime years”, 
and the Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2018) proposals to reconcile risk sharing 
with good incentives as “astonishing for its lack of ambition” (Münchau 
2018a,b). These commentators agree with the intellectual premise of the 
Eurosceptics, namely, that risk sharing inevitably implies redistribution 
at the expense of countries with track records of fiscal prudence. The only 
difference is that they view redistribution of this type as an acceptable 
price to pay for a successful euro area, whereas northern Eurosceptics 
do not.
Conclusion 
The euro crisis was difficult to bring under control in part because 
managing a debt crisis inside a currency union posed new challenges 
that took time to understand and address, and in part because debt crises 
create conflicts of interests that turned out to be particularly pernicious in 
the euro area context. These conflicts delayed or prevented effective crisis 
resolution and created a legacy of resentment and distrust between debtor 
and creditor countries. They also contributed to the view that meaningful 
euro area risk sharing necessarily has redistributive consequences, at the 
expense of countries with track records of fiscal prudence. 
Although wrong, this view is hard to dispel, in part because it has 
attracted support both from opponents of any risk sharing at the level of 
the euro area and from proponents of full risk mutualization.  Reform 
of the euro area financial architecture that seeks to avoid permanent 
redistribution is rejected by one side because it is viewed as a ploy that 
will ultimately lead to mutualization through the back door, and by the 
other because it lacks mutualization through the front door. It is hard 
to see how meaningful reform – with or without redistribution – can 
succeed in such circumstances. 
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USE OF THE LOCAL LAW ADVANTAGE 
IN THE RESTRUCTURING OF 
EUROPEAN SOVEREIGN BONDS
Lee C. Buchheit1
Abstract
Emerging market sovereigns issue bonds in the international capital 
markets governed by a foreign legal regime such as the law of England 
or New York State. European sovereigns, however, have been able to 
issue bonds governed by the issuer’s own law. In the event of a future 
financial crisis, this gives European sovereign issuers the ability to pass 
local legislation that will facilitate an eventual restructuring of their 
bonds — the “local law advantage.” Greece did this in 2012 as part of a 
restructuring of €206 billion of Greek Government bonds.
The validity of the revisions to Greek law enacted in 2012 by the Greek 
Parliament has been upheld in multiple judicial challenges (in Greece, 
Germany, Austria and before the European Court of Human Rights), as 
well in a major ICSID arbitration. This raises the question of whether 
other European sovereigns enjoying the local law advantage over their 
bonds can, in an emergency, rely on the power of their own legislatures 
to amend local law in order to facilitate a future restructuring of those 
instruments.
1 Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP
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The Local Law Advantage
When emerging market sovereigns issue bonds in the international 
capital markets, those bonds are governed by a foreign law, normally the 
law of England or the State of New York. The reason is simple. Allowing 
a sovereign bond to be governed by the sovereign’s own law places the 
investor at the mercy of the local legislature. If the local law changes in 
a manner that impairs the performance of a local law bond or facilitates 
its restructuring, even judges in New York and England must respect that 
change.2 I shall refer to this as the “local law advantage” that a sovereign 
enjoys over a bond governed by its own law. In contrast, a sovereign bond 
governed by a foreign law will be beyond the mischievous reach of the 
country’s legislature. Sovereigns can (and occasionally do) attempt to 
pass laws —  normally in the nature of capital controls — that purport to 
interfere with the performance of foreign currency-denominated bonds, 
but these enactments rarely provide the issuer with a legal defense to the 
performance of the instrument in a foreign court.3
Unlike their emerging market counterparts, European sovereigns have 
generally been able to issue bonds governed by their own law. Investors 
seem to have more confidence that a developed country will not attempt 
to change its law in a manner that may injure holders of the sovereign’s 
debt instruments. To do so, the argument goes, would be suicidal for a 
country that must regularly refinance its debt from the capital markets 
with the support of foreign investors.
Greece 2012
When the Greek sovereign debt crisis erupted in the spring of 2010, 
the official sector (the EU and the IMF) elected to lend Greece all the 
money needed to repay maturing Greek Government Bonds (“GGBs”) 
in full and on time. A similar policy was later followed in the bailouts for 
Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus. The problem was that Greece’s debt stock 
was obviously unsustainable. On the night/early morning of October 
26-27, 2011, the official sector actors therefore careened from their prior 
position of forbidding Greece from restructuring any of its debt to a new 
2  See New York City Bar, Governing Law in Sovereign Debt-Lessons from the Greek Crisis 
and Argentina Dispute of 2012, Committee on Foreign & Comparative Law, Feb. 2013, at 
page 7, summary point 3. http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072390-Gov-
erningLawinSovereignDebt.pdf.
3 Lee C. Buchheit & Elena S. Daly, Contracts in a Time of Capital Controls, J. int’l bank-
ing and fin. law (Sept. 2015).
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position commanding Greece to restructure all of the GGBs left in the 
hands of private sector investors with at least a 50% principal haircut. 
Having decreed the result, however, the official sector did not confide the 
method by which that result was to be achieved. Greece was given five 
months to complete the debt restructuring or face default and a possible 
exit from the Eurozone.
For the prior two years, GGB holders saw Greece’s official sector 
sponsors lend Greece the money needed to repay maturing GGBs. Senior 
public officials such as the President of the European Central Bank and 
his deputies issued regular assurances to the effect that there never would 
be a sovereign debt restructuring in the Eurozone (which the market 
understandably heard as an assurance that all Eurozone sovereign bonds 
would be paid in full).4 The market could thus literally smell the official 
sector’s fear of bringing a messy Argentina-style debt crisis to the belly of 
Europe. In the face of this, a significant number of GGB holders would 
probably have called the official sector’s bluff by declining to restructure 
their GGBs. After the tens of billions of euros already sunk in bailing 
out Greece, Ireland and Portugal, would the official sector really risk a 
collapse by allowing Greece to default on holdout GGBs? The question of 
the hour was therefore how to minimize the anticipated holdout creditor 
population in a savage restructuring of GGBs.
Greece enjoyed a significant local law advantage with respect to its 
bond indebtedness. Approximately 93% of GGBs were governed by 
Greek law. To facilitate the debt restructuring, the Greek Parliament 
passed a law on February 23, 2012 that effectively homogenized the 
holders of Greek-law governed GGBs into a single class for purposes of 
voting on a debt restructuring. If holders of at least 50% in aggregate 
principal amount of the Greek law-governed GGBs voted either in 
favor or against the proposed amendment, and at least two-thirds of the 
principal amount voted accepted the terms of a debt restructuring, their 
decision would bind all other holders of those instruments. The law thus 
embodied the notion of supermajority creditor control of the process, 
very much along the lines of the class voting mechanism prescribed in 
domestic insolvency regimes for corporate debtors.
In choosing to retrofit a class voting mechanism on the holders of 
Greek law-governed GGBs, the Greek Parliament made a restrained use 
of its local law advantage. Parliament could, for example, have attempted 
to impose directly the financial terms of the restructuring by legislative 
4 For a description, see Paul Blustein, Laid Low: Inside the Crisis that Overwhelmed 
Europe and the IMF (2016).
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fiat, rather than allow the affected creditors to vote on the measure. But 
such a thermonuclear use of the local law advantage would not have been 
supported by Greece’s official sector sponsors. Moreover, the members 
of the Euro-area had already endorsed the use of a creditor class voting 
mechanism as a method for dealing with future sovereign debt crises in 
Europe.5
It worked. The necessary supermajority of creditors approved the 
restructuring in March 2012 and accordingly there were no holdouts 
among the universe of Greek law-governed GGBs. Thirty-six series 
of GGBs were governed by English law, each with its own collective 
action clause. The required supermajority bondholder consent to join 
the restructuring was obtained for 17 of these series of English law 
GGBs. Holdout creditors had acquired blocking positions in the other 
series. Approximately 97% of the eligible debt stock was covered by the 
restructuring.
Parliament’s action was subsequently challenged in Greek, German 
and Austrian courts, as well as in a major arbitration commenced 
under one of Greece’s bilateral investment treaties.6 The action was also 
challenged in proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights.7 
5 On November 28, 2010, the finance ministers of the larger European countries re-
leased a document bearing the caption ‘Statement by the Eurogroup’. It contained 
the following paragraph: In order to facilitate this process [the restructuring of the 
private sector indebtedness of an insolvent euro area Member State], standardized and 
identical collective action clauses (CACs) will be included, in such a way as to preserve 
market liquidity, in the terms and conditions of all new euro-area government bonds 
starting in June 2013. Those CACs would be consistent with those common under UK 
and US law after the G10 report on CACs, including aggregation clauses allowing all 
debt securities issued by a Member State to be considered together in negotiations. This 
would enable the creditors to pass a qualified majority decision agreeing to a legally 
binding change to the terms of payment (standstill, extension of the maturity, inter-
est-rate cut and/or haircut) in the event that the debtor is unable to pay.
 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecof-
in/118050.pdf. This statement was repeated verbatim in the ‘Conclusions of the 
Heads of State or Government of the Euro Area of 11 March 2011’ http://www.con-
silium.europa.eu/media/21423/20110311-conclusions-of-the-heads-of-state-or-gov-
ernment-of-the-euro-area-of-11-march-2011-en.pdf.
6 For a discussion and thorough analysis of these legal challenges see, Sebastian Gr-
und, Enforcing Sovereign Debt in Court -- A Comparative Analysis of Litigation and 
Arbitration Following the Greek Debt Restructuring of 2012, 1 U. Vienna L. Rev. 34 
(2017).
7 Mamatas and Others v. Greece (application nos. 63066/14, 64297/14 and 66106/14). 
See European Court of Human Rights press release of 21 July 2016, ECHR 256 (2016).
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None of these legal challenges prospered.8
Ex post facto laws and sovereign debt workouts
The retroactive implementation of a class voting mechanism on the holders 
of Greek law-governed GGBs was not undertaken lightly. It represented 
perhaps the mildest possible use of Greece’s local law advantage over the 
Greek law-governed debt stock consistent with the need to ensure that 
a transaction — if broadly supported by a supermajority of similarly-
situated creditors — could not be undermined by a holdout minority. The 
Greek authorities and their official sector partners were acutely aware 
that passing any law with retroactive effect, often referred to as an ex post 
facto law, is generally undesirable.
The Greek Parliament’s decision was subsequently validated as a 
matter of Greek and European law. Which raises the question, why 
cannot other European sovereigns — whose debt is wholly or principally 
governed by the sovereign’s own law — follow the Greek precedent should 
circumstances ever require a restructuring of their bonds? Is anything 
more needed, over and above the local law advantage enjoyed by most 
Euro-area sovereigns, to facilitate an orderly restructuring of sovereign 
debt in Europe? In effect, does the Greek precedent obviate the need for 
any other measures to facilitate future sovereign debt restructurings in 
Europe?
My view is that any use of the local law advantage by a European 
sovereign should only be considered as a last resort and, even then, only 
if a crisis erupts before an orderly debt restructuring mechanism can be 
put in place. My reasons are: 
(i) Ex post facto laws are disfavored in all legal regimes for the 
obvious reason that they erode the fundamental premise that 
contracts will be enforced as written.
(ii) Any public suggestion that members of the Euro-area expect 
to rely on ex post facto laws as the principal tool to facilitate future 
sovereign debt restructurings could restrict European sovereigns 
from borrowing under their own laws. Investors should logically 
8 See Sebastian Grund, Restructuring Sovereign Debt Under Local Law: The Greek case 
and Implications for Investor Protection in Europe, 12 Cap. Mkts L. J. 253, 273 (2017) 
(“Five years after Greece implemented the biggest sovereign debt restructuring in his-
tory, European courts and international tribunals have finally vindicated its legal deci-
sion.”)
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begin insisting on the use of a foreign law for European sovereign 
bonds9 or they might begin charging a basis point penalty for the 
continued use of local law. 10
(iii) It is true that Greece survived the legal challenges to its 2012 
legislative retrofit of a class voting mechanism on the local law debt 
stock. But rippling through those decisions is a sense that Greece 
acted with considerable restraint and under absolute necessity. That 
same latitude may not be shown if the member state concerned had 
the opportunity to put in place a forward-looking mechanism to 
ensure an orderly debt restructuring but simply neglected to do so.11
(iv) Each member country will have its own constitutional 
constraints on the ability of the government to interfere with private 
property. The Greek Constitution, for example, provides that no one 
shall be deprived of property “except for public benefit” (Article 17), 
subject to the power of the State “to consolidate social peace and 
protect the general interest” (Article 106). Not every constitution 
may offer similar flexibility.
(v) Since 2013, all European sovereign bonds have incorporated an 
aggregated collective action clause (that is, a contractual provision 
that mimics, with certain exceptions, the class voting mechanism 
of corporate insolvency regimes). If a crisis were to occur during 
the next decade or so, however, only a portion of the bonds of the 
afflicted sovereign will contain such clauses. In such a situation, 
what would be the relationship between bonds with CACs and those 
without CACs? Two options. The local legislature could pass a law:
• retrofitting a new class voting mechanism over the entire debt 
stock (effectively ignoring the presence of CACs in some of the 
9 Following the action of the Greek Parliament in February 2012, for example, the 
Hellenic Republic has been forced to designate English law as the governing law of 
its international bond issues.
10 For empirical illustrations of this dynamic, see Marcus Chamon et al., Foreign Law 
Bonds: Can They Reduce Sovereign Borrowing Costs (2014 draft), https://editorial-
express.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=RES2015&paper_id=901; 
Michael Bradley et al., Pricing Sovereign Debt: Foreign versus Local Parameters, 
European Fin. Mgt. J. (forthcoming 2018), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/
full/10.1111/eufm.12161
11 For a prior discussion of this question, see Lee C. Buchheit & Mitu Gulati, Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring in Europe, Global Pol’y (forthcoming 2018), https://onlineli-
brary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1758-5899.12531 
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bonds), or
• imposing a class voting regime only on the bonds that do not 
contain CACs (relying on the CACs in the bonds containing the 
clauses to facilitate the restructuring of those series).
In either case, were the retrofit voting mechanism to be more liberal 
(in terms, for example, of the voting thresholds required to approve a 
debt restructuring) than the corresponding features of the contractual 
CACs, this might forfeit judicial sympathy in a future legal challenge by 
an aggrieved bondholder.
Use of the Local Law Advantage in the Restructuring of European Sovereign Bonds - Lee C. 
Buchheit
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JUDICIALIZATION OF THE EURO 
CRISIS? A CRITICAL EVALUATION
Bruno De Witte
In the literature dealing with the euro crisis and euro crisis reforms, the 
view is often taken that we have seen a process of judicialization of key 
decisions in this field. We understand the concept of judicialization in 
the loose meaning of the ’transfer to courts of contentious issues of an 
outright political nature and significance’ (Saurugger and Fontan 2017, 
5). There is certainly an appearance of judicialization because we have 
seen, over the past eight years, numerous court judgments (some at the 
European level, but mostly at the national level) dealing with aspects of 
the euro-crisis reforms. But it is not so obvious that these many   court 
rulings also denote a true transfer of powers from the political institutions 
to the judiciary, as claimed for example by Federico Fabbrini: ‘the Euro 
crisis and the legal and institutional responses to it have dramatically 
increased the powers of the judiciary vis-a-vis the political branches, 
making economic and monetary affairs in Europe more judicialized than 
even in a hyper-judicialized system like the US.’ (Fabbrini 2016, 63). In 
this contribution, I submit that no ‘dramatic increase of powers’ for the 
judiciary has happened. Even though courts were often called to intervene 
in relation to crisis measures, they have, most of the time, adopted a 
cautious position backing up the measures taken by the political actors.
The fairly large number of court cases dealing with the crisis 
measures can be explained by the legal nature of some of those measures. 
A first category of cases originated from the fact that the European 
Stability Mechanism and the Fiscal Compact took the form of separate 
international treaties, rather than EU law proper. This  triggered the 
use of domestic procedures allowing supreme or constitutional courts 
to review the constitutionality of new international treaties (which 
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is a normal task for courts in many national legal systems1). A second 
category of cases originated from challenges brought by individuals 
against austerity measures and haircuts in programme countries (mainly 
in Greece, Portugal and Cyprus, but also in Romania, Latvia, Hungary 
and Ireland). Those challenges were brought before national courts, but 
also spilled over occasionally to the Court of Justice of the EU and to the 
European Court of Human Rights. In particular, these challenges could be 
seen as test cases for the justiciability of fundamental rights, in particular 
two sets of rights: the right to property (in relation, for instance, to the 
‘haircuts’ imposed on debt holders or bank customers), and fundamental 
social rights (such as  the right to social security, the right to collective 
action, the right to housing, etc.). 
I will start by examining the first group of court cases: in a number 
of euro area countries, constitutional and supreme courts were indeed 
called to conduct, in 2012 and 2013, an ex ante or ex post review of 
the legality of the ESM Treaty and the Treaty on Stability, Cooperation 
and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (better known 
as Fiscal Compact, after the title of its most important chapter). Those 
countries include Slovenia, Estonia, Ireland, Germany, Austria, Hungary, 
France and Belgium. The two international treaties raised several 
procedural and substantive constitutional issues (Bardutzky and Fahey 
2014). The courts were clearly under considerable pressure to approve 
those treaties, due to the economic interests at stake and the volatility 
of financial markets, and all of them did, in fact, approve them. The fact 
that the courts were under political pressure to give the ‘right answer’ 
does not mean that their reasoning was unconvincing, on the contrary 
(Reestman 2017, 269). They all found their own way of performing a 
credible constitutional analysis, dismantling the potentially explosive 
constitutional implications of some treaty provisions, and taking the 
edge off arguments that the ESM or Fiscal Compact undermined national 
parliamentary democracy. Their judgments have helped to legitimize the 
ratification of those treaties, and have thus contributed to a major shift in 
the functioning of EMU. 
In one country did the constitutional challenge spill over to the 
European level. In the Pringle case, the Irish Supreme Court was faced 
with a challenge by a member of the Irish parliament, Mr Pringle, against 
1 For an earlier discussion of the legal-constitutional reasons explaining the recourse 
to separate international treaties rather than to EU law proper in dealing with the 
euro crisis, see De Witte 2012. 
PART I I - Disentangling The Crisis And The Courts
105
the ratification of the ESM Treaty by Ireland. Mr Pringle argued that 
ratification by the Irish parliament without a prior referendum would be 
unconstitutional, but that argument was rejected by the court. He also 
argued that the conclusion of the ESM Treaty breached various provisions 
of EU law, and this challenge was referred by the Irish Supreme Court to 
the Court of Justice of the EU. The latter court reacted very quickly (it 
was pressed by time, as the preliminary reference was lodged in 2012, 
during the hottest period of the euro crisis) and gave a ruling in which 
it held that the ESM treaty was perfectly compatible with EU law. In 
particular, the Court of Justice rejected what was, perhaps, the strongest 
objection, namely that the creation of the ESM was incompatible with 
the no-bail-out clause of Article 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union because it created a financial rescue mechanism 
for Eurozone states facing major sovereign debt problems. The Court of 
Justice adopted a literal reading of Article 125, pointing out that the ESM 
grants loans to countries, rather than directly assuming the debts of those 
countries, and it buttressed that literal (but controversial) reading of the 
no-bail-out clause by pointing out that ESM loans would be accompanied 
by strict conditionality and would contribute to the overall stability of the 
euro area, which, after all, was the original rationale for incorporating the 
no-bail-out clause in the Maastricht treaty (De Witte and Beukers 2013; 
Hinarejos 2015, 123-129).
As regards the second set of court cases, those dealing with austerity 
measures and their impact on the fundamental rights of individuals, the 
overall picture is one of either judicial avoidance (that is, courts refusing 
to engage with the  substantive issues by raising procedural hurdles) 
or of judicial deference to political choices. This is most obviously the 
case for the haircuts affecting private property interests. The Mamatas 
judgment of the European Court of Human Rights is a clear case of 
judicial deference.2 The applicant, after having unsuccessfully appealed 
before Greek courts against the ‘haircut’ imposed on private holders 
of Greek public debt, brought the case before the European Court of 
Human Rights in Strasbourg. The European Court readily agreed that 
the imposition of the collective action clause against the will of private 
owners of Greek bonds, such as Mr Mamatas, reduced the value of their 
bonds and constituted therefore an interference with the right of property 
which is protected by the European Convention. But the Court went on 
2 European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 21 July 2016, Mamatas v Greece, 
Application o. 63066/14. 
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to hold that this interference was justified by the public interest, namely 
the need to deal with the grave sovereign debt crisis affecting Greece, and 
that the interference was not disproportional: the burden imposed on 
the applicant (and the other victims of the haircut) was commensurate 
to the need of achieving a substantial reduction of the overall volume 
of Greek debt. When making this proportionality assessment, the Court 
insisted that, in economic and financial matters such as these, states had a 
particularly large margin of appreciation with which the European Court 
would interfere only for cases of manifest violation of Convention rights.
The legal challenges brought against the haircuts of bank accounts 
in Cyprus 2013 show a similar picture of judicial deference in the other 
European court, the Court of Justice of the European Union. In the case 
Ledra Advertising and others, a claim was made by a number of Cypriot 
account holders that the European Commission, by acting as part of the 
troika preparing the Memorandum of Understanding with Cyprus, had 
helped causing their loss of possessions. The Court of Justice of the EU, in 
its judgment of 20 September 2016, found the case admissible, i.e. it agreed 
that the action of the Commission had been conducive to an interference 
with the right of property of the Cypriot citizens. That interference was, 
however, justified according to the Court of Justice because it served ‘the 
objective of general interest pursued by the European Union, namely 
the objective of ensuring the stability of the banking system of the euro 
area as a whole.’3 The Court added that the measures taken were not 
disproportionate, without applying the detailed proportionality test that 
it otherwise employs when assessing restrictions of fundamental rights. 
Again, like in the Mamatas judgment of the European Court of Human 
Rights, we see that the European judges are reluctant to interfere with 
what they perceive as highly discretionary political choices. 
Sovereign debt loan assistance came with conditions that states 
had to meet. Those conditions prioritised rapid fiscal consolidation 
and structural reform, leading to major changes to employment and 
welfare rights and entitlements in bailout states. There have been cuts 
to health, education, social security and social assistance, public sector 
salaries, pensions as well as an extensive deregulation of collective 
bargaining structures and workplace protections. Judicial challenges to 
those austerity measures were mostly unsuccessful (Kilpatrick, 2017). A 
3 Court of Justice of the European Union, Joined Cases C-8/15P to C-10/15P, Ledra 
Advertising et al., v European Commission and European Central Bank, judgment of 
20 September 2016, paragraph 71 of the judgment. See the comment on this case by 
Dermine, 2017. 
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characteristic example of judicial deference to political decision-making 
is formed by the interconnected decisions of the Greek Council of State 
(February 2012) and of the European Court of Human Rights (May 
2013) in the Koufaki case.4 Both courts reasoned that the severe cuts in 
wages and pensions for Greek civil servants were in the general interest 
of Greece, and also of the euro area as a whole. Whereas Ms Koufaki’s pay 
cut was defined by the European Court of Human Rights as restricting 
her right to property, that restriction was held to be justified by the 
budgetary emergency faced by the Greek state. 
Not all European courts were equally deferential, though. Unlike the 
Greek Council of State, the Portuguese Constitutional Court found that 
the extremely serious financial situation of the country could not justify all 
the austerity measures implemented by the government and parliament. 
The Portuguese Court struck down some of the austerity measures on the 
ground of violations of the principle of equality, because some categories 
of people (in particular civil servants) had been treated worse than others 
(Canotilho, Violante and Lanceiro 2015). It was however careful to treat 
those cases as purely domestic ones, without tracing back the Portuguese 
austerity measures to their origin in the Memorandum of Understanding 
prepared by the troika, and thereby avoiding to challenge the legality of 
EU action.
At the end of the day, we see that neither the European Court of 
Justice nor the European Court of Human Rights have struck down a 
single euro-crisis related measure, and that national constitutional and 
supreme courts have, for the most part, been quite deferential to the 
political choices made by their governments and parliaments. 
The one, partial, exception to this landscape of judicial restraint 
is the German Constitutional Court. In a series of judgments in 2011 
and 2012, it did approve the participation of Germany in the early euro 
rescue programmes, in the ESM and in the Fiscal Compact, but those 
judgments were accompanied by warnings as to the limits of financial 
solidarity in the euro area, and by instructions to reinforce the control 
powers of the German parliament in fiscal policy matters. Later on, the 
Constitutional Court expressed skepticism about the legality of the euro-
crisis policy of the ECB, in the OMT case (also known as the Gauweiler 
case, after one of the applicants in this case). The Court in Karlsruhe 
took the view that the ECB might have overstepped the limits of the 
4 European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 7 May 2013, Koufaki and ADEDY v 
Greece, Application no. 57665/12 and 57657/12.  
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powers conferred on it by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, but accepted to refer that question for final determination to 
the Court of Justice of the EU. The Court of Justice, as it had done in 
Pringle some years before, deployed its interpretative resources to save an 
essential element of the euro crisis response. In its Gauweiler judgment, 
it held that the ECB had remained within the limits of its constitutional 
powers; it defined the announcement of the OMT buying programme 
as a measure of monetary rather than economic policy, which therefore 
falls squarely within the scope of the ECB’s powers as defined by the 
European Treaties. It furthermore held that buying sovereign debt on the 
secondary markets, if done by the ECB in a restrained manner, did not 
constitute a form of monetary financing prohibited by Article 123 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The European Court’s 
judgment thus entirely upheld the sovereign debt policy announced by 
the ECB and reinforced the latter’s institutional position (Zilioli 2016). At 
the same time, the Court’s judgment was sufficiently subtle and nuanced 
as to convince the German Constitutional Court – when that court 
had to decide the case after the preliminary ruling - not to pursue its 
threatened rejection of the ECB’s measure. In this way, the widely feared 
open confrontation between CJEU and German Constitutional Court 
was finally averted (Steinbach, 2018), and the judicialization of the euro 
crisis reforms took, once again, a rather benign turn.
We can conclude this contribution by qualifying the thesis of the 
judicialization of the euro crisis. Whereas it is undeniable that many 
courts have been called to judge the legality of crisis measures, the overall 
attitude of those courts has been to respect the choices made either by 
the political institutions (national governments or Eurogroup) or by the 
European Central Bank. This attitude of judicial deference is certainly 
convincing when it relates to the adoption of general policy measures 
such as the creation of the  European Stability Mechanism or the launch 
of a bond buying programme by the ECB. Judicial deference is more 
problematic when individuals complain about direct interference by euro 
crisis measures with their property or livelihood; in such cases, courts are 
called to exercise their natural role of protecting citizens against legislative 
or administrative measures that affect their fundamental rights. However, 
also in those ‘austerity’ cases affecting individual persons, the courts have 
mostly (with some exceptions) been rather timid in reviewing the choices 
made by the political actors. There is thus no evidence of the kind of 
strong judicialization that would consist in a massive transfer of powers 
from the political to the judicial branches.  
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PAPER TIGERS 
(OR HOW MUCH WILL COURTS 
PROTECT RIGHTS IN A FINANCIAL 
CRISIS?) 
Mitu Gulati & Georg Vanberg
Abstract1
Constitutions often contain rules that are meant to constrain the behavior 
of future governments during crises. Anti-discrimination rules and 
protections against expropriation of private property are classic examples. 
But when crisis hits, politicians are typically tempted by their short-run 
interests to try to bypass these rules. Enforcement of such constitutional 
constraints is therefore often placed in the hands of courts. But can courts 
serve as effective enforcement mechanisms in crisis times? We argue that 
courts, deciding in the middle of a crisis, will often be tempted to convert 
what are supposed to be hard rules into softer standards, effectively 
negating the constraining effect of these provisions on policymakers. 
While existing literature has argued that weak courts are particularly 
likely to engage in such behavior when confronted by strong executives, 
we argue that similar dynamics can also develop between strong courts 
and weak executives. Using examples from the recent sovereign debt 
crisis in the Euro area, we illustrate both logics.
1 For comments, thanks to Lee Buchheit, Sebastian Grund, Bruno de Witte, Jeromin 
Zettelmeyer, and Chiara Zilioli, and participants at the Institutions and Crisis con-
ference and the Managing and Understanding Sovereign Risks course at the Euro-
pean University Institute in April 2018.
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Introduction
The financial crisis of 2008-2013 had sweeping economic and political 
consequences around the world. In an effort to stabilize economies 
threatening to spiral out of control, and to prevent further disaster, 
governments around the globe took unprecedented actions, ranging from 
infusion of public capital to specific banks and enterprises, to “bail outs” 
of national governments, to deep cuts in social services and government 
spending. As the immediate crisis receded, and the economic turmoil 
abated, commentators and policymakers began to consider “lessons 
learned” in an effort to minimize the risk of a repeat of such events, and 
a number of institutional reform efforts commended. An important 
element of these reforms focused on strengthening budgetary rules, 
financial regulations, and oversight. In Europe, the most salient of these 
was the adoption of the “Fiscal Compact,” a treaty that requires EU 
member states to adopt a number of budgetary procedures in order to 
be eligible for future EU aid under the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM).2 
These reforms were motivated in part by the conviction that previous 
rules had not been backed by sufficiently strong enforcement mechanisms, 
and that new procedures should include provisions that would make them 
“stick.” In order to achieve this, policymakers placed increasing weight on 
courts as potential enforcers. Thus, the Fiscal Compact required member 
states to incorporate the new fiscal rules into domestic law (“preferably 
constitutional,” as the treaty stated) in order to make them enforceable by 
national courts (which governments could supposedly ignore only with 
great difficulty). The treaty also provided that members states could face 
challenges before the European Court of Justice for failing to comply with 
these requirements (see Keleman 2018 for a detailed treatment).
In this paper, we are concerned with an aspect that has received 
only limited attention in these debates, but that is critical given such 
reliance on judicial enforcement: are courts likely to be effective 
enforcement mechanisms for the new fiscal rules? The fact that this 
question has received little scrutiny is surprising. An answer is central to 
understanding whether the newly-adopted measures are likely to work. 
Moreover, there is material one can draw on in trying to think about 
2 The formal title of the Fiscal Compact is the “Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and 
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union.” It was adopted by EU member 
states in 2012, and came into force in 2013. For a discussion on the adoption of the 
fiscal rules by individual countries during the crisis, see Asatryan et al. (2016).
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the role that courts might play in enforcing fiscal rules, particularly in 
times of crisis: courts were intimately involved in various aspects of the 
crisis response. Austerity measures (including public sector wage and 
pension cuts) were subjected to judicial review in various countries 
(Contiades & Fotiadou 2018, Violante & Andre 2018). Similarly, attempts 
to restructure sovereign debt as well as the decision by the European 
Union (through the European Central Bank’s OMT policy) to provide 
access to low interest credit for governments threatened by fiscal collapse 
(most notably, Greece) were the subject of legal cases before national and 
supranational courts (Vanberg & Gulati 2018).
The argument we develop in this chapter is that courts are likely to 
face significant limitations in their ability and willingness to enforce 
constitutional rules in times of (financial) crisis. These limitations are 
a result of the peculiar institutional features of courts. In consequence, 
we argue, courts are not well-suited to provide “teeth” for rules – 
including fiscal rules – that EU members states (or, more generally, 
constitution writers anywhere) may want to impose in order to constrain 
policymakers in times of crisis. We illustrate our argument with two 
case studies from the recent fiscal crisis – the decisions by the German 
Federal Constitutional Court and European Court of Justice on the 
European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transactions (“OMT”) 
policy, and the European Court of Human Rights’ decision on the Greek 
government’s restructuring of its sovereign debt in 2012. The conclusion 
that emerges from our argument is that – in light of the limited efficacy 
of judicial enforcement of fiscal rules and rules affecting sovereign debt – 
consideration of how to provide such rules with teeth without relying on 
courts is an important area of future research. 
The Argument
By definition, crisis places stresses on a political system. The fact that 
“business as usual” is inadequate implies that policymakers will often 
feel the need, or pressure, to take extraordinary measures in an effort 
to confront a crisis – including measures that may be in tension with 
underlying constitutional commitments. Recognizing that extra-
constitutional action may sometimes be required in such circumstances, 
many constitutions provide for emergency powers that allow for the 
suspension of specific constitutional provisions.
At the same time, crisis does not provide a blank check for dispensing 
with all constitutional restrictions, for two reasons. First, some 
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constitutional constraints are imposed precisely because constitution 
writers want to restrict the ability of governments to engage in particular 
actions during crisis times. For example, the restriction on issuing “paper 
money” in the US Constitution was adopted in order to prevent state 
governments from responding to pressure to provide debt relief through 
the printing press (Appleby 1987).
Perhaps more interestingly, the intended effects of some constitutional 
provisions in ordinary times require that individuals expect these rules 
will have teeth in extraordinary circumstances. Consider two examples. 
A long literature in political economy has stressed the importance 
of secure property rights and constitutional restrictions on arbitrary 
takings as a key ingredient for economic growth (North & Weingast 
1989, Olson 1993). But of course the beneficial effects of constitutional 
protections of property rights on the willingness of individuals to invest 
will be undermined if individuals do not expect these restrictions to be 
binding when governments are tempted to engage in expropriation in 
times of crisis. The second example is of more immediate relevance to 
current paper. Consider the “no bail out” provision of the Maastricht 
Treaty (Article 125). This provision restricts the ability of the European 
Union to “bail out” member states who are unable to meet their fiscal 
obligations. The intent behind the restriction is clear: in creating the 
common currency Eurozone, member states were concerned to ensure 
that governments would engage in responsible spending. By shutting 
off the possibility that the consequences of excessive deficit spending 
might be forestalled by a bail-out, Article 125 was intended to provide 
incentives for fiscal discipline. Crucially, however, note that this provision 
can only have this effect if governments expect that the provision will be 
enforced in times of crisis. Put differently, the entire logic of these kinds 
of provisions is predicated on the assumption that they will be enforced 
in extraordinary times.3
But what are the prospects for enforcement of such provisions in times 
of crisis – particularly by courts? We argue that judicial enforcement 
faces two potential obstacles. The first emerges from a feature that has 
3 One potential objection to this example is that the “no bail-outs” clause never meant 
to be a strict rule, but rather intended as a malleable standard that would allow for 
financial assistance to debt-burdened countries. We are skeptical of this claim, but 
recognize that the issue is the subject of considerable disagreement and debate (e.g., 
Gerner-Beurle 2015). Importantly, however, this is not material to the thrust of our 
theoretical argument. Our concern is not whether Article 125 is a rule or a standard. 
Rather, it is the more general point that if the drafters of constitutions (or founding 
treaties) want to adopt rules that will bind the hands of future governments, judicial 
enforcement cannot always be counted on.  
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received considerable scholarly attention: the relative institutional 
weakness of the judiciary. Courts are typically dependent on executive 
or legislative cooperation for the enforcement of their decisions. In 
ordinary circumstances, these branches are under pressure to comply 
with judicial orders. But when a crisis raises the (perceived) urgency 
of particular measures for these actors – even if these measures are in 
tension with constitutional norms – the risk of non-compliance looms. In 
such circumstances, courts may be ineffective because their decisions are 
ignored. More likely, courts may be ineffective because judges anticipate 
their precarious situation, and choose to sanction a contested policy rather 
than expose their institutional weakness (Vanberg 2005). Examples of 
such “strategic retreat” are not difficult to find, including the US Supreme 
Court’s decision to uphold FDR’s abrogation of the gold clauses in federal 
government bonds (Glick 2009), or the Russian constitutional courts 
increasing deference to presidential authority following a confrontation 
with President Yeltsin in 1993 (Epstein, Knight & Shvetsova 2001).
While the fact that the relative weakness of courts can undermine the 
effective enforcement of constitutional rules is well understood (Staton 
2010, Vanberg 2005), scholars have paid less attention to the fact that – 
ironically – judicial strength can also limit enforcement of constitutional 
rules in times of crisis. Suppose that a court does not face a compliance 
problem: its decisions, including a decision to enforce a constitutional 
rule that restricts government action in times of crisis, will be followed 
by relevant actors. Such a scenario is plausible, including in many EU 
member states, when governments may face a significant public backlash 
for brazen defiance of judicial decisions (Vanberg 2005). Courts typically 
enjoy higher public support than other branches (Gibson, Caldeira & 
Baird 1998). This support provides a significant resource, since resisting 
decisions becomes risky for executives and legislative majorities – 
especially if the decisions themselves are popular. To take a concrete 
example, consider the German constitutional court’s decision on German 
participation in the ECB’s OMT policy, designed to provide fiscal crutches 
to Greece and other distressed EU member state governments. A decision 
of the constitutional court to veto German participation would have 
been popular in Germany, and given the court’s standing, resisting such 
a decision would have been difficult for the German government. (We 
return to this decision in more detail below.)
In times of crisis, a court that is powerful in the sense that its decisions 
are likely to be respected faces a different challenge than a weak court. 
For judges on such courts, the question is no longer whether the court 
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can enforce a particular constitutional rule, but whether it is willing to do 
so. As we argue at length elsewhere (Vanberg & Gulati 2018), there are 
strong reasons to suspect that judges may be reluctant to do so. Perhaps 
the most important reason is crisis itself: although ostensibly charged 
with enforcing the law, judges are also aware of the practical implications 
of their decisions. Few believe in the maxim “let justice be done, though 
the heavens may fall.” In crisis situations, these practical consequences 
of judicial decisions – particularly a decision to veto a governmental 
response to a crisis – are likely to weigh heavily, since the potential 
consequences of prolonging or deepening the crisis are salient.
Judicial sensitivity to the potential consequences of vetoing a 
governmental response during crisis is further exacerbated by the 
particular institutional structure and position of the judiciary. One 
aspect is the judiciary’s place in the policy process. As a veto player – and 
one who is perceived to act “at the end” of the policy process – judges 
face skewed accountability incentives. A decision to veto a governmental 
policy exposes the court to blame if the crisis appears to lengthen or 
deepen as a result. But a decision to uphold a policy, even if it is ultimately 
unsuccessful in resolving the crisis, is likely to saddle blame for the failure 
on the government that formulated it. Second, the fact that courts are not 
directly accountable to citizens, and do not have access to the immediate 
claim of a popular mandate, may make judges especially reluctant to take 
on this risk of vetoing a government’s actions in times of crisis. A final 
aspect concerns the fact that judges typically lack economic expertise and 
have less access to independent expert advice – particularly on highly 
complex issues, such as restructuring of sovereign debt, or the fiscal and 
economic implications of budgetary decisions. In short, the perception 
that they are dealing with complex issues in which they are not expert, 
that a decision to veto a governmental response may – given crisis 
conditions – have significant detrimental consequences, and that the 
court potentially exposes itself to being blamed – and thus damaging its 
standing – for hamstringing a government’s crisis response through such 
a veto, is likely to make judges particularly careful in engaging in rigorous 
enforcement of certain constitutional restrictions.
In short, our expectation is that crisis conditions generate two 
challenges for courts that make these institutions less capable of reliably 
enforcing constitutional restrictions than one might believe at first. Given 
the perceived high stakes of crisis response actions, weak courts may not 
be able to reliably enforce restrictions, even if they were willing to do so, 
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because governments would fail to comply. And strong courts – because 
they are able to enforce these rules – may not be willing to do so, given 
the perceived high stakes of the situation. In either case, courts may prove 
to be less efficacious than is commonly assumed in the reforms that have 
been adopted in response to the financial crisis.4 We now turn to two case 
studies to illustrate the argument.
Our first case study considers challenges to the Greek debt 
restructuring of 2012, during which the Greek legislature retroactively 
changed the terms of its government debt contracts, so as to be able to 
force a restructuring on its creditors. Unsurprisingly, creditors sued in 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), claiming that they had 
been expropriated in violation of basic property rights protections the 
Greek state owed them. As we argue in more detail below, the ECHR 
found itself in a weak position vis-à-vis the Greek government. The 
second study examines challenges to the European Central Bank’s OMT 
policy (announced in August 2012) before the German Constitutional 
Court. We argue that in contrast to the ECHR, the German court was 
in a strong position, and could have – had it chosen to do so – forced 
a German withdrawal from OMT. And yet, in both cases, when push 
came to shove, the courts elected not to try to enforce restrictions on 
governmental behavior that had plausibly been violated.
The Greek Retrofit of 2012
Our first case study centers around the multiple legal challenges brought 
against the Greek sovereign debt restructuring during the recent financial 
crisis. After making its way through local tribunals, the most important 
of these challenges arrived at the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) in 2016. The issue at stake originated in 2012. At the time, Greece 
(and thanks to it, the entire Euro area) had been mired in financial crisis 
for almost two years. Temporary funding from the IMF and the Euro 
area had failed to resuscitate the market’s confidence in Greece’s ability 
to repay its outstanding debt (roughly Euro 400 billion in 2010).5 Worse, 
the Greek crisis had diminished market confidence regarding a number 
of other Euro area countries. Borrowing costs had risen sharply for the 
weaker Euro area economies (Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Cyprus, 
4 This is an argument about general tendencies – undoubtedly, there is variation 
among judges to rule against crisis actions even in the face of crisis.
5 For details on the crisis, see, e.g., Zettelmeyer et al. (2013); Blustein (2016).
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among others), and IMF rescue plans had been put in place for both 
Portugal and Ireland. 
By mid 2012, many observers had concluded that something drastic 
had to be done to rescue Greece from its debts, and to prevent financial 
contagion from spreading to the rest of the Euro area. One potential 
answer was for the European Central Bank (ECB) and the richer Euro 
area nations to guarantee all Greek, Italian, Irish, and Spanish government 
bonds. But that option seemed to be closed off. Legally, such a guarantee 
would appear to violate Article 125 of the Lisbon Treaty, the “no bailout” 
clause that states that the Union is not responsible for, and will not 
assume, liabilities of members. Politically, Greece, along with a number 
of other southern European nations, was viewed by many citizens in 
northern EU member states as having borrowed irresponsibly for years. 
There was little appetite in these countries for providing funds to bail out 
what appeared to many as irresponsible southerners and their equally 
irresponsible creditors.
Caught in this bind, the Greek government turned to a retroactive 
modification of the terms of its debt as a solution. It was able to pursue this 
avenue because the vast majority of Greek debt (over 90%) was governed 
by local Greek law. This, in turn, implied that the Greek parliament could 
affect the value of the debt through legislation. For example, it might 
pass a law to mandate that all debt claims under Greek law go through a 
six-month process of court-supervised mediation before being brought 
before a judge – a move that would be legally valid and also reduce the 
value of the debt claims.
The specific strategy the Greek government settled on was to impose a 
provision that would allow for a change in the payment terms of its bonds 
with the agreement of a supermajority of the creditors (66.67%) and the 
debtor. Importantly, a large fraction of Greek debt was held by regulated 
institutions (banks, mutual funds, pension funds, etc.) who were likely to 
be amenable to governmental suasion on the part of European authorities. 
Presumably, the Greek government and its advisers had calculated that 
the required approval could be obtained at 66.67% before settling on this 
threshold. As a result, rather than requiring the approval of every single 
bondholder for a restructuring (something that would be impossible to 
accomplish), it would be possible for a supermajority of bondholders to 
force a restructuring on dissenting bondholders (highly plausible). The 
Greek parliament passed the required legislation, and one of the largest 
sovereign debt restructurings in history went through, imposing an NPV 
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haircut of upwards of roughly 65% on bondholders (Zettelmeyer et al. 
2013, provide details). With the help of some additional policy moves 
(described in the next case study), the crisis gradually abated. 
The Greek government’s actions provoked multiple legal challenges 
(Grund 2017a & b, Buchheit 2018). Several of these focused on the fact that 
the European Convention on Human Rights Law guarantees all European 
Union citizens the protection of their property rights. Specifically, Article 
1 of Protocol No. 1 protects the right to the “peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions” (Buchheit & Gulati 2010; Wautelet 2013).6 This right may be 
restricted only in the public interest, and only through measures that do 
not impose an individual and excessive burden on a private party. While 
Article 15 opens the door to measures that are “inconsistent” with the 
convention in times of “public emergency,” there were significant doubts 
whether the current circumstances, and the Greek government’s actions, 
warranted such an exception. Because these legal challenges had to wind 
their way through local avenues first, the case, Mamatas and Others v. 
Greece, did not reach the ECHR -- which has ultimate authority on the 
question of whether Article 1 was violated -- until 2016. Significantly, by 
this point, the borrowing costs of governments across the Euro area had 
gone back down to their pre-crisis levels; it appeared that the combination 
of public policies that had been pursued had effectively quelled the crisis.
In confronting this case, the ECHR found itself in a tough position. 
On the one hand, the Greek government had engaged in a fairly blatant 
taking of property. It had retroactively inserted new contract terms into its 
bonds with the precise goal of dramatically reducing the amounts it owed 
creditors – a move that would seem to be precisely the kind of action that 
Article 1 is supposed to guard against. At the same time, even if the judges 
did not want to sanction the ability of European governments to rewrite 
their contracts to expropriate value from investors, as a policy matter, 
the restructuring appeared to have worked. By 2016, the sovereign debt 
crisis of 2010-2013 that nearly destroyed the European Monetary System 
appeared to have been brought under control.
 Moreover, the court found itself in a weak position. As an international 
court, staffed by foreign judges, the ECHR enjoyed little public support 
in Greece. It is unlikely that a decision by the Greek government not to 
comply with an adverse judicial decision would have imposed domestic 
6 The Greek constitution itself also has protection for property rights, in stating that no 
one shall be deprived of private property except for the “public benefit” (Article 17) 
(Buchheit 2018).
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political costs on the government. Moreover, a decision to declare the 
Greek restructuring illegal would have been near impossible for the 
Greek government to comply with even if it had wanted to. Greece was 
still mired in a deep debt crisis (Zettelmeyer et al. 2017). But unlike 
during the 2010-12 period, there was no longer any appetite on the part 
of official sector institutions to provide Greece with the bailout funds that 
would have been needed to pay creditors. In the other words, the ECHR 
found itself in the position of a relatively weak court that could anticipate 
that an attempt at vigorous enforcement of property protections would 
likely be met with noncompliance by the government. Even if the judges 
believed that the government had blatantly violated the rule of law, they 
could not expect that a decision to declare the restructuring invalid would 
be honored. The Court reacted in the manner our argument suggests: 
rather than risk non-compliance, which would have weakened the court’s 
legitimacy, the Court choose to uphold the Greek government’s actions.
Importantly, in engaging what can arguably viewed as a strategic 
retreat, the court attempted to minimize the future implications of its 
ruling. Three moves are especially relevant. First, the Court rejected the 
argument that the modification of the bond contract terms was not an 
interference with property rights, but rather part of the government’s 
prerogative as a sovereign lawmaker. Put differently, the judges rejected 
the argument that sovereign immunity protected the government from 
judicial review, an argument that had worked in some domestic courts 
(Grund 2017). Instead, the court took the position that the Greek action 
was clearly a significant interference with the right of enjoyment of 
possessions. However, the judges cautioned, this did not necessarily imply 
that the action was invalid. The second key element of the court’s decision 
was to argue that the Greek action could not be sanctioned just because 
Greece was in dire emergency (as per Article 15). Arguably, this move 
served to narrow the loophole for future governments that might attempt 
to expropriate value from their creditors. Had the Court relied on Article 
15 alone to uphold the Greek action, in the future, it would almost surely 
have to defer to the judgments of local governments regarding whether a 
crisis is deep enough to justify extraordinary actions – a judgement that 
would likely be initially reviewed in a local court (which would surely 
be sympathetic to the local government) before being appealed to the 
ECHR. 
In short, to constrain future governments (and future courts) from 
allowing similar behavior, the judges would have to add more conditions 
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to their decision – conditions that would be difficult to satisfy in the 
future. This is what the third element of the decision – which focused 
on investor expectations – did. The Court explained that investors had 
had fair warning that a restructuring of the debt was likely ever since late 
2010. Surely, the judges explained, investors could not have expected that 
their bonds were immune, given that the government was in crisis, and 
unable to pay back its creditors in full. Further, the court held, the Greek 
retrofit had put in place a restructuring mechanism (one requiring an 
affirmative vote of 66.67% of all the creditors in favor of the restructuring 
plan) that was similar to the standard mechanism in the sovereign bonds 
governed by foreign laws. As a result, the judges concluded, investors 
were being treated as well as they could have expected.
Legally, the “investor expectations” argument made by the Court 
was flimsy (Violi 2016). Investors indeed knew in March 2012 that 
a restructuring attempt was likely because the Greek government 
was in deep crisis. But that does not mean that they expected that the 
government would use its legislative power to retroactively rewrite their 
contracts in a fashion that would allow the government to impose severe 
haircuts on creditors.7 Senior European policy makers like Lorenzo Bini 
Smaghi and Jean-Claude Trichet had, after all, made multiple statements 
in the context of the Greek crisis to the effect that no Euro area sovereign 
debt would be restructured (Blustein 2016).8 
It is difficult to know how successful the court’s strategy of relying 
on the “investor expectations” (in a crisis) argument will be in 
7 As for the argument that it was fair to put in place restructuring clauses in the bonds 
because such clauses were standard in bonds on the international market, that is ever 
weaker. The fact that other bonds have provisions that make them easier to restructure 
says nothing about whether investors who had bonds that did not have these provisions 
were expecting such provisions to be legislatively imposed on them. If anything, the 
fact that these investors had purchased bonds lacking the option to restructure sug-
gests that investors did not expect to be restructured. Worse, the provisions that Greece 
retrofit onto its local law bonds were nothing at all like the ones in international bonds. 
International bonds require a 75% vote of the creditors (in amount) on a bond by bond 
basis. In the Greek retrofit, the vote requirement was not only lower (66.67%), it was an 
aggregated requirement for all of Greece’s local law bonds (Zettelmeyer et al. 2013). In 
other words, much easier to satisfy than what would have been required in a standard 
international bond. 
8 Bini Smaghi memorably (and, in hindsight, hilariously) told the Financial Times, in 
May 2011: “A debt restructuring... would be like the death penalty – which we have 
abolished in the European Union.” (Atkins 2011). Similarly, European monetary af-
fairs commissioner, Joaquim Almunia, said in an interview with Bloomberg in 2010: 
“No Greece will not default. In the Euro area, default does not exist.” (Monaghan 
2010).
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circumscribing the conditions under which a sovereign in the Euro area 
can impose bond restructuring in the future. Certainly, the court was 
trying to constrain future courts and governments from going down the 
Greek retrofit path. That said, given the vagueness and manipulability 
of the concepts at hand, we are skeptical that this standard will impose 
an effective constraint. Time will tell. As Robert Scott and Jody Kraus 
observe in their classic Contract Law text, judges – when faced with 
tough decisions that will produce high short term costs – often choose to 
convert bright line rules into fuzzy standards in order to avoid these costs 
(Scott & Kraus 2013). But, as Scott and Kraus explain, this strategy opens 
Pandora’s box in terms of long term costs.
“Whatever it Takes”
While the ECHR’s decision in Mamatas arguably illustrates strategic 
retreat by a weak court in the face of likely defiance, our second case 
study is designed to showcase the other end of the spectrum: judicial 
“self-censoring” by a strong court concerned about the potential 
consequences of limiting a government’s ability to respond to crisis. This 
case study revolves around two opinions issued by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court (FCC) in a dispute surrounding the European 
Central Bank’s (ECB) response to the economic crisis enveloping Europe 
in 2012. By the summer of that year, it appeared that threats to the viability 
of the common currency were becoming real for the countries of the 
Eurozone: borrowing costs were skyrocketing for a number of European 
countries, putting them in an increasingly dire financial situation.
In the face of this threat, ECB governor Mario Draghi promised in 
August 2012 to do “whatever it takes” to calm financial markets, and to 
protect the financial stability of Euro zone governments (Gerner-Beuerle, 
Küçük & Schuster 2014: 282, Khan 2016).9 The policy he announced in 
order to accomplish this was the Outright Monetary Transactions Policy 
(OMT). Under the OMT program, the ECB promised to buy the short-
term bonds of Euro area member countries in unlimited amounts should 
circumstances call for it (lending credence to the promise to do “whatever 
it takes”). Moreover, the ECB promised that should a restructuring of a 
Euro member nation’s bonds occur, the ECB would not claim priority 
status (as it had some months prior with Greece) (Coeure 2013). 
The hope of the ECB, shared by other European policymakers, 
9 Draghi’s specific words were: “Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever 
it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough.” 
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was that the OMT program would lower the cost of financing for 
distressed countries. Knowing that the ECB was standing ready to buy 
bonds in the secondary market in “unlimited” amounts, purchasers in 
the primary market for bonds would feel safer, leading to a lowering 
of interest rates. The ultimate goal of the policy was thus to avert the 
risk of “redenomination” – that is, the need for a member nation to 
exit the Euro. Greece, of course, was the primary candidate for such a 
development. By all appearances, the combination of Draghi’s statement 
and the announcement of the OMT program worked to calm the markets 
(Jones 2015: 63). Interest rates fell dramatically, including for the bonds 
of countries in distress.
Despite its apparent success, the ECB’s OMT policy was not met 
with applause in all corners of the Eurozone, particularly in Germany. 
In Germany, European Union efforts to “prop up” Southern European 
countries, including through OMT, were unpopular. At its core, the ECB 
is a collection of central banks. Thus, the guarantee to do “whatever it 
takes” was, in effect, a guarantee by the stronger central banks to purchase 
bonds issued by financially distressed governments. The strongest of 
these central banks was the Bundesbank – and the potential that German 
taxpayers might be liable for what would amount to significant transfer 
payments to Southern European countries raised significant, and 
politically salient, concerns in Germany. 
Moreover, to many German observers, OMT represented a violation 
of the terms under which Germany had entered the Euro, and submitted 
to the authority of the ECB.10 Under the Maastricht Treaty, the ECB has 
a circumscribed mandate to engage in monetary policy to keep prices 
stable, but not to engage in monetary financing of individual Euro area 
countries (Article 123 TFEU). A promise to buy unlimited quantities of 
a member country’s debt in order to prop it up when it did not enjoy the 
confidence of the markets seemed inconsistent with the ECB’s mandate 
(Mody 2014, Art 2015).11 It also appeared in tension with the so-called 
“no bail-out clause” of the Lisbon Treaty (Article 125), which prohibits 
the European Union from “bailing out” member state governments in 
financial distress. From the perspective of the critics in Germany, OMT 
10 The title of a Bloomberg article reporting on the case is telling: “ECB Bond Program 
Dubbed ‘Financial Dictatorship’ in German Court” (Matussek & Speciale 2016).
11 The fact that the ECB seemed to have announced a willingness to take haircuts on 
the same terms as ordinary investors made things worse: It further increased the risk 
that countries like Germany faced in the event that another member nation of the 
Euro area acted irresponsibly in accumulating too much debt. 
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constituted not only a violation of European law, but also a violation 
of German law (Wilkinson 2015: 1050). Significantly, these concerns 
were shared by the Bundesbank itself: Jens Weidemann, the head of the 
Bundesbank, was staunchly opposed to OMT (Wagstyl 2016). Led by a 
German legislator, Peter Gauweiler, a number of prominent politicians 
and academics lodged constitutional complaints in front of the German 
Constitutional Court to challenge the legality of the ECB’s OMT program, 
arguing that the policy violated both European law, and the budgetary 
autonomy of the German parliament. 
Potentially, these challenges posed a significant threat to the OMT 
policy (Sinn 2013). There were two reasons. One was the authority of 
the constitutional court. The FCC enjoys tremendous confidence among 
German citizens – exceeding trust in other political institutions, including 
parliament and the federal government by significant margins (see 
Vanberg 2005; Vorlaender & Brodocz 2006). Opposing a negative ruling 
on OMT by the court – especially given the general public skepticism 
towards German financial obligations towards Southern European 
countries – would likely incur significant political costs on the part of 
the German government. Second, the German institution most directly 
involved in the OMT program – and therefore most immediately affected 
by a potential FCC veto – was the Bundesbank. And the Bundesbank had 
already taken the position that participating in the OMT was improper, 
including in materials submitted to the FCC.12 Put differently, given that 
implementation of an order from the FCC finding the OMT to be ultra 
vires would have been in the hands of the Bundesbank (in its role as 
Germany’s representative at the ECB), compliance with a veto of OMT 
seemed assured. Moreover, even though the German government led by 
Mrs. Merkel had indicated its support of Mr. Draghi’s program (Mody 
2014), it gave no indication of being willing to cross the combination 
of two of the most respected institutions in Germany should the FCC 
rule against OMT. And without German participation, the credibility of 
the OMT’s program would have been severely compromised, arguably 
jettisoning the policy.
The judges of the FCC likely knew that they were in a position – via 
a veto – to undercut the ECB’s crisis response, and to cripple the OMT 
policy. When the court issued its final decision in June 2016, it refused 
to veto OMT, and largely upheld the ECB’s policy. To make a case that 
12 For a report on the amicus brief filed by the Bundesbank, see Jan Hildebrand, “Weid-
mann rechnet mit der EZB ab,” Handelsblatt, April 4, 2013.
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this decision can be interpreted as an instance of “strategic retreat” by a 
powerful court concerned to avoid the consequences of a veto, we need 
to show that it is plausible that:
1. The judges of the FCC believed that OMT constituted a violation 
of German and/or European law, and
2. That they chose to uphold OMT because they were concerned 
about the consequences of hamstringing the ECB’s crisis response.
Of course, it is not possible to establish the views of the judges conclusively. 
However, strong evidence regarding the judges’ sincere views of the 
legality of OMT emerge out of the sequential nature of the two opinions 
issued by the court in this case. The FCC’s decision in June 2016 was the 
second opinion it had issued on the constitutional complaints. The court 
had issued an earlier, initial decision in January 2014 – a decision in which 
the court announced its view of the OMT program, but referred the case 
to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for a ruling on the compatibility 
of the program with EU law.13 This initial opinion left little doubt that the 
six member majority (two judges dissented) viewed the OMT program 
as inconsistent with European law. Moreover, the court explicitly laid 
out the narrow conditions under which, in the opinion of the judges, 
the OMT policy would be legal. Specifically, the FCC posited that there 
could not be a commitment to buying bonds in unlimited quantities, and 
that a meaningful time gap between the issuance of debt by a distressed 
sovereign and its purchase by the ECB would be required. Moreover, the 
FCC insisted that the purpose of the ECB’s actions must be price stability 
(not economic resuscitation), and that the ECB’s bonds would not face 
the risk of being restructured. In effect, the conditions laid out by the 
German court in its initial decision would gut the OMT (Mayer 2014). 
“Whatever it takes” would no longer be the policy promise.
However – despite clearly articulating its view that the program was 
illegal – the court refrained from striking it down. Instead, the judges 
forwarded the case to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) under the 
preliminary reference procedure – the first time the Second Senate of the 
FCC had done so. The decision to do so was widely seen as unusual and 
historic (see Wendel 2014: 263-64; Gerner-Beuerle, Küçük & Schuster 
2014: 282), in part because the judges had the option of ruling on the 
case as a matter of domestic German law by focusing on the question 
13 Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) [Federal Constitutional Court], Jan. 14, 2014, 
Case No. 2 BvR 2728/13. 
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whether the OMT program was in violation of Germany’s accession to 
the monetary union – a position that had been taken by the petitioners. 
One interpretation of this move fits well within the framework of our 
model: by sending the case to the ECJ, the judges of the FCC – knowing 
that a decision to strike down the OMT would place tremendous pressure 
to comply on the German government, putting the risk of a return to 
economic upheaval on the table – stepped back from a line they were 
reluctant to cross. As an editorial in one of the major German newspapers 
put it at the time, “First, the judges ruled that the conduct of the ECB 
was illegal. Afraid of their own courage, they then turned to the ECJ for 
help.”14
Given its forceful language, and the explicit conditions demanded, 
the initial German opinion seemed to indicate that if the ECJ failed to 
impose the specified restrictions on the OMT program, the FCC might 
strike down the program in its final decision. Of course, should the ECJ 
follow the FCC’s demands and rule OMT illegal (or subject to conditions 
that would make it unworkable), there loomed the risk of returning the 
Euro area to crisis. In the end, the judges of the ECJ – generally much 
more favorable to the program of European integration – called the FCC’s 
bluff. The ECJ ruled OMT legal as a matter of European law, without the 
need to respect the conditions that the FCC had demanded (Wilkinson 
2015). The case now returned to the FCC for final decision.
The situation confronting the judges of the FCC at this juncture 
was both similar, and significantly different than it had been in 2014. 
It was similar in the sense that given the authority of the FCC, the 
support the Court enjoyed from the Bundesbank, and the significant 
public opposition in Germany to continued German financial support 
for distressed Euro area governments, supporting OMT in the face of 
a negative FCC decision would have been difficult if not impossible for 
the German government.15 A negative decision would almost certainly 
undermine the OMT policy in a significant way. The situation was 
different in the sense that, unlike in 2013, the court no longer had the 
option of “passing the buck,” at least for a time, to the ECJ. By 2016, 
the judges of the FCC understood that they would now have to make a 
decision, and that that decision would be implemented by the relevant 
14 See Holger Steltzner “Die Angst der Verfassungsrichter” (“The fear of the constituti-
onal court judges”), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2/7/2014.
15 Case C-62/14, Peter Gauweiler and Others v. Deutscher Bundestag (June 16, 2015), 
http://curia.europa.eu/.
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German institutions. Moreover, the apparent effectiveness of the OMT 
program was clear: Four years had passed since the crisis. A decision to 
rule the OMT program illegal raised the specter of a return to chaos and 
the most significant crisis the EU had faced in its existence. The blame for 
such an outcome would fall on the FCC.
Despite the forceful argument in its original decision that OMT could not 
pass muster without significant limitations, in June 2016, the FCC caved: 
in its second decision, the court accepted the ECJ’s judgment, and upheld 
the OMT program despite the fact that the ECJ had not imposed any of the 
conditions demanded by the FCC (Evans-Pritchard 2016; Jones 2016).16 
Importantly, all of the six judges who had comprised the majority in the 
2014 decision, remained on the court: the switch in the court’s position 
cannot be explained as the result of turnover on the bench. In our view, 
a plausible interpretation of the court’s “about face” is as an instance of 
strategic retreat by a strong court: knowing that a veto carried the real 
risk of plunging the Eurozone back into financial crisis, the judges of the 
FCC chose to uphold the ECB’s policy despite their legal reservations.17 
Thus, this episode illustrates that – as suggested by our argument, and 
contrary to the traditional view of courts – judicial self-censoring may 
not only result from judicial weakness, but also from judicial strength.
Conclusion
History tells us that governments around the world frequently react to 
financial crises by enacting legislation constraining their future selves 
from over indulging in debt. The hope is that by enshrining constraints 
on fiscal policy in law, governments can pre-commit themselves to 
responsible behavior (Ginsburg 2018). But history also tells us that the 
political flesh is weak, and that when new crises arise, politicians will be 
tempted to push the boundaries of these constraints, and even overstep 
them. The question we ask in this paper is whether courts can – as is often 
expected of them – act as effective enforcement mechanisms in these 
kinds of situations. We argue that there are strong reasons to be skeptical. 
16 Perhaps to save face, the FCC noted that it reserved the right to revisit the matter if 
OMT were to be used to assist countries without “market access.” But this was an 
empty threat given that the ECB’s promises were going to ensure market access in 
the first place. 
17 A second, and not inconsistent, aspect of this episode is that a veto of OMT following 
the ECJ’s decision would have created a direct confrontation between the ECJ and 
the FCC. 
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If courts are weak relative to governments, and expect their decisions 
to be ignored, courts will be tempted to capitulate. Conversely, if courts 
are strong and expect that their decisions will be respected, then courts 
risk being blamed for having exacerbated the crisis – something judges 
will not want, if they value public support. The result is the same in both 
cases: courts, and particularly local courts, are not likely to be effective 
at enforcing long-term commitments to rules in times of financial crisis, 
even if these rules are intended to be enforced.
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FROM FORM TO SUBSTANCE: JUDICIAL 
CONTROL ON CRISIS DECISIONS OF 
THE EU INSTITUTIONS (WITH A FOCUS 
ON THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION)
Chiara Zilioli1
With few exceptions2 the courts, by definition, intervene only “ex post 
facto”. One could say that their function is to check what has happened, 
1 Director General Legal Services, European Central Bank, Professor at the Law Fac-
ulty of the Goethe University in Frankfurt am Main. The opinions expressed in this 
article are purely personal and do not necessarily reflect the position of the European 
Central Bank.
2 The Court of Justice can also be requested by a Member State, the European Parlia-
ment, the Council or the Commission for an ex ante Opinion as to whether the con-
tent of an envisaged agreement to be signed by the EU is compatible with the Treaties 
(Article 218(11) TFEU), in order to forestall complications which would result from 
legal disputes (Opinion 1/09 of 8 March 2011, para. 47), or to assess the competence 
of the Union or its institutions to enter into that agreement (Article 196(2) of the 
Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice. See also Opinion 1/03 of 7 February 2006). 
 A decision of the Court of Justice stating an incompatibility after the conclusion of 
a binding international agreement could in fact provoke “not only in the internal 
EU context but also in that of international relations, serious difficulties and might 
give rise to adverse consequences for all interested parties, including third coun-
tries” (Opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014 on the draft agreement providing for the 
accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, para. 146). Once issued, the Opinion is 
binding for the institutions of the Union and therefore, once the incompatibility of 
the draft agreement with the Treaties is established, it can be concluded only after 
having modified such draft agreement or the Treaties.
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and eventually redress it, in the light of the principles and rights3 
recognised as fundamental in the specific legal order. Courts are expected 
to apply these principles and rights and balance them against each other; 
since none of them is absolute, each needs to coexist with the others. 
In a society based on the rule of law, a judge has the delicate task 
of ensuring the respect of fundamental rights and, when two conflicting 
principles and rights are at stake, of balancing them for the common 
good. The common good entails protecting individual rights against 
abuse which, in turn, maintains the citizens’ trust in the rule of law, but 
at the same time allowing these rights to be limited. (We should also 
remember here that we are talking of fundamental economic rights, for 
which the question of compensation in the event of their infringement is 
perhaps more unambiguous than for other fundamental personal rights.)
During the financial crisis, the pressure to take decisions quickly to 
protect the public good of financial stability, overruling sometimes the 
private rights at stake, has provoked discussion on whether, in a crisis, 
fundamental rights deserve the same level of protection and whether the 
dichotomy between Union law, where fundamental rights are protected 
by the Charter4, and other legal frameworks (for example, under the 
Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism), where they are 
not but in which the EU institutions have been assigned certain tasks, 
is sustainable. Several decisions taken during the crisis, made under the 
pressure of emergency, were indeed very “different” from usual business 
and normal procedures. This is probably why after the crisis we have 
experienced an increase in the recourse to the courts to check their 
legality. 
The focus of the panel to which my paper contributes is to examine 
the role that the courts have played, both during and after the crisis, in 
balancing the rights of all the affected parties and in challenging the 
practices, procedures and sometimes legislation established in the crisis 
time. 
3 In the EU legal system, and especially in the Charter of Fundamental rights of the 
European Union, fundamental rights and general principles are considered differ-
ently, even if the distinction is not quite clear, and the Explanations relating to the 
Charter (OJ C 303 of 14 December 2007, at p. 35) do not really help. 
 On the difference between these two concepts in Union law, see T. Tridimas, Funda-
mental Rights, General Principles of EU Law, and the Charter, in Cambridge Yearbook 
of European Legal Studies, Vol. 16, 2014, p. 361 et seq.; S. Peers et al., The EU Charter 
of fundamental rights: a Commentary, Oxford, 2014; S. Walkila, Horizontal Effect of 
Fundamental Rights in EU Law, Groningen/Amsterdam, 2016, especially p. 181 et 
seq. See also the Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón of 18 July 2013 in Case C-176/12, AMS.
4 Charter of Fundamental rights of the European Union.
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(I was fortunate to speak last, so I could relate my comments to the 
ones of the previous speakers.) Georg Vanberg has analysed whether 
courts are unduly soft and compromising when having to take decisions 
and applying fundamental principles to political decisions. He described 
his ideal judge as one that is strong enough to apply an absolute right in an 
absolute way, with no concessions, no balancing and no proportionality. 
My frank opinion is that the judge that society needs is not this – a 
machine that will apply absolute principles in a rigid manner, no matter 
what other (absolute) right or public interest is affected. This is why I do 
not feel critical of the many judgments that have been adopted on the 
political and legislative decisions taken during the crisis, rather I consider 
that they have been as a rule very constructive. I would tend to agree 
with Bruno de Witte that the courts have broadly been coherent with 
their previous stance on the issue of judicial restraint and, where two 
interpretations were legitimately possible, have chosen the interpretation 
more consistent with the existing constitutional and institutional order 
(perhaps with the exception of the Bundesverfassungsgericht – German 
Federal Constitutional Court).
In this paper I analyse the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union and of national constitutional courts, looking in 
particular at three questions.
First, whether the more frequent recourse to the courts and the 
prominence of their decisions have increased the weight of the courts in 
the constitutional balance of powers.
Second, whether the scope of judicial control has changed, becoming 
broader, and if so, in what way and in what respects.
Third, whether the intensity of judicial control has deepened, bringing 
the courts beyond the traditional judicial restraint.
My conclusion is that the control exercised by the courts in the post-
crisis period has played an important role in reassuring citizens that 
the fundamental principles stand and must be respected even when 
decisions need to be taken under pressure; and that the courts, beyond 
formal barriers, do not hesitate to analyse measures that have an impact 
on citizens, while exercising judicial restraint and remaining coherent 
with the fundamental principles of our legal framework and within the 
constitutional balance of powers.
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1. Has the more frequent recourse to the courts and the 
prominence of their decisions increased the weight of the 
courts in the constitutional balance of powers?
In my opinion, the constitutional balance of powers has not been 
unsettled by the courts in their rulings after the crisis. Indeed, it is 
precisely the role of the constitutional courts to intervene and judge on 
the respective competences of the public authorities, as a guarantor of 
the distribution of powers established in the national constitution or in 
the Treaties. Of course, this can have an impact on the other powers of 
the State – when a red light is shown, the objective is to re-establish the 
proper interinstitutional balance. 
In this context, some national constitutional courts, such as the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) have adopted decisions which, in 
the end, might be seen as influencing policymaking, either by aiming 
to limit the scope of discretion of EU institutions and specifically that 
of the ECB (first listing proposed conditions under which the ECB can 
exercise its discretion; then referring to the limits of the German law 
authorising the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty as the limit that 
every German institution has the duty to comply with and be vigilant 
on5), or by reinforcing the legislative process through introducing new 
5 Bundesverfassungsgericht, judgment of 21 June 2016, 2 BvR 2728/13, para. 174: “… the 
constitutional complaints and the application in the Organstreit proceedings – to the 
extent that they are admissible – are unfounded. If the conditions listed below are met, 
the inaction on the part of the Federal Government and of the Bundestag with regard 
to the policy decision of the European Central Bank of 6 September 2012 does not 
violate the complainants’ rights under Art. 38 sec. 1 sentence 1, Art. 20 secs. 1 and 2 
in conjunction with Art. 79 sec. 3 GG, nor are the Bundestag ’s rights and obligations 
with regard to European integration – including its overall budgetary responsibility – 
impaired. As long as the conditions formulated by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union in its Judgment of 16 June 2015 are met, the policy decision of the Governing 
Council of the European Central Bank of 6 September 2012 and its possible imple-
mentation neither constitute a qualified exceeding of the competences attributed to 
the European Central Bank by Art. 119 and Arts. 127 et seq. TFEU, Arts. 17 et seq. 
ESCB Statute (1.), nor violate the prohibition of monetary financing enshrined in Art. 
123 TFEU (2.). The German Bundesbank may participate in the implementation of the 
OMT decision only within the framework laid down by the Court of Justice of the Eu-
ropean Union. If it does not do so, the Federal Government and the Bundestag would 
be required to intervene (3.). As long as the conditions formulated by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union are met, no threat to the Bundestag ’s overall budgetary 
responsibility that would require the Federal Government and the Bundestag to take 
steps against the OMT Programme in order to protect the constitutional identity is 
apparent (4.). However, should the OMT Programme be implemented, these organs 
would be obliged to constantly monitor the fulfilment of these conditions in order to 
counter threats to compliance with the European integration agenda or to the overall 
budgetary responsibility of the German Bundestag early on (5.)”.
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procedures. On the latter, all the crisis-relevant judgments of the BVerfG 
strengthen the position of the Deutscher Bundestag (the German Federal 
Parliament), the expression of the sovereign will of the electoral body, 
underlining the need to respect the form of parliamentary government 
and the democratic principle which also binds the Federal Executive to 
its decisions and approvals.6 
This jurisprudence is also reflected inter alia in a form of positive law 
which gives extensive powers to the German legislature.7   
Another way in which the BVerfG can be seen as influencing 
policymaking is through judicial cooperation: in a recent case, it managed 
to broaden the pool of information provided to the Court of Justice with 
a view to its giving judgment. 
In the Gauweiler case, the Deutsche Bundesbank was not invited to 
the preliminary ruling proceedings in front of the Court of Justice as its 
participation in the main proceedings before the BVerfG had been as 
expert witness and so the Bundesbank was not a party thereof. In the 
Weiss case, however, the BVerfG informed the Court of Justice that the 
6 Already the first crisis-related judgement of the Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
Judgment of 7 September 2011, 2 BvR 987/10, 2 BvR 1485/10 and 2 BvR 1099/10, 
para. 128 et seq., on aid for Greece, European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)), de-
spite ultimately rejecting the applicant’s claims, set procedural minimum standards 
that aimed at ensuring the involvement of the German legislature in decisions with 
important budgetary implications. (See also Bundesverfassungsgericht: Judgment of 
28 February 2012, 2 BvE 8/11 and Judgment of 12 September 2012, 2 BvR 1390/12. 
See M. Steinbeis, Das ESM-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts: ein fiebersenkend-
es Mittel, in Verfassungsblog, 12 September 2012; D. Jaros, German Constitutional 
Court on the Ratification of the ESM Treaty and of the Fiscal Compact, available at 
http://europeanlawblog.eu, 10 October 2012; M. Bonini, Il BVerfG, giudice costituz-
ionale o «signore dei trattati»? Fondo «salva-stati», democrazia parlamentare e rin-
vio pregiudiziale nella sentenza del 12 settembre 2012, in Rivista telematica giuridica 
dell’Associazione italiana dei costituzionalisti, 6 November 2012. Finally, see also 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, Judgment of 18 March 2014, 2 BvR 1390/12.) In general, 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht enhances the value of parliamentary law institutions 
which, by expressing the form of government accepted by the German Basic Law 
(Grundgesetz), ask for a strict application by the legislature and a strict respect by the 
executive.
7 The ESM Financing Act (ESM-Finanzierungsgesetz, ESMFinG) of 13 September 2012 
(Federal Law Gazette I, p. 1918), amended by Article 1 of the Act of 29 November 
2014 (Federal Law Gazette I, pp. 1821 and 2193). Section 5 – Participation of the 
Budget Committee of the German Bundestag: “In all other matters concerning the 
European Stability Mechanism affecting the budgetary responsibility of the German 
Bundestag where a decision by the plenary is not provided for pursuant to section 
4, the Budget Committee of the German Bundestag shall be involved. The Budget 
Committee shall monitor the preparation and implementation of agreements on sta-
bility support” (para. 1). The second paragraph contains a detailed list of cases in 
which the prior approval of the Budget Committee is required. 
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Bundesbank was formally an expert but, in substance and according to 
German law, a party in the main proceedings which were the subject of 
the reference. The Court therefore gave the Bundesbank the opportunity 
to submit written observations in the case, in its capacity as party to the 
main proceedings.8  
Yet the BVerfG had not made this point in Gauweiler. 
One cannot but think that this new interpretation from the BVerfG 
is linked to the concern aired by it in paragraph 182 of the final BVerfG 
decision in Gauweiler,9 in which the BVerfG complains that the Court of 
Justice has not analysed properly any other evidence than the opinion of 
the ECB. By requesting in Weiss that the Bundesbank submit observations, 
the Court will be obliged to consider its opinion, despite its well-known 
reluctance to hear expert witnesses.
Other examples are even more obvious. Some constitutional courts 
have unilaterally annulled parts of memoranda of understanding (MoUs) 
agreed by the executive on the grounds of infringement of fundamental 
8 Article 23(2) of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 
96.1 of the Court’s Rules of Procedure state that shall be entitled to submit state-
ments of case or written observations to the Court: the parties in the main case, 
Member States, the European Commission and, where appropriate, the institution, 
body, office or agency which adopted the act the validity or interpretation of which is 
in dispute. Article 97.1 of the Rules of Procedure states that “the parties to the main 
proceedings are those who are determined as such by the referring court or tribunal 
in accordance with national rules of procedure”.
9 Bundesverfassungsgericht, Judgment of 21 June 2016 - 2 BvR 2728/13, para 182: 
“… the Court of Justice accepts the assertion that the OMT Programme pursues a 
monetary policy objective – an assertion that has been contested in a substantiated 
manner in the present proceedings – without questioning or at least discussing and 
individually reviewing the soundness of the underlying factual assumptions, and 
without testing these assumptions against indications that evidently argue against a 
character of monetary policy – particularly the selectivity of the purchases (BVerfGE 
134, 366 <406 and 407 para. 73>; cf. […]) and the parallelism of those purchases to 
the EFSF and ESM aid programmes (BVerfGE 134, 366 <407 and 498 paras. 74 et 
seq.>; cf. […]). The Court of Justice does not address the consideration that limiting 
the OMT Programme to monetary policy goals aiming at restoring the transmis-
sion mechanism could be hindered by the fact that according to the policy decision 
purchases of government bonds are generally not permissible – irrespective of the 
effects on the transmission mechanism – if the state in question does not have access 
to the bonds market or if it does not abide by the rules of current macroeconomic 
adjustment programmes; it also does not address the fact that the quantifiability of 
the share of the interest rates that is not dependent on macroeconomics has been dis-
puted – e.g. by the Bundesbank – although quantifiability would be a precondition 
for the determination of the volume that could by justified under monetary policy 
considerations if the programme were implemented”.
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principles10. I refer to the decisions of the constitutional courts in Portugal 
and Greece especially, which compelled the Member State to find another 
way of achieving the agreed total amount of budgetary consolidation. By 
way of example, the Portuguese Constitutional Court rejected the legality 
of some of the austerity measures (in particular those related to equal 
treatment of pensioners, both public and private11) that had been agreed 
between the Portuguese Government and the Troika as conditions for 
the release of the loan package granted by the Economic Adjustment 
Programme, which established a plan for budgetary deficit reduction. 
2. Has the scope of judicial control changed? Has it 
broadened, and if so, in what way and in what respects?
Looking at the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, I would answer in 
the positive and I would underline three issues.
First, the Court of Justice has started to analyse also non-binding acts 
(and not limiting itself to declaring the action inadmissible), arguing that 
such acts are actually creating changes and producing consequences, 
even though they do not in themselves directly affect citizens. I refer, for 
instance, to the ECB’s press release of 6 September 201212 stating that, 
10 See the Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Condition-
ality, 17 May 2011, agreed between the Portuguese Government and the Troika, i.e. 
the European Commission, European Central Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund.
11 Portuguese Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional), Acórdão No. 353/2012. 
A group of members of Parliament requested the Court to declare unconstitutional 
some of the rules of the 2012 State budget Law (Law No. 64-B/2011 of 13th Decem-
ber), after the rejection (at a majority of nine judges against three) of the same request 
with reference to the 2011 State budget Law (Acórdão No. 396/11). See also Acórdão 
No. 187/2013 (against some norms of the 2013 State budget Law), No. 602/2013, and 
Acórdão No. 14/2014 (against the Law No. 83-C/2013, of 31 December 2013, which 
approved the State budget for 2014) in which the Court declared the unconstitu-
tionality of the public sector wage cuts; of the cuts in survivors’ pensions and of 
the contribution on unemployment and sickness benefits. See M. Nogueira de Brito, 
Putting Social Rights in Brackets? The Portuguese Experience with Welfare Challenges 
in Times of Crisis, in C. Kilpatrick, B. De Witte (eds.), Social Rights in Times of Crisis 
in the Eurozone: The Role of Fundamental Rights’ Challenges, EUI Working Paper 
LAW 2014/05, p. 67 et seq.; J. Gomes, Social Rights in Crisis in the Eurozone. Work 
Rights in Portugal, ibidem, p. 78 et seq.; R. Cisotta, D. Gallo, The Portuguese Constitu-
tional Court Case Law on Austerity Measures: A Reappraisal, in ibidem, p. 85 et seq.; 
M.L. Pires, Private Versus Public or State Versus Europe? A Portuguese Constitutional 
Tale, in Michigan Journal of International Law, Emerging Scholarship Project, 2013, 
p. 101 et seq. 
12 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html
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as announced at the earlier press conference, decisions had been taken 
concerning the programme for purchasing government bonds issued by 
Member States of the euro area, which were to be known as “Outright 
Monetary Transactions (OMTs)”. Although this programme has never 
been translated into reality and the implementing legislation is missing, 
the announcement was in itself sufficient to have the (expected) effect on 
the financial markets and generate questions on its compatibility with 
Article 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU)13. 
Also the Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework, published on 5 
July 2011 on the ECB’s website, a non-binding policy paper describing 
the Eurosystem’s role in the oversight of payment, clearing and settlement 
systems, has been the subject of an action before the Court of Justice14. 
13 See Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 16 June 2015, Case C-62/14, Peter 
Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag (ECLI:EU:C:2015:400). The Court of 
Justice, instead of accepting the objections of inadmissibility coming from Italy, Ire-
land, the Netherlands, Spain, France, Greece, Portugal and Finland as well as the 
Parliament, the ECB and the Commission, according to which in the absence of im-
plementing acts the OMT programme would have been a mere communication tool 
and not a binding act, choose to provide the ECB with an interpretation. The Court 
therefore replied to those exceptions that: “as regards the argument that the dispute 
in the main proceedings is contrived and artificial and that the questions referred 
are hypothetical, it should be observed that, as is apparent from paragraph  15 of 
this judgment, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been 
brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, 
to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need 
for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance 
of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions 
submitted concern the interpretation or the validity of a rule of EU law, the Court is 
in principle bound to give a ruling (see, to that effect, judgment in Melloni, C399/11, 
paragraph  28 and the case-law cited)” (para. 24) and that the fact “that the pro-
gramme for purchasing government bonds announced in the press release has not 
been implemented and that its implementation will be possible only after further 
legal acts have been adopted, it does not — as the referring court states — render the 
actions in the main proceedings devoid of purpose since under German law preven-
tive legal protection may be granted in such a situation if certain conditions are met” 
(para. 27). 
14 Judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber), 4 March 2015, Case T-496/11, 
United Kingdom v European Central Bank (ECLI:EU:T:2015:133). According to the 
Court, a requirement for central counterparties (CCPs) involved in the clearing of 
securities to be located within the euro area exceeds the ECB’s competences under 
Article 127 TFEU and in Article 22 of the Statute. 
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The same can be said of some MoUs on EU financial assistance15.
Finally an ECB (non-binding) opinion has originated a direct action 
for damages before the General Court. The Court is requested to decide 
whether ECB opinions, i.e. opinions adopted by the ECB in the context of 
compulsory consultation by other Union institutions and Member States 
on draft legislation in the ECB’s fields of competence, could be capable 
of incurring the liability of the ECB owing to a lack of consideration of 
fundamental rights issues16. 
Second, the relevance given to the respect of fundamental rights, even 
for decisions taken during the crisis and even when institutions exercise 
competences conferred on them outside the Treaties, is higher than 
before. It is well known that Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU) recognises the Charter of Fundamental rights of the European 
Union and gives it “the same legal value as the Treaties”. In moments of 
crisis, fundamental rights and general principles are confirmed as an 
inalienable parameter, in the assessment of the Court of Justice, against 
15 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 13 June 2017, Case C-258/14, Eugenia 
Florescu and Others v Casa Judeţeană de Pensii Sibiu and Others – reference for a pre-
liminary ruling (ECLI:EU:C:2017:448). The Florescu judgment clarifies that MoUs 
fall within the jurisdiction of the Court and are part of Union law. According to 
the Court, the Romanian MoU “gives concrete form to an agreement between the 
EU and a Member State on an economic programme, negotiated by those parties, 
whereby that Member State undertakes to comply with predefined economic objec-
tives in order to be able, subject to fulfilling that agreement, to benefit from financial 
assistance from the EU” (para. 34). Among the conditions attached to the finan-
cial assistance, set out in the MoU, is the reduction of the public sector wage bill, 
while the fourth subparagraph of point 5(b) states that the pension system needs 
to be reformed (para. 46). The purpose of the national measure at issue in the main 
proceedings, which introduces wage cuts and pension reforms, is to implement the 
undertakings given by Romania in the MoU, which is part of Union law (para. 47).
16 See Application of 6 February 2017, Case T-107/17, Steinhoff and Others v ECB, http://
curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=190130&pageIndex-
=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=211251 
 in which the applicant argued that the ECB, in its opinion of 17 February 2012 
(CON/2012/12), failed to point at the illegality of the Hellenic Republic’s intended 
debt restructuring “by means of a compulsory exchange”. The ECB opinion related to 
the draft law “retrofitting” collective action clauses into Greek law-governed sovereign 
bonds. In the applicants’ view the ECB produced an incomplete and thus fundamental-
ly erroneous document, not pointing out in the opinion the unlawfulness of the forced 
debt restructuring in view of the principle of pacta sunt servanda; they underlined the 
contrast with Article 17 of the Charter on Fundamental rights of the European Union 
(protecting the right to property), and the breach of Article 63 TFEU on the free move-
ment of capital and of Article 124 TFEU on privileged access to financial institutions.
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disproportionate or inadequate decisions17. It is not possible to analyse 
in-depth in this paper the scope of the Charter; the extent and limits of 
its application; the recognition of horizontal direct effects of some of its 
articles and the related question concerning the distinction between rights 
and principles18; and the limitations imposed upon rights19. Suffice it to 
remember that the judgment in the Ledra20 case clarifies the scope of the 
Charter: “ … the Charter is addressed to the EU institutions, including … 
when they act outside the EU legal framework”. According to the Court, 
the Commission is bound to ensure that every MoU is consistent with the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter and should thus refrain 
from signing a MoU whose consistency with Union law it doubts21. More 
generally, the role of the Court of Justice as a constitutional court is 
enshrined not only in its exclusive competence to check that secondary 
legislation complies with the Treaties (e.g. action for annulment, 
preliminary ruling on validity, exception of inapplicability), or in the 
17 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 20 September 2016, Joined Cases C-8/15 
P to C-10/15 P, Ledra Advertising Ltd and Others v European Commission and Eu-
ropean Central Bank (ECB), para. 70.; C. Kilpatrick, B. De Witte, A Comparative 
Framing of Fundamental Rights Challenges to Social Crisis Measures in the Eurozone, 
in Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 2014, available at http://www.sieps.
se/en/publications/2014/a-comparative-framing-of-fundamental-rights-challeng-
es-to-social-crisis-measures-in-the-eurozone-20147epa/.
18 See the judgment of 17 April 2018, Case C-414/16, Egenberger (ECLI:EU:C:2018:257).
19 J. Fraczyk, EU fundamental rights and the financial crisis, in S. Douglas-Scott, N. 
Hatzis (eds.), Research Handbook on EU Law and Human Rights, 2017, p. 468 et seq. 
20 Judgment Ledra Advertising, op. cit., para. 67.
21 See paragraph 59. For an opposite position, see C. Barnard, The Charter, the Courts 
and the Crisis, in University of Cambridge, Faculty of Law, Research Paper No 
19/2013, according to whom in crisis human rights are not respected in the same 
way. It should be noted however that the article was written before the Ledra judg-
ment. For an analysis of that issue, see C. Zilioli, Justiciability of central banks’ deci-
sions and the imperative to respect fundamental rights, in ECB legal conference 2017, 
Shaping a new legal order for Europe: a tale of crisis and opportunities, Frankfurt 
am Main, 2017, p. 91 et seq.; D. Sarmiento, Who’s afraid of the Charter? The Court 
of Justice, national Courts and the new framework of fundamental rights protection 
in Europe, in Common Market Law Review, Vol. 50, issue 5, 2013, p. 1267 et seq. Cf. 
also D. Sarmiento, The Price of Borrowing EU Institutions, and the Price of Being Bor-
rowed – A short comment on Ledra Advertising, in Despite our Difference, 21 Septem-
ber 2016, available at https://despiteourdifferencesblog.wordpress.com/2016/09/21/
the-price-of-borrowing-eu-institutions-and-the-price-of-being-borrowed-a-short-
comment-on-ledra-advertising/; A. Hinarejos, Bailouts, Borrowed Institutions, and 
Judicial Review: Ledra Advertising, in EU Law Analysis, 25 September 2016, available 
at http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2016/09/bailouts-borrowed-institutions-and.
html; and P. Dermine, “The end of impunity? The legal duties of “borrowed” EU 
institutions under the European Stability Mechanism Framework”, in European 
Constitutional Law Review, 2017, p. 369 et seq.
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interpretative function of Union law (including the indirect checking 
of compliance of national law with Union law, shared with national 
courts and with the European Court of Human Rights), but also, more 
specifically, in ensuring that the EU institutions balance different general 
principles, values and fundamental rights. These must be guaranteed 
and protected by Union law in the actions of the EU institutions, even 
where they enjoy exclusive competence: striking a balance between the 
need to preserve the discretionary powers of the institution and the 
need to ensure respect of fundamental rights, as indicated in the Treaties 
and in the Charter and interpreted by the Court22 in the actions of the 
institutions.  
Third, there is an attempt by many plaintiffs, some of which are still 
ongoing, to bring the Court of Justice to extend the causality link, thus 
facilitating the attribution of acts to the institutions and imposing liability 
for a de facto “influencing” of decisions that are formally taken at the 
national level. The question is whether the causality link can be extended 
to beyond what is normal, reaching out to factors influencing the choice. 
(The argument that a government had no choice is very difficult to sustain. 
That said, if an obligation to follow instructions could be demonstrated, it 
might be possible to impute liability to the instructing party). 
It should also be noted that in Ledra the plaintiffs were heard in 
appeal, despite their case having been declared non-admissible by the 
General Court: the Court of Justice wants to look at the substance of the 
case, not at the form, and nevertheless gave the plaintiffs the opportunity 
to be heard, despite the inadmissibility of their case as declared by the 
General Court.
22 See F.G. Jacobs, Is the Court of Justice of the European Communities a Constitutional 
Court?, in D.M. Curtin and D. O’Keeffe (eds.), Constitutional Adjudication in Eu-
ropean Community and National Law, Dublin, Butterworth, 1992, p. 25 et seq.; B. 
Vesterdorf, A Constitutional Court for the EU?, in International Journal of Consti-
tutional Law, Vol. 4, issue 4, 2006, p. 607 et seq.; A. Tizzano, Il nuovo ruolo delle Corti 
supreme nell’ordinamento politico e istituzionale: la Corte di giustizia dell’Ue, in Il 
diritto dell’Unione europea, 2012, p. 811 et seq.; G. Itzcovich, The European Court 
of Justice as a Constitutional Court. Legal Reasoning in a Comparative Perspective, 
in Sant’Anna Legal Studies, 2014, available at http://stals.sssup.it/files/itzcovich%20
4%202014.pdf; C. Zilioli, La Corte, giudice costituzionale delle competenze attribuite 
alle istituzioni dell’Unione: il caso della Banca Centrale europea, in Lenaerts, K., Un 
parcours européen: de la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes à la Cour 
de justice de l’Union européenne, Liber Amicorum in honour of Antonio Tizzano, 
Giappichelli, 2018, and the literature cited therein.
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3. Has the intensity of judicial control deepened, bringing 
the courts beyond the traditional judicial restraint?
My third question mirrors the one that Bruno de Witte already mentioned, 
whether the intensity of judicial control has intensified.
It is true that, with Gauweiler, for the first time in history a monetary 
policy decision has been challenged in front of a court of law23, but 
the scrutiny of the Court of Justice was limited owing to the exclusive 
competence of the ECB to take decisions in this field and the Court’s 
recognition of the ECB’s wide discretion in this very technical matter24. 
I would argue that the general approach of courts (with the 
exception of the BVerfG) has remained one of judicial restraint: thereby 
acknowledging the need to respect the provisions of the Treaties 
establishing the respective – and sometimes exclusive – competences 
of the various institutions and the power to make policy choices within 
those competences. The Court of Justice only verifies the legality of the 
actions of other EU institutions, without entering into the merits of 
their policy decisions, which are part of the discretion the drafters of the 
Treaties decided to grant to them25. This judicial restraint is best shown 
by two examples.
First, in the important cases on monetary policy decisions, and in 
the discussion on the room for discretion that EU institutions have in 
taking complex economic decisions, judicial restraint has prevailed. Two 
cases were referred by the BVerfG to the Court of Justice on this issue. 
In the first, Gauweiler, the Court confirmed its jurisprudence on judicial 
restraint in cases in which the institution is conferred powers and needs 
to decide in cases that require a complex economic analysis, despite the 
concerns of the BVerfG: “Generously accepting as fact asserted aims 
while at the same time granting wide margins of assessment to bodies 
of the European Union and considerably decreasing the intensity of 
23 Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, op. cit. and C. Zilioli, 2017, op. cit, p. 94-95.
24 On the contrary, concerning matters in which the scope for discretion is more limited, 
the Court’s review can be more intensive, going to the appraisal of the facts, as in indi-
vidual decisions involving staff, or to an unlimited jurisdiction, in decisions imposing 
sanctions (Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 of 23 November 1998 
concerning the powers of the European Central Bank to impose sanctions (OJ L 318, 
27.11.1998, p. 4)). Also concerning the supervisory field, the intensity of the judicial 
scrutiny depends on the scope of the discretion granted by the EU legislator and on the 
degree of complexity of the subject matter. For a deeper analysis of these aspects, see C. 
Zilioli, 2017, op. cit. 
25 C. Zilioli, 2017, op. cit., at p. 98.
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judicial review is well-suited to enable institutions, bodies, offices, and 
agencies of the European Union to autonomously decide upon the scope 
of the competences that the Member States have attributed to them (cf. 
BVerfGE 123, 267; 349 et seq.). Such an understanding of competences 
does not sufficiently take into account the constitutional dimension of 
the principle of conferral”26. The Court recognised that “questions of 
monetary policy are usually of a controversial nature and in view of 
the ESCB’s broad discretion, nothing more can be required from the 
ESCB apart from that it use its economic expertise and the necessary 
technical means at its disposal to carry out that analysis with all care and 
accuracy”27, only requiring a careful and impartial analysis of all relevant 
elements of the situation in question and an adequate statement of the 
reasons for its decision28.
The second case, Weiss29, is still pending (the hearing will be on 10 
July 2018) and the same questions have been asked again, although 
applied to a situation involving the implementation of the ECB’s public 
sector purchase programme (PSPP). It is now to be assessed whether, 
given the PSPP’s magnitude and the impact on the market, the Court’s 
approach should remain the same. In Gauweiler the Court said that the 
fact that a monetary policy measure has an impact on economic policy 
does not make it an economic measure. Now the question being asked is 
whether or not, if the impact on the economy is so big, it is still possible 
26 Decision of 18 July 2017 - 2 BvR 859/15, 2 BvR 2728/13, para. 184.
27  Case Gauweiler, op cit., para. 75.
28 Ibidem, para. 69. For an analysis, see C. Zilioli, The ECB’s powers and institutional 
role in the financial crisis. A Confirmation from the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, in Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, February 2016, p. 
171 et seq.
29 Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesverfassungsgericht lodged on 15 
August 2017, Case C-493/17, Heinrich Weiss and Others.
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to talk about monetary policy measures30. 
Second, even in Ledra, where the Court went in-depth into the 
application and applicability of fundamental rights considerations, the 
Court has not assessed the substance of an institution’s balancing31 of 
the two conflicting interests of property vs. financial stability: “… the 
Commission cannot be considered, by dint of having permitted the 
adoption of the disputed paragraphs, to have contributed to a breach 
of the appellants’ right to property guaranteed by Article 17(1) of the 
Charter. It follows that the first condition for establishing non-contractual 
liability of the European Union is not satisfied in this instance, so that the 
appellants’ claims for compensation must be dismissed”32.
I think such judicial restraint is good. Our democratic society is based 
on the separation of powers. As Justice Lübbe-Wolff highlighted in her 
dissenting Opinion (in the referral of BVerfG in Gauweiler), the will of 
the drafters of the Constitution and the Treaties was to assign certain 
tasks to a certain power. It is not for the judges to substitute their decision 
for the one of the technical experts, to take over another power of the 
30 In this regard, see Bundesverfassungsgericht, Decision of 18 July 2017 - 2 BvR 859/15, 
para 114: “(…) there is strong evidence that the PSPP decision is not covered by the 
ECB’s mandate due to its size and more than two years of implementation. From the 
point of view of the Senate, based on an overall view of the relevant demarcation crite-
ria, it could no longer be regarded as monetary policy but as a predominantly econom-
ic policy measure. Although the PSPP has an explicit monetary policy objective, it uses 
monetary policy to pursue that objective (aa); however, due to the volume of the PSPP 
and the related predictability of the purchase of government bonds, the economic im-
pact is already directly inherent in the program itself (bb). Thus, the PSPP may prove 
disproportionate to its underlying monetary policy objective (cc). In addition, the de-
cisions forming the basis of the program lack a reasonable justification which would 
allow the continuity of the program to be kept under review during the multi-annual 
implementation of the decisions (dd)”.
31 Cf. de Vries, Balancing Fundamental Rights with Economic Freedoms According to 
the European Court of Justice, in Utrecht Law Review, 2015, in which the author spe-
cifically discusses the “balancing of conflicting interests”, available at https://www.
utrechtlawreview.org/articles/10.18352/ulr.220/galley/217/download/.
32 Ledra Advertising, op. cit., para. 75.
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tate33. Such restraint, however, should find its limits in the compliance 
with the constitutional guarantees envisaged by the Treaties and in the 
acknowledgement of the role of the Court of Justice as a constitutional 
judge regulating not only vertical and but also horizontal conflicts of 
competences34.
33 Dissenting Opinion of Justice Lübbe-Wolff on the Order of the Second Senate of 14 
January 2013, para. 3 et seq.: “At any rate, what the plaintiffs, insofar as they turn against 
federal inaction with respect to the OMT decision, petition the Federal Constitutional 
Court to order goes, in my view, beyond the limits of judicial competence under the 
principles of democracy and separation of powers. The demarcation of these limits is 
open to debate. There may also be good reasons for controversy over the question which 
of the various techniques to avoid overstraining judicial power (political question 
doctrines, other criteria of admissibility, recognition of margins of appreciation or 
application of other restrained standards of review) is applicable in a given case. Under 
German law, which has so far been interpreted as not containing a political question 
doctrine, such controversy will concern the choice between admissibility criteria and 
reduced intensity of review as instruments of judicial restraint. A judge considering 
the limits of justiciability transgressed will therefore typically not be able to invoke 
clear standards in support of that claim. I must admit that this is so in the present case, 
but I do think that some guidelines can be derived from the principles of democracy, 
separation of powers and the rule of law. To mention only those which have a bearing 
on the case at hand: 
1.  The limits of reasonable governance by rules must be respected, because under the 
principles of democracy and separation of powers, decisions by judges at whom the 
citizens cannot, either directly or indirectly, come back by exercising their right to vote 
are justifiable only as decisions according to legal rules. 
2.  The need for determinative legal standards, even if they be just judge-made standards 
from earlier case-law, grows with the importance of the decision to be made. The 
judicial branch of government will not work without a creative element. But the more 
far-reaching, the more weighty, the more irreversible – legally and factually – the 
possible consequences of a judicial decision, the more judicial restraint is appropriate 
where, due to vagueness, the legitimating force of existing legal rules appears feeble. 
3.  In determining the reach of judicial competence, the reach of judicial power to 
implement should be considered. This is not just a pragmatic maxim serving to avoid 
losses of authority that might endanger the proper functioning of a court, but also a 
legal imperative, since from the means of power vested or not vested in a court or in the 
courts in general by constitutional and other statutory rules, inferences can be drawn 
as to intended competences.
4.  The more judicial restraint is required, the more preferable is it to exercise such 
restraint by way of refusal to go into the merits (political question doctrine, criteria 
of admissibility) rather than by way of applying restrained standards of review 
(recognition of margins of appreciation, substantive obviousness criteria and the 
like). That is because the former path is the path of greater restraint. Dealing with 
the substance of the case is altogether avoided here, while the mere application 
of restrained standards of review will typically result in some kind of benediction, 
although reduced in scope, of the object of judicial review.
5.  It should be kept in mind that the limits of justiciability are not necessarily the same for 
national and transnational courts, but may diverge – in varying directions, depending 
on the nature of the case – because national and transnational courts differ in the 
sources of legitimacy of their operation, notably in the legal bases of their competence 
and implementing power”. 
34  C. Zilioli, 2018, op. cit.
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MACRO RATES VIEWS: IS EMU 
‘BREAK-UP’ RISK OUT FOR GOOD?
Francesco U. Garzarelli
The risk of redenomination into national currencies priced in Euro 
area financial assets was a distinctive feature of the 2009-12 European 
sovereign and banking crisis, and one that intensified the economic 
downturn. The fear of EMU ‘’break-up’ was not just an expression of 
investors’ collective uncertainty. Indeed, in the negotiations surrounding 
Greece’s third round of financial assistance, the prospect of the country 
leaving the single currency was fielded as one of the options. Operational 
procedures were also put in place for such a contingency, tainting the 
notion of an ‘irreversible’ currency agreement.
On most measures, redenomination risk reflected in EMU government 
bonds and other Euro area financial assets is now back to pre-crisis levels. 
This is due to a combination of the ECB’s large-scale QE (and investors’ 
expectations that, in the extreme, the central bank will intervene as ‘lender 
of last resort’), the improvement in the business climate and a series of 
upgrades to the Euro area’s institutional architecture – probably in that 
order. Looking ahead, we argue that greater ex ante ‘risk-sharing’ among 
member states is needed to keep EMU ‘break-up’ risk more structurally 
in check. Progress in this area is proving slow, however. Down the line, 
it may also result in dislocations and, possibly, subordination of existing 
EMU government bonds.
1. EMU ‘Break-Up’ Risk Is Down...
There are several ways of quantifying the time-varying amount of EMU-
wide systemic stress perceived by market participants. The most direct 
one is to run a periodic survey of investors and analysts, such as the one 
152
collated by SENTIX1. Another avenue involves aggregating prices on 
fi nancial assets subject to credit risk, as the ECB’s Composite Indicator of 
Systemic Stress2 (CISS) does.
Our preferred measure of systemic risk is based on the behaviour 
of intermediate maturity sovereign bond benchmark yields issued by 
EMU member states.3 Specifi cally, we compute the second principal 
component (PC2) of the level of 10-year government bond yields in the 
major EMU markets. Since the fi rst principal component (PC1) of yields 
captures their co-movement related to a common duration factor, PC2 
isolates the cross-sectional variance of EMU yields that is uncorrelated to 
market-directional shift s. Our systemic risk measure is plotted in Exhibit 
1, on a scale ranging from 0 (minimum in-sample systemic risk) to 100 
(maximum in-sample risk).
Th e advantages of this methodology are twofold. First, PC2 provides 
a clear market-based taxonomy of ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ EMU 
constituents, allowing it to evolve over time. Before and aft er the crisis, 
Germany is, in the eyes of the market, the ultimate ‘core’ country. Greece 
and Portugal are at the periphery, geographically and fi nancially, while 
Belgium sets the boundary between the two groups. Second, our statistical 
1  https://www.sentix.de/index.php/en/sentix-Euro-Break-up-Index-News/
2  https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1426.pdf
3 See: ‘EMU Sovereign Spreads: the Macro, the Policy and the Politics‘, Mac-
ro Rates Views, 21 April 2017. https://research.gs.com/content/research/en/re-
ports/2017/04/21/8e54745c-80a8-4e24-aa8f-b0fd1f99161c.html 
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measure allows us to gauge the sensitivity of diff erent sovereign issuers 
funding costs to swings in systemic risk – and therefore to better capture 
movements in sovereign bond diff erentials that are related to country-
specifi c macroeconomic fundamentals. On our estimates, the sensitivity 
of Italian and Spanish sovereign yields versus their German counterparts 
to swings in EMU risk sentiment is four times greater than France’s. 
Portugal’s is even higher (Exhibit 2).
As can be seen from Exhibit 1 above, investor perception of EMU-wide 
systemic risk appears to have now returned to pre-crisis levels. With the 
exception of a brief period ahead of the French Presidential election in the 
spring of 2017, systemic risk has been resilient to political tensions across 
numerous EMU Member States – most recently, those surrounding the 
formation of a government in Italy.
Even within the restored more benign systemic risk environment, 
investors continue to discriminate between sovereign issuers based on 
their creditworthiness. Th e underperformance of Italian government 
bonds versus their Spanish counterparts over the past year is a good 
example. Our modelling work suggest that around 40-50 basis points of 
the yield diff erential between Italy and Spain (currently at around 65 
basis points) refl ects the fact that the prospects for nominal GDP growth 
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in the latter are stronger, in turn supporting a relatively faster improvement 
in public fi nances. Exhibit 3 plots the contribution of these macro factors 
to 10-year benchmark yields in the two countries.
2. ...But Is It Out for Good?
Th e degree to which one can be confi dent that EMU ‘break-up’ risk is 
out for good is a more contentious matter than measuring its level and 
variance over time. One way to approach this involves trying to identify 
which factors may have contributed to bringing it down, and whether 
they have permanent eff ects.
A fi rst factor is economic growth and the improvement in the jobs 
market. As Exhibit 4 shows, the decline in EMU systemic risk has been 
reinforced by a pick-up in Euro area GDP growth and a resulting decline 
in the rate of unemployment across most member states. Th e improved 
economic performance also contributed to stabilising public fi nances4, 
and allowed banks to raise private capital.
4 See: ‘European Views: Healthier composition of public fi nances‘, European Views, 
2 May 2018 (https://research.gs.com/content/research/en/reports/2018/05/02/3e-
fa9bf3-b01f-479b-b170-c04b22af3402.html) and ‘Euro area government defi cits fall 
further‘, European Views, 25 April 2018 (https://research.gs.com/content/research/
en/reports/2018/04/25/9055b10c-471e-4798-897d-519b243e6427.html) 
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Th e degree to which one can be confi dent that EMU ‘break-up’ risk is 
out for good is a more contentious matter than measuring its level and 
variance over time. One way to approach this involves trying to identify 
which factors may have contributed to bringing it down, and whether 
they have permanent eff ects.
A fi rst factor is economic growth and the improvement in the jobs 
market. As Exhibit 4 shows, the decline in EMU systemic risk has been 
reinforced by a pick-up in Euro area GDP growth and a resulting decline 
in the rate of unemployment across most member states. Th e improved 
economic performance also contributed to stabilising public fi nances4, 
and allowed banks to raise private capital.
4 See: ‘European Views: Healthier composition of public fi nances‘, European Views, 
2 May 2018 (https://research.gs.com/content/research/en/reports/2018/05/02/3e-
fa9bf3-b01f-479b-b170-c04b22af3402.html) and ‘Euro area government defi cits fall 
further‘, European Views, 25 April 2018 (https://research.gs.com/content/research/
en/reports/2018/04/25/9055b10c-471e-4798-897d-519b243e6427.html) 
A second factor is the progressively heavier dose of monetary stimulus 
provided by the ECB: conventional rate cuts, long-term refi nancing 
operations, negative rates. Th is sequence culminated with the launch of 
QE at the start of 2015. On our estimates, QE has shaved 50-80bp off  
10-year German Bunds through a ‘stock eff ect’ of cumulative purchases, 
and boosted the ‘forward guidance’ of the ECB on policy rates5. 
Combined, these measures have also provided EMU sovereigns more 
room to manoeuvre fi scal policy by lowering the interest bill on public 
debt.
A third factor consists of EMU’s institutional upgrade. Th e central 
structures in the new landscape, largely built between 2012 and 2016, 
include (i) an inter-governmental entity – the European Stability 
Mechanism, or ESM – with committed capital and senior creditor 
status. Th e ESM can extend loans to EMU member states and intervene 
in primary and secondary markets for sovereign debt (albeit subject 
to conditionality). And (ii) the establishment of a banking union 
5 See: ‘ECB QE Withdrawal Syndrome?‘, Global Market Analyst, 17 April 2018 (https://
research.gs.com/content/research/en/reports/2018/04/17/39c49738-b4ba-4bfc-
8b3c-3116767a86bc.html) 
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comprising a single banking supervisor – the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism, or SSM – alongside a Single Resolution Mechanism, or SRM, 
and an accompanying Single Resolution Fund, or SRF. Banking union 
has brought more transparency, and hence market discipline, into the 
banking industry and mitigated the risk of losses spreading from banks 
to the sovereign balance sheet of their country of domicile.
3. More ‘Risk-Sharing’ is Needed...
Which of the three factors identified above has been most important for 
the reduction in EMU ‘break-up’ risk is a point of contention, particularly 
since they overlapped. In our opinion, the ECB’s QE has played a crucial 
role through the large scale exchange of public debt of all EMU sovereign 
borrowers (bar Greece) with single fiat-money currency. That said, none 
of these factors seems to us of permanent nature, at least yet. This is for a 
number of reasons.
A material slowdown in economic growth, let alone a recession, 
seems a long way off. But should it occur sooner, the ensuing rise in 
unemployment could accentuate a rise in anti-mainstream and European 
institution sentiment that was fuelled in the crisis years. The 
Eurobarometer, a public opinion survey regularly conducted by the 
European Commission, indicates that confidence towards the European 
Union still has some way to go in order to return to pre-crisis levels, as 
can be seen in Exhibit 5. Similarly, ‘anti-establishment’ political 
formations remain in the ascendancy in many member states (although 
this appears also closely connected with concerns over immigration), and 
could gain more traction if the economy worsens. With public 
indebtedness at post-war highs in several EMU countries,6 negative rates 
and QE already in place, the space for counter-cyclical policies at the 
political, fiscal and monetary level appears lower now than during the 
sovereign and banking crisis.
6 On this point, see the latest IMF Fiscal Monitor, April 2018 (https://www.imf.org/
en/Publications/FM/Issues/2018/04/06/fiscal-monitor-april-2018)
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comprising a single banking supervisor – the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism, or SSM – alongside a Single Resolution Mechanism, or SRM, 
and an accompanying Single Resolution Fund, or SRF. Banking union 
has brought more transparency, and hence market discipline, into the 
banking industry and mitigated the risk of losses spreading from banks 
to the sovereign balance sheet of their country of domicile.
3. More ‘Risk-Sharing’ is Needed...
Which of the three factors identifi ed above has been most important for 
the reduction in EMU ‘break-up’ risk is a point of contention, particularly 
since they overlapped. In our opinion, the ECB’s QE has played a crucial 
role through the large scale exchange of public debt of all EMU sovereign 
borrowers (bar Greece) with single fi at-money currency. Th at said, none 
of these factors seems to us of permanent nature, at least yet. Th is is for a 
number of reasons.
A material slowdown in economic growth, let alone a recession, 
seems a long way off . But should it occur sooner, the ensuing rise in 
unemployment could accentuate a rise in anti-mainstream and European 
institution sentiment that was fuelled in the crisis years. Th e 
Eurobarometer, a public opinion survey regularly conducted by the 
European Commission, indicates that confi dence towards the European 
Union still has some way to go in order to return to pre-crisis levels, as 
can be seen in Exhibit 5. Similarly, ‘anti-establishment’ political 
formations remain in the ascendancy in many member states (although 
this appears also closely connected with concerns over immigration), and 
could gain more traction if the economy worsens. With public 
indebtedness at post-war highs in several EMU countries,6 negative rates 
and QE already in place, the space for counter-cyclical policies at the 
political, fi scal and monetary level appears lower now than during the 
sovereign and banking crisis.
6 On this point, see the latest IMF Fiscal Monitor, April 2018 (https://www.imf.org/
en/Publications/FM/Issues/2018/04/06/fi scal-monitor-april-2018)
Th e QE eff ects on EMU sovereign bond yields should remain largely ‘in 
the price’ for as long as national central banks continue rolling over the 
stock of public debt (around a quarter of the total) they have accumulated 
over the four-year period to the end of 2018.
But the days of large scale net secondary market purchases, where 
the Eurosystem bought the equivalent of close to 100% of gross bond 
issuance of the large member states, look to be behind us. Th e ECB has 
restricted itself to not own more than a third of public bonds to avoid 
becoming a dominant creditor of Euro area governments, with all its 
potential legal ramifi cations. Eventually, policy rates should normalise. 
All this will put upward pressure on the cost of funding, particularly for 
EMU peripheral sovereigns.
Open market operations in sovereign debt by the ECB will still be 
available under the Outright Monetary Transactions framework (which 
ECB Board member Coeuré once described as an ‘an insurance policy 
against redenomination risk’7). But these operations in secondary markets 
will be subject to conditions, and possibly debt restructuring, agreed with 
member states. How such conditionality will interplay with domestic 
activity and the political process in the country under fi nancial duress, 
7  https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2013/html/sp130902.en.html 
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and whether it will amplify calls to leave the euro, is anyone’s guess.
The ‘home bias’ in the ownership of public debt in peripheral countries 
is higher than it was before the crisis. This has mixed implications. On 
the positive side, the risk of a ‘sudden stop’ in the roll-over of public 
debt is lower since domestic investors have a higher propensity to invest 
in their own sovereign paper (and can be more easily be subjected to 
‘financial repression’). Moreover, thanks to portfolio re-investments, 
national central banks will remain involved in secondary government 
bond markets (for a country the size of Italy, we estimate that the central 
bank will roll-over roughly the equivalent of the annual deficit). On the 
negative side, the amount of sovereign credit risk shared amongst private 
non-domestic bondholders is lower. A fall in value of sovereign bonds 
resulting from fiscal problems would thus fall more squarely on domestic 
investors.
Finally, the institutional evolution of the Euro area over recent years 
has been notable, lending further support to French diplomat Jean 
Monnet’s maxim that “Europe will be forged in crises”. There appears to 
be agreement among most member states that more is required to lower 
the odds of systemic events occurring, and addressing them without 
incurring economic costs as high as in the last crisis. The policy debate, 
however, appears to have reached a stalemate such that further ‘risk 
sharing’ will require decisive steps towards ‘risk mitigation’. The notion 
that a deeper integration can bring benefits to all EMU participants 
is hindered by unequal starting positions (public debt, NPLs, etc.), an 
inadequate incentive structure, and near-term political pressures.
Such dialectics are evident in the policy work surrounding the 
completion of the banking union. This envisages the phasing in of a 
common European Deposit Insurance Scheme, or EDIS, and the creation 
of a common ‘fiscal backstop’ for the Single Resolution Fund, both of 
which presume greater pooling of risks among EMU member states. 
Given a large ‘home bias’ in banks’ holdings of sovereign bonds (which 
carry a zero risk weight for regulatory capital purposes), countries with 
stronger public finances fear that granting greater common insurance to 
financial institutions domiciled in higher-debt countries will result in 
a relaxation of fiscal discipline. ‘Risk mitigation’ in this context entails 
higher bank capital buffers (negotiations on the minimum requirement 
for banks’ own funds and eligible liabilities, or MREL,8 are ongoing), a 
reduction in domestic sovereign exposures, and more ambitious plans 
to reduce non-performing loans. While all these initiatives have merit, 
8  https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/mrel
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pushing them through too forcefully may perversely set off the risk that 
they were intended to reduce.
4. ...And a Euro area ‘Safe Asset’
The policy debate around these issues is germane to the one surrounding 
a Euro area ‘safe asset’. What public debt instrument should a financial 
institution located anywhere in the Euro area consider ‘risk free’ from an 
economic and regulatory standpoint? 
German Bunds – which would fit the bill from a pricing behaviour 
standpoint – are in too small supply to satisfy everyone’s needs. A 
genuine Eurobond involving mutual guarantees and/or a central taxation 
capability in Member States has little political support. Against this 
backdrop, the policy choice for ‘safe assets’ has converged on a GDP-
weighted portfolio of sovereign issuers – very similar in composition 
to the ‘capital key’ based allocation that the ECB uses in the conduct 
of QE. This choice carries implications for the pricing of its sovereign 
constituents, however.
Consider for example a situation where banks are taxed for holding 
too many government bonds of one sovereign, or in proportion to their 
departure from the capital-key benchmark.9 This would address one 
dimension of risk mitigation, possibly allowing for greater risk sharing 
within the banking union. Exhibit 6 and Exhibit 7 illustrate that, for 
example, the larger banks (those under common supervision and subject 
to the EBA stress tests) in both Italy and Germany would potentially 
need to rebalance their government bond holdings towards the portfolio 
benchmark. More prominent effects would stem from the response of the 
myriad of smaller banks, where the sovereign ‘home bias’ is most acute.
9 See: ‘Sovereign Concentration Charges: A New Regime for Banks’ Sovereign 
Exposures‘, Nicolas Veron, November 2017 (http://bruegel.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2017/11/IPOL_STU2017602111_EN.pdf) 
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Estimating what could be the impact on government bond yields of the 
phasing in of such capital surcharges for concentrated sovereign exposures 
is not straightforward. Consider that sovereign debt is already subject to 
the EBA’s stress test (in the adverse scenario, for instance, the test assumes 
a 10% markdown on 10-year Italian BTPs), so systemic banks are already 
sensitive to being too-heavily exposed to their own sovereign. And if this 
new regulation unlocks EDIS, the overall benefi ts to economic growth 
brought about by a greater ‘fungibility’ of bank deposits across the Euro 
area would need to be taken into account. Still, in high-debt countries 
banks’ scope to earn ‘positive carry’ would decline and sovereign bonds 
would need to fi nd a new home outside the aggregate fi nancial sector, 
potentially leading to displacements.
More elaborate forms of ‘safe assets’ under discussion in European 
policy circles build on the capital-key portfolio concept. Th e ESM raises 
funds in capital markets against the name of all EMU member states in 
order to provide fi nancial assistance to Euro area countries and banks. 
Since joined issuance entails that the rating of ESM bonds would 
correspond to the rating of its weakest backer, the institution has, since 
inception, secured committed and paid-in capital from the member 
states. Th e ESM also enjoys senior creditor status, i.e., in the event of 
default, EMS bondholders would get paid ahead of investors in national 
government securities.
Making the ESM bigger in order to cope with fi scal issues of the scale 
of the larger EMU countries, or assigning it more functions, can go some 
way in fostering the stability of the Euro area as a whole, thus lowering 
‘break-up’ risk. But the larger the ESM becomes in size and scope, the 
greater the potential of eating into the demand for national public debt – 
of both core and peripheral countries.
Finally, there is a proposal to launch European Safe Bonds,10 or 
ESBies, which has been captained by the European Financial Stability 
Board (EFSB), and could soon receive a formal endorsement by the 
European Commission.11 Th e idea is to use securitisation techniques to 
‘tranche’ a capital-key-weighted portfolio of EMU government bonds 
into a senior slice, which would receive preferential treatment in the case 
10 https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/task_force_safe_assets/html/index.en.html 
11 See: “Making EMU more resilient - Assessing the ‘safe bonds’ proposal“, European 
Economic Analyst, 14 March 2018 (https://research.gs.com/content/research/en/re-
ports/2018/03/14/e3846f38-34dd-439a-9f86-a6c485475207.html) 
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of default, and one or two junior ones. Holders of both the senior and 
junior tranches of such sovereign CDOs would be exposed to the same 
credit risk as holding the capital key portfolio. Proponents argue that 
Euro area banks should receive preferred capital treatment for holding 
the senior tranche of the securitisation – which would therefore become 
the ‘safe asset’ – but not the loss-absorbing junior tranche.
Financial intermediaries would have little difficulty in pricing and 
making a market for ESBies. In principle, their creation of a sovereign 
securitisation could also be fast-tracked by using the ECB’s large 
government bond portfolio built through QE. Given the deep economic 
and financial inter-linkages among EMU member states, whether the 
senior tranche of the CDO is really all that ‘safe’ should one of its larger 
constituents default, and who would be interested in owning the junior 
tranche in bad times are topics still for debate. Equally importantly, the 
launch of ESBies would mark a clear segmentation of the existing EMU 
sovereign bond market, with an unclear status of existing national bonds 
which are not part of the securitisation.
All told, the decline in EMU ‘break-up’ risk in recent years has 
been remarkable, providing investors with outsized returns. But, in our 
opinion, it has been driven by factors which are not permanent. In our 
opinion, greater ex-ante ‘risk-sharing’ among member states is needed to 
achieve a more lasting reduction in area-wide systemic risk.
Progress in this area will also involve identifying a ‘safe asset’ for the 
Euro area. Since joint and several common issuance is not politically 
feasible, several policy proposals have emerged which build on a GDP-
weighted portfolio of EMU government bonds, either securitised or 
collateralised. If these ‘safe asset’ proxies gain prominence, they could 
lead to dislocations of the existing national bonds and, potentially, 
their outright subordination. This should be seen as the cost to keep 
redenomination risk more structurally at bay.
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INSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS
Wolfgang Münchau
The main point I made during the conference is that the Eurozone 
requires deeper reforms for its sustainability than those currently under 
discussion in Brussels. In this essay I will address the following connected 
issues:
• Why it is the best course of action for the Eurozone not to undertake 
half-hearted reforms right now.
• Why the priority of Eurozone politics should be to challenge the 
dollar as the leading global currency.
• Why the biggest threat to the Eurozone’s sustainability right now is 
not Italy, but a German fiscal policy geared towards the eradication 
of all national debt.
• How Eurozone crisis resolution gave rise to populism and why the 
centrist establishment underestimate the scale and the nature of the 
threat.
• Time to pull the plug on Eurozone reforms.
It was only a few months ago when Angela Merkel and Martin Schulz 
agreed that Germany would enter into a meaningful dialogue with 
Emmanuel Macron on reform of the Eurozone. As it turned out, the 
Eurozone agenda was a personal project of Mr Schulz’, not of the SPD. 
When Mr Schulz was ousted as party chairman in February, the SPD lost 
interest. The grand coalition is once again in power, but now without the 
one and only interesting project that would have justified its existence.
Olaf Scholz, the SPD finance minister and the party’s new strongman, 
is notably cool on the whole idea. His previous political experience has 
been in national politics - first as the party’s general secretary in the 
last decade and later as mayor of Hamburg. On the important issue of 
164
a European deposit insurance scheme, he is seen as even more skeptical 
than Wolfgang Schäuble.
The usual opposition to Eurozone reform from inside Ms Merkel’s 
party, the CDU, and its Bavarian sister party, CSU, is as strong as ever. 
The CDU/CSU Bundestag group rejects all but one of the items on 
Mr Macron’s reform agenda. They do not want an enlarged European 
stability mechanism, the rescue umbrella. They do not want a single 
Eurozone budget. And like Mr Scholz they do not want a European 
deposit insurance scheme until the Italian banks have managed to get 
rid of most of the bad loans on their balance sheet. This is not going to 
happen anytime soon. They oppose debt relief for Greece too. The only 
reform project for which there is some lukewarm support is the idea 
of a fiscal backstop to the bank resolution fund, but on a very limited 
scale - beyond of what an economist considers a fiscal backstop. Under 
discussion is an extended credit line.
The message is clear: Germany is saying no to Mr Macron on 
Eurozone reform. There may still be some token deal, perhaps a tiny 
Eurozone budget with no macroeconomic significance. France is now in 
the position Marine Le Pen has warned about: in a monetary union in 
which the voice of France counts for little and a geopolitical situation in 
which the UK is the more reliable partner.
Mr Macron’s enthusiastic support for European integration contrasts 
with the unchanged political reality that France and Germany are no 
longer the natural allies of yesteryear. Unlike in France, the pro-European 
parties in Germany are in retreat. Ms Merkel’s party lost one million 
votes to the FDP and the AfD, both of which advocate policies that would 
lead to the destruction of the Eurozone. We should recall that 60 CDU/
CSU MPs voted against the Greek support programme in 2015. If faced 
with a rebellion of the same magnitude today, the grand coalition would 
no longer have a majority. The lack of parliamentary majority is the real 
constraint of German politics right now.
Does this make Eurozone reform impossible for all times? Of course 
not. The June deadline for Eurozone reforms was chosen because Mr 
Macron needs to something concrete to show for before the European 
elections in May 2019.
As a long-standing advocate of Eurozone reform myself, I am finding 
myself in the unusual position of favouring a tactical retreat. It would 
be better to wait for a better moment to push the two issues that really 
matter, neither of which is on the agenda right now: the creation of a 
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mutualised safe asset, a Eurobond in other words; and the legal and 
political separation of national governments and their banks. Reformers 
should use the fact that the large and persistent current account surpluses 
of the northern Eurozone countries make them vulnerable to a sudden 
disruption of trade flows. Only an existential crisis that threatens the 
very survival of the Eurozone has the potential to concentrate minds 
in the northern Eurozone. There is no guarantee that the north would 
come to the conclusion that it needs to accept the reality of a political 
union. Northern European states may conclude the opposite. But as the 
evolving dialogue between France and Germany shows, the arguments 
on positions on governance have hardly changed over the last 30 years.
The alternative would be to waste scarce political capital on the wrong 
type of reforms, like a securitised and not mutualised safe asset, a forever 
incomplete banking union, and semi-automatic debt restructuring as 
demanded by Germany.
If the alternative is a big leap in the wrong direction, standing still 
constitutes relative progress.
1. The original sin: a euro without geopolitical ambitions
Many of the problems faced by those who are trying to find a solution 
to the Eurozone’s governance problems date back to the 1990s, when 
the euro’s architecture was drawn up. One particularly fateful decision, 
not often discussed, has been the voluntary renunciation by Eurozone 
members of a broader geopolitical role of the euro. At a time when the 
EU is threatened by the secondary effects of US sanctions, against Iran 
and Russia, and by trade tariffs on various categories of products, the 
omission is critical. The Eurozone would be in a much stronger position 
if the euro had been designed as a political currency from the ground up. 
It would still have had a crisis, but it would have had a mutualised debt 
instrument to deal with it. And it would have been in a much stronger 
position to defend itself against an increasingly erratic EU policy. 
The dollar, by contrast, has been an integral part of US foreign policy for 
many years. Its role as the global anchor currency allows the US to cut 
off an entire country from access to international commerce and finance 
as in the case of Iran. Or a group of individuals as in the case of Russia.
The euro was not designed as a geopolitical instrument. I recall the 
debate in Germany in the 1990s. The Bundesbank deliberately did not 
want a strong international role for the euro, fearing it might conflict with 
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the price stability objective. I also recall the debates among international 
economists whether the euro could challenge the dollar as a global 
reserve currency. The opportunity was there. Serious academic papers 
were written. The fact that it did not happen was the result of a conscious 
political choice.
That choice is in part responsible of EU’s difficulty in responding 
effectively to Trump today. The biggest problem with the US President’s 
decision to pull out of the Iran nuclear deal is the extra-territorial 
effect. Defiant European companies would be cut off from US financial 
and product markets. So would the banks that fund those companies. 
Multinational companies or banks cannot afford that. Mr Trump 
can do this because the US is ultimately in control of all dollar-
based financial flows, including those that originate outside the US. 
The EU cannot impose extraterritorial sanctions on US companies that 
defy European policy. The euro is not as critical to them as the dollar is to 
Europeans. After the euro was introduced in 1999, it quickly became the 
world’s second most important currency but still lags behind the dollar 
on most metrics. Its share of foreign exchange reserves1 was under 20 per 
cent at the end of 2016 against 64 per cent for the dollar. The gap was of 
similar magnitude in the categories of international debt and loans. The 
dollar leads the euro in foreign exchange turnover by a factor of three to 
one. The only category where the euro has almost caught up is that of a 
global payment currency. In the last decade the gap began to narrow but 
it widened again since the financial crisis.
In response to Mr Trump’s decision on the Iranian deal, the European 
Commission only managed to dig up the old blocking statute,2 a ban on 
Europeans to comply with the sanctions. The problem is that the EU 
has no financial instruments to protect European companies. How, for 
example, would you compensate a European bank for no longer being 
able to transact in dollars?
The failure to develop the euro into a rival to the dollar also makes 
the EU more vulnerable to trade tariffs. This is mostly due to the trade 
surplus. This, in turn, is the result of how the Eurozone tackle the debt 
crisis: by forcing crisis countries to run positive current account balances. 
One consequence of the policy is a populist political backlash of the kind 
we see in Italy right now. US protectionism is another.
Before the financial crisis the Eurozone ran a small current account 
1  https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.euro-international-role–201707.pdf 
2  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP–18–3861_en.htm 
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surplus. By last year, it reached 3.5 per cent of economic output.3 The 
larger the surpluses became, the more dependent the Eurozone had 
become on the rest of the world.
Instead of hyperventilating about Mr Trump, Europeans might want 
to reflect on what got them into this mess. They would be more resilient 
today if they did not handle the Eurozone crisis the way they did, and if 
they had made the euro more robust from the outset.
Technically, it would still be possible for the EU to fix the problem, 
but that would require a degree of political union that goes far beyond 
of what Emmanuel Macron proposed. It requires at its core a mutualised 
debt instrument, a euro bond, as a financial instrument to underpin a 
large sovereign debt market. It would also require a broader mandate for 
the European Central Bank.
This brings us back to the theme in part one. A weak deal is not going 
to solve the problem, and it may make it harder to resolve the problem 
when it is needed.
2. Why German fiscal policy constitutes a long-term 
threat to the Eurozone sustainability
Another issue that is not on the official agenda of Eurozone policy makers, 
but should be, is divergent fiscal policy. Italy is currently set on a course 
that puts it in conflict with the observance of both the fiscal compact and 
the associated fiscal rules, and possibly even the EU’s overall 3% ceiling 
for the deficit-to-GDP ratio. Germany, by contrast, not only fulfils all of 
the EU fiscal rules, it has also unilaterally set itself a tougher target.
The 2019 German budget is one of those. Olaf Scholz, Germany’s 
new social democratic finance minister, has proposed a budget with the 
following four characteristics: a nominal cut in investment; a reduced 
ratio of defense spending to gross domestic product; a freezing of funds 
for development aid at 0.5 per cent of GDP; and a lower contribution to 
the next EU budget than what he himself had previously suggested.
The budget fulfils two narrow goals instead: it will ensure that the 
government will run a fiscal surplus through the 2019–2022 budget 
period. And Germany’s debt as a percentage of gross domestic product 
will fall below the artificial 60 per cent threshold set out in the Maastricht 
Treaty in 2019. As the journalists André Kühnlenz and Philipp Stachelsky 
3  https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/stats/bop/2018/html/ecb.bq180406.en.html 
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have remarked,4 Mr Scholz’s ambition is to become the “Red Hawk” with 
a goal to push the budget into a surplus of 1 per cent of GDP or higher. 
Such a surplus would, over time, eradicate all public debt.
Beyond the negative consequences for Germany itself, this budget 
will invariably exacerbate the Eurozone’s already strong imbalances. 
Germany has been running current account surpluses of around 8 per 
cent for the last couple of years. According to a news report by Spiegel, the 
German news magazine, the country’s air force has become dysfunctional 
as a result of chronic under-investment. Only 10 out of 128 Eurofighter 
aircraft are fit for combat. Angela Merkel, who supports the budget, has 
been less than honest with her repeated commitment to NATO defense 
spending target of 2 per cent of GDP.
There is a rather simple solution to all of these problems: run a 
moderate fiscal deficit, of say 2 per cent of GDP, invest in the restructuring 
of the country decrepit military capacity, replenish the depreciated 
stock of public sector infrastructure, and actively encourage high-tech 
projects. This would help the German chancellor counter accusations 
that Germany is not pulling its weight in NATO. It would make Germany 
and the EU less of a target for US trade tariffs by reducing Germany’s 
and the Eurozone’s external savings surplus. And it would strengthen 
Germany’s long-term potential growth. It is not often that one could 
achieve so many objectives with a single policy tool.
I know, of course, that this is legally not possible because of a 
constitutional “debt break” - a fiscal rule that forces Germany to a run 
a nearly balanced budget over the economic cycle. But this rule is self-
inflicted. It is the work of a previous grand coalition. It is not an external 
constraint, but an internal choice.
And besides, Mr Scholz is not just following rules here. He is doing 
more than he needs to. The SPD is returning to its pre-Keynesian roots.
I care less about the fast progressing self-destruction of the SPD 
than about the externalities. The Germans made a choice. They will get 
what they voted for. But the policy will affect millions of people who did 
not have a vote because the budget will set the path for the rest of the 
Eurozone. In particular, it will constrain the degree of fiscal flexibility the 
European Union would grant to countries during an economic downturn. 
Italy, for example, desperately needs more public investment in addition 
to economic reforms as a way out of a twenty-year period of economic 
stagnation. The voters have been turning away from the established 
4  https://makronom.de/wir-brauchen-eine-positive-investitionsquote–26332 
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parties of the centre, a trend likely to continue unless there is a sustained 
economic recovery. France is in a better position but not strong enough 
to follow Germany either. We may marvel at Macron’s rise to the French 
presidency a year ago, but he only got 24 per cent of the votes in the first 
round of the presidential elections. The far-right National Front remains 
a clear and present danger both to him and the Eurozone.
There will never be a solution to the Eurozone’s existential uncertainty 
unless the other Eurozone countries speak truth to power. They should 
deem Germany to be in breach of the single most important policy rule 
set out in the Maastricht Treaty: that member states treat economic policy 
as a matter of common concern. The German budget is as un-European 
as Greece’s excessive fiscal deficits almost a decade ago.
I only have a single rational explanation for such a policy choice. 
Getting rid of your own debt is a way to end the whole debate about risk 
sharing in the Eurozone.
3. On the destructive role of complacent narratives
We have so far looked at two policy instruments that could go a long 
way to solving the Eurozone’s multiple problems, which are becoming 
political in nature. A geopolitical euro and a co-ordinate fiscal policy 
among member states. The failures of the past have led to a rise of popular 
parties in different Eurozone member states that make such policies even 
harder to implement than would otherwise be the case. In this section 
I will argue that the rise of populism is to a large extent a self-inflicted 
wound of a liberal establishment that has been far too complacent about 
the Eurozone.
It is, of course, pointless to compare today’s populists and nationalists 
to the Nazis and fascists eighty or ninety years ago. But I see much clearer 
parallels between the fall of the Weimar Republic and the vulnerability of 
Europe’s liberal elites. Some of today’s defenders of the liberal order are 
making the same mistake as, for example, the German Centre party of 
the early 1930s, by underestimating the scale of the threat.
Harold James, the Princeton historian, has given us ten reasons 
on why our political systems today share some of the self-destructive 
characteristics of the Weimar Republic.5 One is the strength of the 
economic shock. Another is an excessive optimism about the power of 
5 https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/weimar-republic-lessons-for-to-
day-by-harold-james–2018–05 
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constitutions to protect the system.
I would like to offer some additional thoughts on the role of 
complacent narratives, the stories we tell each other that make us feel 
better. As a commentator of Eurozone affairs, for example, I keep on 
hearing that a euro exit cannot happen because it is not allowed. The 
Italian constitution, for example, makes it impossible for a government 
to rescind international treaties by referendum. This argument not only 
overestimates the power of constitutional law to protect from us from 
illegal acts by governments, as Professor James pointed out. It also ignores 
the circumstances under which a country would leave the Eurozone. All 
its government would need to do is engineer a financial crisis, declare 
force majeure and introduce a parallel currency over a long bank holiday 
weekend. There is nothing in the Italian constitution to prevent a financial 
crisis or to stop a government from giving people the means to buy food.
This is also why it does not matter why the Italian coalition agreement 
no longer contains a formal euro exit clause, as it did in an earlier draft. We 
know that Matteo Salvini, leader of the Lega, wants to create conditions 
for a euro exit. We also know that some, though not all, members of the 
Five Star Movement want that too. That is all we need to know.
Another argument is that the financial markets would frustrate a 
rebellion. This shares some similarities with the first. Those who make it 
commit the error of attaching the mindset of a centrist politician to that 
of the new leaders. Centrists, in Europe at least, have an emotional need 
to be considered fiscally-conservative. Centrists look at bond spreads the 
way deer stare at headlights. To someone like Mr Salvini, a financial crisis 
is not a threat but a promise, one that allows him to pull the plug on euro 
membership.
A third argument is the super-human ability by the Italian president 
to prevent disaster. The Italian constitution has wisely given the president 
strong powers. The president has the right to appoint ministers and 
refuse to sign legislation deemed incompatible with the constitution. But 
presidential mandates are finite, and even a strong president like Sergio 
Mattarella cannot tell MPs and Senators to pass a Eurozone-compliant 
budget.
A fourth argument is that the centre will always be able to stitch 
things up. Really? I recall the attempt by the Partito Democratico and 
Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia last year to change the electoral system in 
their favour. The miscalculated the sheer scale of support of the populists. 
You cannot save liberal through gerrymandering.
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Fifth, I hear if all else fails, there is always the European Central 
Bank. Mario Draghi saved the Eurozone in 2012, can he save liberal 
democracy? His main anti-crisis tool, a programme known as Outright 
Monetary Transactions, is irrelevant in this case. OMT was designed for 
rule-compliant governments that find themselves under a speculative 
attack by investors. Not the case here. Quantitative easing did help, but 
the programme will eventually end. It was justified by the fall in inflation 
rates. I cannot be revived as a tool to fight a future debt crisis.
And finally, there is the hope that the economic recovery will benefit 
the centrist parties. I think the opposite is the case. The Five Star Movement 
and Lega will generate a recovery through a large fiscal stimulus, and will 
gain the credit for it. They are in power precisely because the centrists 
failed to deliver on the economy.
The truth is that there is no such thing as a technical backstop for 
liberal democracy.
And herein lies the main lesson of the Weimar Republic. If liberal 
democracy fails to deliver economic prosperity for a sufficient large 
portion of the population over long periods, it ends - along with the 
financial and economic institutions it has created.
Conclusion
The Eurozone and the EU are facing these future existential challenges:
• A trade war that is in part the result of its persistent structural 
current account surplus, which is itself the result of its approach to 
Eurozone crisis management.
• A rise of populism in Italy, that challenges especially all aspects of the 
EU policy consensus: on fiscal policy, on monetary policy and the 
sanctity of a single currency, and on external relations, in particular 
with Russia.
• The effect of secondary US sanctions in relation to Iran and Russia.
• Widening imbalances due to a permanent divergence of national 
fiscal policies.
The reforms currently under discussion are not going to address the first 
three problems. The only plausible answer to these problems is the launch 
of a mutualised debt instrument and a genuine capital markets union.
The fourth problem - opposite fiscal policies by Germany and Italy 
in particular - needs to be addressed directly. Fiscal policy needs to con-
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verge in the absence of a full fiscal union.
I see the temptation by officials to jump for quick fixes like sovereign 
bond-backed securities. I am not sure that it would even solve the narrow 
objective of reducing banks’ exposure to the sovereign debt of their 
home states. They would certain not address the more urgent issues of 
strengtheing the Eurozone’s tactical position in a trade war, stopping the 
effects of secondary sanctions, or reducing the internal imbalances in the 
Eurozone.
The Eurozone is facing a whole number of existential challenges. They 
can be met by acceptance of mutualised debt and a fiscal union. The 
direction of the current policy debate suggests to me that none of the 
challenges is adequately addressed, if addressed at all.
I therefore see the disintegration of the Eurozone, and possibly the EU, as 
the most probable result of these events.
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DEEPENING OF EMU: SOME TOPICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS
Thomas Wieser
In this paper, I set out some considerations for completing the set up of 
the Euro. They are framed against the present topical political debates, 
and how I assess the feasibility of a set of solutions. The politically 
desirable outcome should largely complete the Banking Union and have 
a few further reform steps, that will only partially satisfy the ambitions of 
some Member States whilst going beyond what others see as desirable or 
necessary at this stage.
I start off by discussing the changes and reforms that have been 
introduced over the last six to eight years. They form the background 
to the discussion of priorities in the completion of EMU. Whilst there 
is little disagreement on the need for a complete Banking Union, the 
issue of fiscal deepening was and remains divisive. However, even on 
the issue of Banking Union, short term political problems may outweigh 
the considerable intellectual agreement on how beneficial a completely 
homogenous or transnational banking and financial sector would be for 
the Euro Area.
Incrementalism or Grand Design?
At the time of the negotiations for the Maastricht Treaty, it was clear to 
participants that the text was not the final configuration of Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU). Two strands of discussion at the time are 
worth recalling:
• The sequencing debate: prominent especially in Germany, where the 
“crowning theory” (Krönungstheorie) was central to the debate. Its 
main theorem was that Political Union had to precede a fully loaded 
EMU.
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• Progress through crisis: in analogy to Schuman (“not built all at once 
…. (and) will be forged through crisis”).
Historical developments have shown that progress through smaller 
steps has indeed been the politically plausible and achievable mode of 
deepening European integration. 
Living with imperfection, or incompleteness, has some advantages and 
some drawbacks. Experimentation in small steps avoids large mistakes 
that can not be rectified. Each step of integration can be assimilated into 
the political culture of Member States for longer periods before the next 
step commences. 
Conversely, the incomplete architecture of the European project 
increases risks of instability, and even fears of reversal in troubled times.
The project of completing EMU has stress tested the economic and 
political resilience of Member States over the last ten years. Whilst the 
different stages of the crisis post-2008 were not necessarily causally 
related to EMU, they brought out the faultlines of design and practice. 
Judged by the uneven progress of the last 2 decades, Schuman appears 
vindicated for now: it took the Great Financial Crisis and the subsequent 
Euro crisis to see any progress in deepening Europe’s Economic and 
Monetary Union.
If there is a strong consensus on anything in Europe, it is on the 
fact that Treaty changes (apart from technical changes) are politically 
not feasible. This belief rests on experiences with referenda over the 
last decades and populist attitudes towards Europe, indeed towards all 
political mainstream parties and institutions. 
This has resulted in a number of the reforms of recent years being 
based on intergovernmental agreements. The implications for the role of 
European institutions, and the relative shifts in influence among larger 
and smaller Member States deserve a wider discussion than they get. 
In any case the result has been a succession of reform steps that were 
not necessarily addressing the most important institutional and economic 
deficits in the most appropriate manner.
“Firewalls”
The absence of instruments for addressing balance of payments crisis in 
the Maastricht Treaty rested:
• on the assumption that within a monetary union there could per 
definition no longer be such a crisis, and 
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• on the no bail out provisions of the Treaty (which merely specify, 
inter alia, that “a Member State shall not be liable for or assume the 
commitments …. of another member State …”).
The absence of such instruments was one of the reasons why it took 
Europe so much longer to resolutely address the effects of the financial 
crisis. The Euro Area now has the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
with a paid in capital of 80 billion Euro, which can provide adjustment 
loans against conditionality of up to 500 bn Euro. The ESM had to be set 
up as a body outside the Treaty, as an intergovernmental institution ruled 
by a Board of Governors, i.e. the Finance Ministers of the Eurogroup. The 
Commission is not a party to the Treaty setting up the ESM.
The founding of the ESM in turn led to what was presumably the 
game changer in our crisis approach. It enabled the ECB to announce 
OMT and thus transcend the monetary financing prohibition.
There is an ongoing discussion of turning the ESM into a European 
Monetary Fund. There are few specific thoughts and suggestions on what 
precisely this should encompass and achieve. An important aspect in this 
debate is what effect this would have on the future role of the IMF in 
Europe, and the future wider relationship between Europe and the IMF. 
Changes in the role of the Commission could have wider ramifications 
and need to be carefully addressed. The debate on changing the set up 
of the ESM has had two interconnected sources. First, the Commission 
has clearly set out its ambitions to bring the ESM into the perimeter of 
institutions under the Treaty, which would be possible as an Agency. This 
has so far been rejected by a clear majority of Member States. 
The second strand of debates is more complex. The adjustment 
programs, first under the EFSF and subsequently the ESM, led to new 
institutional relationships between the Member States of the Euro Area, 
the Commission and the other institutions, i.e. the ESM, the ECB and 
the IMF. 
At the beginning of the crisis, it was not yet clear whether the IMF 
should actually be part of the institutional crisis architecture of the Euro 
Area. Even in countries such as Germany there was no strong a priori at 
the outset. The final decision, as set down in the ESM Treaty, was clear: 
the IMF should be part of the adjustment programs. Partially this was 
due to the strong push from IMF management at the time, and largely 
this was due to the wish of a number of Member States to have an outside, 
quasi neutral, participant on board.
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As it turned out, differences of approach between the four institutions 
increasingly led to frictions in program design and execution. Especially 
the difference between the IMF and the Commission proved difficult 
to overcome. The contrast could hardly have been greater: on the one 
hand a technical institution that had been set up decades ago to deal with 
financial and financing crisis, far removed from day to day control and 
supervision by national parliaments. On the other hand the Commission, 
that increasingly understood itself to be a political actor, and which by 
ways of our constitutional set up has to interact with Member States in a 
multitude of areas. This leads to internal contradictions and conflicting 
targets and trade offs.
These trade offs make the Commission see program design and 
implementation with other eyes than the IMF. As seen by a fairly large 
group of Member States this has made the Commission susceptible to 
(in their eyes) unacceptable compromises on program conditionality, 
requiring other institutions to be present as a corrective. Thus the IMF, 
and thus the debate on shifting important program responsibilities from 
the Commission to the ESM. The possibilities for such shifts are more 
limited, due to clear Treaty provisions, than some Member States would 
wish for.
Banking Union
Progress has been significant: we have made large steps towards Banking 
Union, especially since 2012. 
There is a single supervisor (SSM) for banks under the umbrella of 
the ECB in Frankfurt. It has ensured that the playing field is becoming 
more level than it was. We have a single Resolution Authority which is 
funded by the European banking system. Regulatory reforms have made 
the banking system more robust and resilient.
The next steps should be a political agreement on Deposit Insurance 
(EDIS) which hopefully should come about this year. The debate of the 
last years has shown that this will only happen in conjunction with a 
number of so-called risk reduction measures. More correctly, one should 
be talking about necessary risk control measures. 
The principle underlying this negotiating package is the following: 
risk will be shared across Member States if, and only if, there is trust 
in how contingent liabilities come about, and how they are dealt with. 
This requires trust in the institutions that govern these markets and how 
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effective surveillance is. If risks are to be shared among Member States (or 
economic actors) then the factors that lead to such shared (contingent) 
liabilities need to be controlled, either jointly (intergovernmental 
approach) or through a joint institution (Community method).
Importantly, there is a good chance that such measures will include 
exposure limits for sovereign bonds in bank balance sheets, and a 
convergence process for national insolvency frameworks and practices. 
Quantified target values for national NPL ratios and their reduction 
are likely. Whether sovereign debt restructuring principles should be 
included or not is being hotly debated.
Such an agreement, if reached, can not be implemented in one step. 
The most realistic agreement would involve a process of moving from 
one step to the next step of integration of deposit insurance schemes, 
each step dependent on progress in fulfilling the quantifiable parameters 
as described above. One should therefore expect fairly lengthy transition 
periods.
Unfortunately, knee jerk reactions on both sides of the debate abound. 
In a small number of Member States, a powerful lobby of politically well 
connected banks has made the move towards joint deposit insurance 
domestically very difficult, even though the economic rationale is quite 
clear: all Member States would be winners. 
In other Member States, sovereign exposure limits are seen with equal 
trepidation, even though some kind of limit to such large exposures is a 
sine qua non in a Banking Union. Sovereign Debt Restructuring has faced 
equal opposition, even though the underlying principle would not differ 
vastly from what we already have today.
Our ultimate aim should be clear: achieving a truly integrated market 
for banking services, where nationality and place of incorporation of 
the institutions are irrelevant. Only then would risk be truly shared and 
diversified, and sovereign risk would significantly be lower. A unified 
banking sector is obviously the most efficient way of channeling surplus 
savings from one part of the monetary union to another. With this, the 
banking crisis in Ireland and Spain, to name but two, would not have 
morphed into the sovereign crisis as they actually did. This requires, as 
above, trust in the institutions that are relevant for banks: the supervisor, 
national tax administrations, national courts and insolvency procedures, 
to name a few. Clearly, we have an important convergence process ahead 
of us, but a convergence process well worth pursuing as one of the top 
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policy priorities of the Euro Area.
In the longer run even further change might be desirable: I consider 
a Treaty based separation of monetary policy and banking supervision in 
the best interest of both. This requires a Treaty change and, therefore, is 
not for the immediate future.
Fiscal Union, Fiscal Rules
A fiscal union can be described as one that combines joint resources 
with joint disciplines, and has the appropriate democratic legitimacy. 
Few dispute the fact that a monetary union needs a fiscal framework in 
order to ensure that negative spillovers are containable, and so that joint 
policies yield the appropriate benefits. 
Moving towards a fiscal union can come in many forms. Attitudes 
towards these political choices are usually informed by approaches 
towards the political legitimation of such policies. A useful categorization 
is whether fiscal policies are:
• regulated through institutions
• by common rules
• or through market discipline.
Again, we see the choice between political union (joint institutions that 
are democratically legitimized) and a common approach that rests on a 
mix of national sovereignty and mutually agreed rules that are surveilled 
by a central institution (the Commission) or regulated through market 
discipline. The latter has not worked that well in practice.
Providing the Euro Area not only with rules but with a common 
budget, or fiscal capacity, has been widely debated over many decades. 
Suggestions range from a small investment budget, to a small budget that 
should stimulate economic reforms, right up to large joint budgets that 
are capable of macroeconomically significant countercyclical policies. 
An argument often made in favor of a joint fiscal capacity is that 
macroeconomic stabilization at the Euro level would improve the 
effectiveness of monetary policy. This would then exclude the need for 
fiscal mechanisms that are not correlated to the business cycle, such as 
structural support capacities.
A useful question in this debate is which problem one is trying to 
fix: issues of regional cohesion, lack of public investment, problems of 
asymmetric shocks, or making sure that “others” (i.e. everybody else) 
have the “correct” fiscal stance. 
The feasibility of such joint fiscal capacities differs according to the 
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extent to which the fiscal sovereignty of national Parliaments is affected. 
Budgets analogous to the EU Budget, i.e. financed by transfers of 
national governments that are calculated according to an agreed set of 
rules, avoid constitutionally difficult questions. The main issue is who 
decides on spending algorithms. 
More difficult are those joint budgets that are financed by joint policies. 
Suggestions abound, ranging from joint financing of unemployment 
insurance schemes to financing through joint tax policies.
The present situation is characterized by the following parameters:
• an EU budget that in form and substance has nothing to do with the 
Euro Area
• fiscal rules that are incomprehensible to most
• their application in practice has led to mistrust and discord among 
Member States and between Member States and the Commission, 
and
• increasingly divergent levels of debt among Member States.
In this situation, large changes to the present set up of the Euro Area are 
unlikely. A plausible outcome of this year’s political negotiations would 
be an agreement on a small fiscal capacity that is financed by transfers, 
and focuses on common public goods. 
A simplification of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) would be 
highly desirable. An intelligent step in the right direction could be to 
focus on larger fiscal errors, and not on the values behind the comma. 
Using cyclically adjusted values for budgetary purposes as we do 
is economically intelligent, but challenging in practice. Forecasting 
potential output based on current values is not a useful basis for practical 
short run fiscal decisions. A promising approach would be to focus on an 
expenditure rule, giving the debt rule a more prominent role, and focus 
on the medium term budgetary approach of governments instead of 
adjusting (in extreme cases) requirements several times a year. 
Using nominal values, as was done up to 2005, is economically not 
optimal. This would only work if one gives an institution, obviously the 
Commission, a fair degree of discretion to evaluate the cyclical component 
of budgetary developments and to make recommendations accordingly. 
This takes away some of the quasi-automaticity of the present framework, 
and requires increased trust in the judgment and recommendations of 
the Commission, higher than some Member States have at present.
The Commission, at the center of the system of fiscal rules, has been 
put into an unenviable position. One of the reforms during the crisis 
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shifted responsibilities for fiscal surveillance even further towards the 
Commission. Shifting voting rules to reverse requirements for qualified 
majorities meant that Member States could, in practice, not overturn 
Commission decisions. The thinking at the time was that this would 
empower the Commission to take unpopular decisions, and see them 
through. In reality, the burden of decision taking has become heavier, as 
the Commission is seen as the one and only relevant actor in this game. 
The lethargy in the Council in discussing fiscal issues may partially be 
explained by this shift in roles and responsibilities. 
As the Commission attempts to steer a course that is described as 
political, sticking to the rules often would imply unpopular decisions. 
Not sticking to the rules is not possible in a system that is so clearly rule- 
based. The only way out is creating new rules when difficult decisions 
loom, so that unpopular decisions need not be taken, and rules are 
upheld. This, however, creates in turn conflicts with other Member States 
that lament the resulting lack of fiscal discipline. 
A possible solution would be to simplify the rules, which makes them 
less “academic”, and trust the Commission to take the necessary decisions 
that incorporate good economic reasoning. For this, a fairly high degree 
of discretion would be necessary. This requires trust of the Council in the 
Commission.
I am skeptical if governments will have the strategic foresight to 
agree to the necessary changes in the short run. They are more necessary 
and pressing than they realize. Whilst there has been some progress 
in fiscal consolidation, the balance between stabilization policies and 
sustainability concerns has not been a great success. Some Member 
States with elevated debt levels have increased debt levels even further. 
Credibility in the system has been undermined through continuous fine 
tuning of rules with only partial compliance. Mistrust in this areas spills 
over into other areas.
Economic Union
The Euro was not conceived as an isolated monetary experiment, but as 
the monetary complement to a fully functioning Internal Market of the 
European Union. This is not the occasion to treat in depth the question 
of how well the Internal Market functions, or which further integration 
steps are required. Suffice to say that there are still significant obstacles 
to reaping the full benefits of European integration in this area. Examples 
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are markets for energy and other utilities, services and even some 
professions. The better such markets function, the better the benefits of 
the Euro can be realized, and vice versa.
Developments in the first ten years of EMU brought about wide 
divergences in real unit labour costs, mostly in countries that had not had 
a long history of shadowing the Deutsch Mark through hard currency 
policies. Strong institutions and processes help in aligning wage, price 
and productivity developments, thus limit negative spillovers and 
external disequilibria within the Euro Area. This is of course a symmetric 
issue of adjustment requirements within the area. 
Democratic Accountability
The question of democratic accountability is often raised, usually in the 
sense of some perceived democratic deficit. Accountability and legitimacy 
need to rest where the constitution positions them. 
In the context of the policies of the EMU there are reporting 
requirements of the ECB to the Council and the European Parliament, as 
well as hearings in front of the EP.
There have been repeated complaints about the lack of democratic 
accountability of decisions taken in the Eurogroup, such as on country 
adjustment programmes. Such decisions are taken on an intergovernmental 
basis, based on the constitutional domestic requirements of the Member 
States represented there. As such there can be no deficit.
An issue in the context of political transparency and involvement 
seems to me that the economic policies of the Euro Area are discussed 
in the Euro Group in Brussels. And that is often where they stay. A 
considerably deeper involvement and information of national policy 
actors would seem to be necessary in order to improve the understanding 
and acceptance and legitimacy of the policies that are joint policies. This 
could largely be the task of the President of the Eurogroup. Given that this 
is a job that is exercised in parallel to that of national Finance Minister, 
this will not happen. Making the job a full time and Brussels-based one 
would make this possible. His or her interactions would need to include 
regular and intensive consultations with national Parliaments.
Deepening of EMU: some topical considerations - Thomas Wieser 
182
Summary and Outlook
Progress in deepening EMU has been significant over the last 
years. Banking Union and other measures have led to a significant 
strengthening of the Euro Area. For 2018, I would expect political 
decisions on completing Banking Union, quite possibly decisions on a 
small budget for the Euro Area, and hopefully some progress on making 
the fiscal framework more practical and politically legitimate. Whilst not 
representing a “completed and final Monetary Union” these steps are 
important ones towards this goal. 
Steps that require major Treaty changes will not be taken, also because 
they would lead to a rebalancing of core constitutional powers between 
national Parliaments and the central institutions of EMU.
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PUTTING THE CART BEFORE THE 
HORSE? A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF 
THE EUROPEAN FINANCE MINISTER 
IDEA1
Maria Patrin and Pierre Schlosser 
1. The argument 
The idea of establishing a European Finance Minister has been in the 
offing for some time now. However, with a few exceptions (Enderlein 
and Haas, 2015; Wolff, 2017; Xanthoulis, 2018), the significant bearing 
and implications of such a proposal on Europe’s Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) – and on the European polity in general – have been 
insufficiently studied by scholars. This contribution intends to fill part 
of this gap. 
The key argument of the paper is that the ex nihilo creation of a state-
like figure such as a European Finance Minister in a political system as 
post-modern as the European Union is a worrisome choice;  especially 
in the form proposed by the European Commission in its recent package 
on completing EMU (EC, 2017b). We claim that the establishment of 
such a new institutional position would indeed go against both letter and 
spirit of the Maastricht Treaty as it would constitute a radical change of 
economic policy cooperation paradigm in EMU. Setting up a Finance 
Minister position would precipitate and formalize the departure from a 
rules-based, fragmented and thin fiscal union – which we refer to as a 
coordination model – towards a thick fiscal union relying on centralized 
and concentrated discretionary power – i.e. a model based on a central 
1 This paper elaborates on earlier contributions by Patrin (The European Finance 
Minister, EUI ADEMU Working Paper, 2018) and Schlosser (Europe’s New Fiscal 
Union, forthcoming) 
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economic policy authority which we refer to as fiscal federalism. 
The empowerment of a Finance Minister would therefore undo the 
Maastricht logic of fiscal policy coordination and would set EMU on 
the trajectory of fiscal federalism (Hinarejos, 2013), a path which was 
however unambiguously discarded by Maastricht Treaty designers. 
We therefore argue that the creation of a Finance Minister would be 
path-breaking. Moreover, entrusting executive powers to a European 
Finance Minister would significantly tilt the current inter-institutional 
balance of the EU polity and would also fundamentally undermine the 
inner Commission working principle of collegiality.  It is our belief that 
the Treaties, as the primary legal source of EU law and as the anchor of 
power distribution among EU institutions, deserve more consideration. 
In this spirit, the paper raises strong doubts as to whether a European 
Finance Minister can be at all created in the absence of Treaty revision. 
It does so in terms of both the political consequences of such a step 
and the legal implications that would underpin the changes. We argue 
that the current Commission’s proposal of creating a European Finance 
Minister – as valid an end point for Europe’s future Fiscal Union it may 
be – is an ill-advised idea. It would not only amount to ‘putting the cart 
before the horse’: it would represent a constitutional change. We do not 
however intend to imply that the Maastricht Treaty is a perfect working 
arrangement, it is by all means far from it.  
In its section 2 the paper first embeds the finance minister idea into 
a deeper debate on fiscal centralization in an asymmetric EMU. Section 
3 then recalls the Maastricht logic of fiscal policy coordination within 
EMU and sketches out why the Maastricht spirit has started to tumble. 
Section 4 deciphers in further details the proposal of a Finance Minister 
as a new way out of the EMU institutional conundrum. Section 5 assesses 
the implications of such a new position from both a legal and inter-
institutional perspective. Section 6 provides a normative view on the 
proposal and concludes. 
 2. Maastricht’s Negative Choice: No Centralized Economic 
Policy Authority 
EMU’s institutional design has been incomplete from its beginning. Its 
asymmetrical setup, ‘with the almost complete transfer of sovereignty 
in monetary policy making to the European level, but with very limited 
transfer of sovereignty in economic policy making’ (Verdun, 1996: 
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65) was perceived as ‘a post-modern construction defying the laws of 
gravity’ (Tsoukalis, 2003: 150). When creating EMU, Treaty designers 
deliberately decided that it should not be accompanied by a political 
union. The imbalanced architecture of Europe’s Economic and Monetary 
Union should hence, first and foremost be seen as a conscious choice 
not to create a classic fiscal union supported by a political union. This 
negative choice had two main consequences.
First, it meant that EMU would see at its centre the absence of a 
political counterpart to the ECB: no European institution was ‘introduced 
to flank the ECB’ (Verdun, 1999: 107). EMU thus currently features a 
strong, very independent and institutionally isolated central bank that 
has no central political counterpart.  The Maastricht Treaty therefore did 
not create any new economic policy authority and hence did not lead to 
the constitution of a fiscal body or institutional capacity (Cameron, 1997: 
476-477). As a consequence, ‘it is unclear which political authority will 
be held responsible if EMU leads to an uneven distribution of costs and 
benefits across the euro zone’ (Verdun, 1999: 107). 
The absence of a central fiscal and politically legitimized institution 
alongside the ECB, i.e. of an authority which could delineate the field of 
action of a European economic policy (Cameron, 1997: 477) had deep 
implications which were anticipated by a few. Verdun (1996), Strauss-
Kahn (1997), Goodhart (1998) Padoa-Schioppa (2004) and De Grauwe 
(2006) – all in their own way – stressed a specific danger of having a 
common currency deprived of a fiscal and political underpinning. 
Namely, the ‘risk of the Eurosystem being seen as the only macroeconomic 
policy-maker in the euro area, and hence to be held responsible for any 
adverse development in the European economy, not only inflation but 
also unemployment and slow growth’ (Padoa-Schioppa, 2004: 57; Pisani-
Ferry, 2006: 834). As predicted by Verdun, ‘one can wonder what political 
body can be held accountable for any imperfections once EMU is fully 
operational’ (Verdun, 1999: 110).  
The second consequence of the Treaty designer’s choice not to 
create a fiscal institution alongside EMU’s monetary institution, is 
that a second best to political unification had to be found to avoid too 
divergent economic policies and the resulting internal imbalances that 
divergent paths would have led to. The road of fiscal policy coordination 
was hence explored as an immediate alternative and as a substitute to a 
fiscal and political union: ‘the project of achieving fiscal union through 
coordination remained alive’ (Pisani-Ferry, 2006: 825). 
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When looking at fiscal policy coordination arrangements it is 
important to distinguish between the fiscal policy coordination 
‘technology’, i.e. rules, technocratic discretion or a common economic 
policy institution, and the fiscal policy coordination ‘actor’, i.e. multiple 
or single actors. In line with the Maastricht spirit of a minimalistic 
approach to fiscal powers centralization, the type of coordination 
adopted in Europe was a rules-based coordination system. Both in 
Maastricht and thereafter, rules have been preferred as a coordination 
device to bind Member State commitments and to hold fiscal policy spill-
overs in check. With the exception of monetary policy, sovereign states 
retained large discretion in designing and implementing their domestic 
economic policies. However, their behaviour was made subject to a series 
of EU level rules – the no bail-out clause and the Stability and Growth 
Pact – aimed at ‘ensuring that negative spillovers are contained’ (Wieser, 
2018: 4). 
Another distinctive trait of EMU was its fiscal policy coordination 
‘actor’ choice. Following the Maastricht decision not to create any 
economic policy institution, the key economic policy functions were 
kept at the Member State level while some coordination tasks were 
attributed to the Commission, the ECOFIN and, in a second step, to the 
Eurogroup. The few existing economic policy coordination tasks were 
thus fragmented among a plurality of actors. They were deliberately not 
concentrated in the hands of a single institution. The ECOFIN Council 
was expected to act both as a forum for the coordination of economic 
policies and as the formal legislator on economic and financial affairs 
for the European Union. The European Commission was tasked with 
the mandate of monitoring economic developments and was entrusted 
with the proposal of sanctions to be adopted by the ECOFIN while 
the ECB was empowered with the conduct of EMU’s monetary policy. 
Crisis management instruments did by and large not exist (Sapir and 
Schoenmaker, 2017). When those instruments and mechanisms were 
finally created during the euro crisis, the ‘centrifugal’ (Dehousse, 1997) 
delegation pattern was confirmed and institutional fragmentation was 
accentuated. 
To sum up, the Maastricht fiscal policy coordination approach was 
made up on the one hand of central rules which ensured that negative 
spill-overs among member states sharing a currency would be held in 
check. On the other hand, EMU’s thin central coordination powers were 
fragmented among several economic policy actors.  Given the magnitude 
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of the sovereignty transfers that the simultaneous creation of a monetary 
centre and of a fully-fledged fiscal centre would have implied, such a 
Monet-like, incremental (see also Wieser in this edition), craftsman-style 
approach seemed rather reasonable. With hindsight, such a second best 
solution proved however ineffective and short-sighted.
3. EMU’s fiscal policy coordination model is tumbling
Over the last 25 years, Europe has been the laboratory of a distinctive 
fiscal policy coordination model. This large-scale experiment by and 
large failed, both in terms of the choice of ‘technology’ and in terms of 
the choice of ‘actor’.
Although it appeared as much less intrusive a solution for Treaty 
designers, the Maastricht rules-based surveillance technology has proven 
to entail dangerous features too (Hinarejos, 2013). The original model as 
well as the more recent reforms pushed regulatory integration to its most 
extreme retrenchment: ‘new and more detailed provisions were added 
with the aim of limiting national fiscal policy discretion’ (Larch and 
Braendle, 2018: 268). Fiscal policy coordination has been strengthened 
and expanded with the adoption of the Six Pack and the 2 Pack (Laffan 
and Schlosser, 2016). With the creation of the European Semester and 
of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure, rules-based surveillance 
has even spilled-over to economic policy coordination more broadly. 
Overall, rules have been made more complete and more specific in the 
hopes, at the time, that these reforms would enhance rule enforcement. 
However, this approach disempowered national economic policy actors 
and ensured that they now feel increasingly ‘baby-sitted’ (Pisani-Ferry, 
2018) by Brussels. Put differently, ‘the EU essentially took upon itself the 
task of preventing national economic policy mistakes’ (Saarenheimo, 
2018: 2; Leino and Saarenheimo, 2017). 
Another corollary of the above reforms was that fiscal rules have 
become so complex that, as of today, they can only be operationalized 
through the expert interpretation2 of the European Commission. In other 
words, a complete contract approach to rules-based coordination has led 
to the advent of central technocratic discretion and an unenforced system: 
‘the SGP has become fairly complex and enforcement ultimately clashes 
2 Jean Pisani Ferry recently argued that ‘the 224-page vademecum on implementing 
fiscal discipline in the EU is hopelessly complex, to such a degree that no finance 
minister, let alone parliamentarian, fully understands what his or her country must 
abide by’ (JPF, 2018b) 
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with the sovereignty of the Member States’ (Larch and Braendle, 2018: 
280).  The unintended consequence of the Maastricht fiscal coordination 
choice was thus that fiscal powers have been ‘centralized through the 
backdoor of coordination’ (Saarenheimo, 2018). 
The existence of a plurality of actors in charge of fiscal policy 
coordination in EMU has equally led to some tension. A second 
unintended consequence of Maastricht was indeed a ‘centrifugal’ 
(Dehousse, 1997) institutional dynamic at play in EMU. Looking at one 
example of fiscal powers, crisis management, Enderlein and Haas (2015: 
8) explain that ‘there are too many actors involved in crisis management 
negotiations’ (Enderlein and Haas, 2015: 8) while ‘no one seems to be 
fully in charge’ (Enderlein and Haas, 2015: 8).  Similarly, the 4 Presidents 
report on the EMU and the 5 Presidents Report on Completing Future of 
EMU have highlighted that considerations over EMU’s design lie close to 
the heart of many European institutions but also that EMU misses a clear 
executive voice. This situation echoes the debate in the early EMU days 
about who Mr. (or Ms) Euro is. Is it the President of the European Central 
Bank? The President of the Eurogroup? Or the European Commissioner 
in charge of EMU? Moreover, further fragmentation has been provided 
by the recent Commission Juncker reform which ushered in the creation 
of a Vice-President in charge of EMU while preserving a Commissioner 
in charge of economic and financial affairs. 
While attempts are being made within the Commission and within 
the Euro Working Group to put the genie back into the bottle (e.g. by 
simplifying the Stability and Growth Pact rules), there is no mistaking 
the reality that only a radical choice can restore a clear division of fiscal 
powers between the centre and the periphery. One should thus confront 
the reality that the model of fiscal policy coordination chosen in Maastricht 
has ran its course. Only a Treaty revision can undo the Maastricht logic 
and provide a more symmetric EMU as well as a genuinely alternative 
fiscal integration model. Yet, the package on deepening EMU brought 
forward by the Commission in December 2017 is explicitly based on the 
premises that Treaty reform is not an option at this stage (EC, 2017 a). 
As such, it aims at fixing Maastricht’s unintended consequences – and 
the even messier consequences of the crisis – by resorting to secondary 
law instruments and ad hoc political arrangements. But is this feasible or 
desirable?
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4. The idea of a European Finance Minister: a path-
breaking institutional innovation – The political issue
On 6 December 2017 the European Commission presented its 
package on Deepening the Economic and Monetary Union (EC, 2017 a). 
It entails a number of measures deemed necessary to completing EMU 
and strengthening its democratic accountability. Measures proposed 
include:
• The creation of a European Monetary Fund as a successor to the 
European Stability Mechanism
• Integrating the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance 
(the so called Fiscal Compact) into the Union legal framework, 
• New budgetary instruments with a stabilisation function 
that can be used by Member States under certain conditions, 
the possibility to mobilise EU funds in support of national 
reforms and a strengthening of the Structural Reform Support 
Programme; (ROADMAP) and finally
• The creation of a European Finance Minister
It is interesting to note that the most prominent proposals of the package 
such as the design of a fiscal backstop and the evolutionary transformation 
of the ESM into an EMF appear as largely path-dependent solutions 
aiming to consolidate the reforms undertaken during the euro crisis. By 
contrast, the idea of constituting a European finance minister is path-
breaking as it would move away both from the past Maastricht-style fiscal 
surveillance model and from the reforms adopted during the euro crisis. 
This step would probably fall under what Saarenheimo terms in this issue, 
the ‘new and qualitatively different territory’ (Saarenheimo, 2018: 1) and 
would thus amount to a constitutional change. Whereas it can be argued 
that the other proposals are necessary to integrate and streamline the sets 
of measures adopted during the crisis, there is no intrinsic necessity in 
the ex nihilo creation of a European Finance Minister. This is the reason 
why this contribution focuses on this new, path-breaking institutional 
arrangement, assessing it from both a political and a legal perspective.    
In the words of the Commission, the proposal to create a Finance 
Minister aims at increasing the coherence, effectiveness and transparency 
of EU economic policy-making (EC, 2017b: 1)3. The Finance Minister 
3 It has to be noted that the proposed creation of a European Finance Minister is no 
legislative proposal, as it takes the form of a Communication, a non-legislative in-
strument (EC, 2017b). 
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would combine existing functions at the EU level, simplifying the EMU 
governance and streamlining decision-making procedures. To do so she 
would be at the same time a member (possibly a Vice-President) of the 
Commission and a permanent Chair of the Eurogroup. In reality, the 
Finance Minister would altogether cumulate three different ‘hats’ as she 
would also be the Chair of the ESM’s (or indeed the EMF’s) Board of 
Governors. The responsibilities of the Finance Minister would include 
strengthened policy coordination and oversight of economic, fiscal 
and financial rules, centralised management of euro-area budgetary 
instruments (e.g. support for structural reform) and oversight of the 
work of the European Monetary Fund (once established). 
In many respects the proposal addresses Maastricht’s unintended 
consequences, by centralising the functions, powers and responsibility 
for fiscal governance in the hands of a single person, thereby   creating a 
political counterpart to the monetary power of the ECB. Interestingly, the 
Commission justifies the creation of such a position with arguments that 
very strongly echo the concerns presented earlier in this paper about the 
plurality of actors and the complexity of EMU institutional arrangements: 
‘compared to monetary policy, which is unified for euro area Member 
States and easily identified by citizens, fiscal policy is essentially managed 
by individual Member States and coordination efforts at EU and euro 
area level are conducted by many actors’ (EC, 2017b: 1). The Commission 
goes on in stressing that such institutional patchwork ‘has led to complex 
decision-making processes, which have often been criticized for not 
being sufficiently understandable and efficient’ (EC, 2017b: 1). 
However the idea proposed by the Commission is halfway between 
a political and a technocratic response to EMU’s shortcomings. Per 
definition, the position of Minister is of a political nature. Undoubtedly 
there is a political ambition behind the Commission’s initiative, which 
intends to strengthen the democratic basis of EMU, especially against the 
background of deep disaffection and dissatisfaction of EU citizens for the 
Brussels-centric management of the Eurozone. Entrusting EMU affairs to 
a centralised figure that can be held responsible and accountable in front 
of the European Parliament and the Council would possibly increase the 
public acceptance of EU action in this field. Yet, the tasks and functions 
attributed to the new Minister are by and large of a technocratic nature. 
They answer to the need of centralising the management of EMU affairs 
– fiscal surveillance above all – in the hands of technocratic experts. At 
the end of the day the Finance Minister would still be a Commission’s 
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member and would as such perform his duties in full independence 
and neutrality.  It is hard to see in how far the political mandate of the 
new Minister would be any different from that of other Commissioners. 
Assigning different hats to a Finance Minister will reduce the number of 
presidents chairing institutions and agencies currently executing fiscal 
tasks. However, it will not lead to a reduction of the high number of these 
institutions and agencies. It is fallacious to believe that by creating a new, 
permanent position the deficiencies of the current fiscal regime would 
magically dissolve.
To sum up, the Commission’s attempt to step away from technocratic 
governance runs the risk to end up being a renewed technocratic solution 
with a semblance of democratic and political legitimacy, as the political 
mandate is missing, or at least highly controversial. Such a path-breaking 
innovation does not find any basis in the EMU architecture agreed in 
Maastricht and would therefore require a revision of the Treaties in order 
to be fully legitimate. In the absence of a thorough rethinking of the legal 
and democratic foundation of EMU, the Minister position risks being an 
empty shell for what looks like a new technocratic arrangement through 
the backdoor. 
In the next section, we argue that also from a legal perspective such a 
reform would require Treaty change. 
5. Institutional Implications of the proposal: compatibility 
with the Treaties – The legal issue
In the introduction to the Communication on the European Finance 
Minister, the Commission states that the Finance Minister shall be 
created within the current EU legal framework: ‘in particular, the 
Communication describes the added value of an ultimate merger of 
the function of Commission Vice-President in charge of the Economic 
and Monetary Union with that of President of the Eurogroup, and it 
highlights that this could already be achieved under the existing Union 
Treaties’ (EC, 2017b: 2). Undoubtedly the Commission is well aware 
of the difficulty – almost impossibility – to agree on a Treaty reform in 
the short run and is keen on advancing institutional reform that can 
remain within the Treaty boundaries. It inserts the Finance Minister in 
the continuity of the reform of the Commission’s college implemented 
by Commission President Juncker at the beginning of his mandate, 
which strengthened among others the role of the Vice President in 
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charge of EMU policy coordination. In this respect the increasing 
powers attributed to Vice-Presidents under the Juncker Commission and 
the growing importance of EMU related matters would represent first 
steps in the direction of creating a dedicated post (EC, 2014). Yet, the 
changes contained in the Commission’s proposal are far-reaching and 
bear significant consequences for the EU institutional architecture. As 
such, they should take more seriously into account the constitutional 
constraints of the Treaties.
In our opinion, the arguments put forward by the proposal in order 
to avoid Treaty changes are not entirely convincing.4 According to the 
Commission, the merging of the positions of Commission member and 
Eurogroup chair does not require Treaty revision because the rules for 
electing the President of the Eurogroup are not in principle incompatible 
with the position being taken up by a member of the Commission. 
Protocol n° 14 on the Eurogroup, annexed to the Treaties, only states 
that “The Ministers of the Member States whose currency is the euro 
shall elect a President for two and a half years, by a majority of those 
Member States”5. Thus, as the Commission points out, Eurogroup 
Ministers would only have to change their Working Methods, which 
currently foresee that the President shall be a national Finance Minister. 
No other impediment seems to exist: “The Minister would not create a 
new supranational bureaucratic layer, nor would the Minister impinge on 
national competences” (EC, 2017b: 5).
This might well be true in relation to the role and governance of 
the Eurogroup. But what about the Commission? In a rather enigmatic 
formulation, the proposal comments on the compatibility between 
Commission’s and Eurogroup’s tasks, declaring that: ‘the Commission 
participates in the work of the Eurogroup, as is foreseen in Protocol n° 14 
to the Treaties. Art. 17(1) TEU lays down the mission of the Commission 
to promote the common interest of the Union, which it does in all its 
activities. It is thus Union primary law that makes it clear that there is no 
incompatibility between the tasks of a Member of the Commission and 
involvement in the work of the Eurogroup’ (EC, 2017b: 7).  Arguably, 
however, there is a sizeable difference between “being involved” in 
4 On a similar note, Enderlein and Haas (2015) support the idea of creating a ‘dou-
ble-hatted’ European Finance Minister yet they admit that such a change “would re-
quire a change of the European Treaties”. 
5 Treaty on European Union - Protocol (No 14) on the Euro Group, Official Journal 115, 
09/05/2008 P. 0283 – 0283
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the work of the Eurogroup and presiding over it. Whereas the former 
is unproblematic from a primary law perspective, it may well be the 
case that taking up the Chairmanship of the Eurogroup might require 
further adjustments. It is no coincidence that institutional changes of 
this kind and magnitude have in the past been agreed during Treaty 
negotiations. The obvious precedent for this institutional reform, the 
creation of the position of the High Representative for Foreign Policy, 
who is Vice-President of the Commission and permanent Chair of the 
Foreign Affairs Council, was notoriously agreed by Treaty revision and 
its role and functions are now clearly spelled out in the Treaties. It is 
curious that no mention to the High Representative is to be found in the 
Commission’s communication on the Finance Minister. Is the omission a 
simple oversight or a deliberate and strategic choice? 
Be that as it may, we believe that the proposed creation of the 
European Finance Minister would have significant consequences on the 
internal balance of the college and would run counter to the principle of 
collegiality, which informs the whole Commission’s decision-making. Art. 
17.6 TEU states that the Commission should act efficiently, consistently 
and collegially under the guide of its President. The introduction of an 
EMU Vice-President who would also be the Eurogroup President will 
likely greatly affect the power balance within the college. Contrary 
to foreign policy, which remains solidly in the hands of the Member 
States, we are dealing here with core Union competences in which the 
Commission’s powers have been continuously growing in importance. 
Especially when it comes to budgetary supervision, the Commission 
is already performing very sensitive tasks and enjoys a great deal of 
autonomy in managing these tasks. The transformation brought about by 
the merging of both Commission’s and Eurogroup’s functions will distort 
the internal collegial decision-making of the Commission. Internal 
decisions of the college on issues pertaining to key EU competences will 
need to be shared with another, external institution. The leverage of the 
college, and possibly of the Commission’s President himself, on the new 
super Minister will arguably be limited. 6
6 For further consequences of the creation of the Finance Minister position for the EU 
inter-institutional balance see Patrin, 2018.
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6. Interpretation and Conclusion
The Commission proposal to create a European Finance Minister, because 
of its potentially enormous ramifications on the EU polity, constitutes a 
path-breaking idea that deserves the full attention of policy-makers and 
expert observers alike.  The full implications, as we argued, can only be 
understood when put into the context of a path-breaking shift from a 
Maastricht-like fiscal policy coordination model to a fiscal federalist 
model that relies on the creation of a central economic policy authority 
of some form. 
Some have argued that ‘no deal is better than a bad deal’ when it 
comes to euro area reform (Bofinger, 2018). Yet, at times, no agreement 
is better than second best agreements when those dramatically affect 
the relationship between the members of a community and risk altering 
the very nature of the community. The fact that ‘second best theory that 
half-way progress sometime leads to inferior outcomes’ (Pisani-Ferry, 
2006: 835) should caution sceptics against other second best options to 
the design of EMU.  Münchau, for one, strongly argues in this edition, 
that ‘it is the best course of action for the Eurozone not to undertake half-
hearted reforms right now’ (Münchau, 2018: 1).  
In our opinion, a sound and sustainable EMU can only be achieved via 
an ambitious institutional reform that would consist in the constitutional 
creation of a formal fiscal institution.7  The neo-functional logic that 
characterized the single market integration when applied to EMU 
seems to be failing and should, in our view, not be applied to core state 
powers. The creation of a Finance Minister, instead of offering a clear-cut 
solution to fiscal policy coordination in EMU, amounts to continuing the 
inconclusive middle way of a combination between rules and technocratic 
discretion. This doesn’t bode well at all for the future stability of EMU 
and for the sustainability of Europe’s domestic democracies.
In this respect, the Commission’s Communication raises a fundamental 
constitutional issue. The insistence on the fact that the position does not 
require Treaty change points to a deep mistrust towards the constitutional 
foundations of the Union. Treaties are viewed as a constraint. However, 
7 In his paper N. Xanthoulis argues that “For a Union finance Minister to have more 
than a de minimis impact on economic policy formulation and implementation, its 
title must be accompanied with the transfer of substantial powers to the EU level. 
[…] the Minister’s position must be coupled with the real centralisation of fiscal poli-
cy and an effective accountability regime that would provide the required democrat-
ic legitimacy”, Xanthoulis (2018) 24. 
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the constitutional value of the Treaties lies in their authority to 
distribute power and to attribute functions to the Union’s institutions. 
Admittedly, the Commission’s proposal for a European Minister of 
Finance precisely aims to change the inter-institutional distribution of 
powers and functions, without any constitutional mandate and in the 
name of “further strengthening democratic accountability” (EC, 2017b: 
1). However, by bypassing the key democratic tool of the Union, the 
Treaties, the proposal risks undermining the EU democratic foundations 
rather than strengthening it. It does so by reverting to technocratic 
arrangements and structures to provide a political response to the many 
shortcomings that we inherited from the post-Maastricht era. This is why 
we believe that, should EU leaders ultimately decide to implement the 
Commission proposal, it should be conducted via Treaty change, not 
through the back-door of covert and technocratic institutional change. In 
sum, the proposed creation of a European Finance Minister corresponds 
exactly to the type of institutional capacity-building measure that would 
tilt the balance of the current – admittedly ineffective and flawed – fiscal 
policy coordination model towards fiscal federalism. It would constitute 
a central fiscal authority. Yet, it is quintessential when designing a 
new political authority that the process through which this authority 
originates is legitimate. The institutional engineering of the euro crisis 
period makes one worry about a technocratic temptation. 
In this light, we therefore strongly argue in favour of democratic fiscal 
federalism solutions and strongly against technocratic fiscal federalism, 
especially when this happens as a hidden result of the alleged attempt to 
strengthen democratic legitimacy and accountability. Only by his name, 
the position of a Finance Minister echoes strong political mandate and 
democratic basis (Xanthoulis 2018). His main EU function, however, 
would consist in centralising the technocratic management of EMU 
affairs. This sounds like a dangerous solution, especially against the 
background of current political contestation at the national level and 
growing populism threatening the mere existence of the European 
Union. If EMU is to be made symmetric and complete, there is no way 
around Treaty change to create a European fiscal institution. 
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